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Chapter 1
Introduction
Social policies that are designed directly to improve the well-being of the poor have become in-
creasingly popular throughout the global South (Honorati et al., 2015). International organizations
such as the World Bank regard such policies as a key factor to development, as is reflected by
their push to increase the number of affordable social protection systems in low-income countries
(World Bank, 2012). Similarly, the first goal of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals agenda
includes the objective to ensure social protection for the poor and vulnerable and to increase
access to basic services.1 Social protection programs −also known as Social Safety Nets− go be-
yond normal emergency relief and look to to offer individuals effective protection against adverse
economic shocks, encourage investments in human capital and improve people’s ability to access
jobs (Devereux and Sharp, 2006). Hence, social protection programs might work as a valuable
complement to income-driven economic development and have the potential to break up poverty
traps (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Alternatively, Sen (1988) provides a more intrinsic motivation
by regarding social policies and economic development as similar means to reach fundamental
achievements of individual well-being such as ‘being in good health’ or ‘being educated’.
The outreach of social protection programs has increased remarkably over the last two decades
and today they involve more than 1.9 billion people in roughly 130 low- and middle-income coun-
tries (Honorati et al., 2015). Most of these programs are funded as social policies by national or
subnational governments, and there is a high degree of variation in their implementation (Banerjee
and Duflo, 2011). Instruments are manifold, including cash transfers (both conditional and uncon-
1Retrieved from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sustainabledevelopmentgoals on June 23, 2017.
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ditional in nature), public works or school feeding programs, and social insurance schemes. Today,
almost every Latin American country runs a conditional cash transfer program, while the large
rural populations in sub-Saharan African countries rely mostly on public works and unconditional
cash transfer programs (World Bank, 2014). In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of unconditional
cash transfers has increased remarkably, from 21 in 2010 to 40 in 2014 (Honorati et al., 2015). In
addition to program outreach, substantial heterogeneity in program quality prevails. In low- and
lower-middle income countries, on average, only one-quarter of the 20 percent poorest people are
covered by a social protection scheme (Honorati et al., 2015). Figure 1.1 illustrates that program
coverage of the poor varies substantially across both region and program type. Overall, no region
is able to to cover more than 60 percent of the poor with any type of program. With about 40
percent of households covered by at least one social insurance scheme, the East Asia and Pacific
region clearly outperforms the remaining four regions of the globe, which show an average coverage
of about 8 percent.2 On the other hand, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where most of the
global poor live, generally, show the severest gaps in coverage overall.
Figure 1.1: Coverage of social protection and labor (SPL) programs by region
Source: Taken from Honorati et al. (2015, p.46). sfsfksjf sfskjfks sdkfjskjfs sdflsdfs sjkfhjshfsd sfsjhfsf skfjsdkfjsa
Notes: Poor households are defined as those in the poorest quintile of countries’ respective consumption/income
distribution. Aggregate statistics are based on countries with information on social safety net programs (105
countries). Regions: EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America
and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
In my dissertation I shall focus on the two main reasons for low program coverage in low-income
countries. The first reason lies in governments’ limited abilities to accurately target the popula-
2Fairly high social safety net coverage in the first four regions (from the left to the right) is mainly driven by
relatively high enrollment into cash transfer schemes (Honorati et al., 2015).
−2−
tion’s poorest people in the first place. As a second reason, most of the social protection schemes
are voluntary and face relatively low enrollment rates on the part of eligible households. These two
problems are especially pronounced for welfare programs that are implemented in sub-Saharan
Africa. A large fraction of the predominantly rural poor population in this area lacks access to el-
ementary formal institutions and markets (Gertler and Gruber, 2002). It instead depends heavily
on informal household- and community-based networks such that newly introduced social policies
are met with skepticism (World Bank, 2004). In their recent book on safety nets in sub-Saharan
Africa, Del Ninno and Mills (2015, p.3) observe that successful program implementation in this
area is most severely hampered by ineffective targeting, which they broadly describe as ”defining
the rule and practice for allocating benefits to the most needy members of society”. In line with
this pattern, Monchuk (2013) observes that in many African countries safety net coverage of the
poor is still low, heavily dependent on external donor support, and often temporary in nature.3
Apart from these implementation concerns, the amount of data availability and the emergence
of sophisticated evaluation designs have remarkably improved our understanding about ‘whether’
and ‘in which circumstance’ social policies work, and work best (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). The
evolution of J-PAL, a network of scientists that focuses on randomized evaluations and policy
outreach in the global South, reflects this trend. Established in 2003, J-PAL counted 240 ongoing
or completed randomized evaluations by 2010 and has increased this number by a factor of 3.5 in
the seven following years.4 Latin America and the Caribbean, the pioneer region in embedding
large-scale anti-poverty programs in experimental evaluation designs, accounted for one-third of
all rigorously conducted impact evaluations in the world between 2000 and 2010. With 37 im-
pact evaluations between 2010 and 2015, sub-Saharan Africa was shown to be the most-heavily
evaluated region in recent years (Honorati et al., 2015). When reviewing the evidence, Honorati
et al. (2015) further find that most social policies are effective in reducing consumption poverty
and that recent impact evaluations confirm the positive effects on human development outcomes
such as education, health and nutrition.
Given their huge potential for reduction of global poverty, the objective of improving coverage
of social policies −especially in sub-Saharan Africa− appears even more pressing. The three parts
of this dissertation evaluate different components of a social protection scheme in West Africa,
3 On the other hand, there are signs that safety nets are taking hold as a core poverty reduction instrument
in Africa as well. Monchuk (2013) finds that the implementation of systematic nation-wide safety nets features
prominently on many governments’ agendas. Rwanda, Kenya, and Tanzania emerged as a first set of countries
which developed national social protection systems (Del Ninno and Mills, 2015)
4Retrieved from https://www.povertyactionlab.org/ on June 24, 2017 and Banerjee and Duflo (2011).
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specifically, a voluntary micro-health insurance that has started operating in northwestern Burkina
Faso in 2004. Since 2007 poor households in the area can purchase health insurance at a 50 percent
discount. I analyze both the underlying method applied to target poor households and the effects
of the subsidy offer on health insurance take-up. The targeting procedure in the present context
directly involved local communities to identify beneficiary households. While being widely applied
in the field, only a few studies have systematically evaluated the accuracy or potential flaws of
so-called Community-Based Targeting (CBT). Pricing of social insurance, on the other hand, is
considered to be an important instrument to increase enrollment among poor liquidity-constrained
households. For a relatively poor country in sub-Saharan Africa, this work thus provides novel
empirical evidence on both the supply and demand side factors that are eminent to increase
coverage of social policies.
A social program’s primary targeting objective is to minimize the exclusion of poor households
(exclusion error). Universal targeting achieves this goal but, at the same time, maximizes the num-
ber of non-poor households covered by the program (inclusion error). A limited program budget
thus introduces a trade-off in the choice of the targeting quota (that is the share of households
covered by the program). A higher targeting quota reduces the exclusion error, but comes at the
cost of potentially smaller program effects, leaving a smaller benefit per capita for poor recipients
(Del Ninno and Mills, 2015). The program’s second crucial choice at the stage of targeting lies in
the choice of a suitable method to identify the target group. In low-income countries, where ad-
ministrative data on households’ incomes (’means’) are typically unavailable, targeting of welfare
programs tends to rely on statistical procedures processing suitable proxies of households’ means
in a Proxy-Means Test (PMT) (Brown et al., 2016). Alternatively, targeting may be decentralized
through Community-Based Targeting (CBT), where the choice of beneficiaries is delegated to local
communities (Ravallion, 2003).5 Both statistical and decentralized targeting methods have their
pros and cons, so that from a policymaker’s perspective each approach may be chosen on reasonable
grounds. Existing studies mention the superior cost-effectiveness (Chambers, 1994b) and higher
satisfaction rates (Alatas et al., 2012; Schu¨ring, 2014) as two advantages of community-based over
5In addition, there are three more commonly applied targeting methods. First, categorical targeting determines
beneficiaries with respect to one single −commonly survey-based− indicator (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2015). Second,
targeting based on self-selection introduces dis-incentives for the non-poor to enroll (Alatas et al., 2013b). Old-
age pensions in South Africa (where ‘age’ is the relevant category variable) and a minimum wage used in India’s
national work employment guarantee scheme, NREGA, are examples for categorical targeting and self-selection,
respectively. Third, geographic targeting uses the location of households’ residences to assign them to geographical
units that may differ in program eligibility or at least program insensitivity (Ravallion, 1993). Geographic targeting
is commonly combined with both community-based (Alatas et al., 2012) and statistical (Bigman et al., 2000; Karlan
and Thuysbaert, 2016) targeting.
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statistical targeting methods. In addition, local participative assessments are found to consider
more poverty dimensions than merely consumption (Alatas et al., 2012; Van Campenhout, 2007)
and to improve local ownership and sustainability of the underlying program (Robertson et al.,
2014). On the downside, it has been often argued that decentralization of political decision making
is susceptible to capture by local elites (Conning and Kevane, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2006). In contrast, PMT-based targeting is the more objective and replicable procedure, which
can avoid potential principal-agent problems (Ravallion, 1993). Hence, if a central government
aims to retain control over the targeting procedure, preference will likely be given to statistical
methods. In a comprehensive review of targeted anti-poverty interventions throughout the global
South, Coady et al. (2004b) find that statistical and decentralized targeting methods are sim-
ilarly often employed. They conclude, however, that ”(t)here is little documented evidence on
community-based targeting as compared to other methods (Coady et al., 2004b, p.59).”
In my dissertation, I consider a program that has applied community-based targeting in com-
munities of northwestern Burkina Faso to test empirically two main hypotheses of the aforemen-
tioned debate; (i) CBT’s superior cost-effectiveness and (ii) its susceptibility to elite capture. In
the first part of this dissertation (chapter 3), I conduct a comparative targeting accuracy as-
sessment for ‘my’ CBT and four common methods of statistical targeting. Based on a rigorous
cost-effectiveness analysis, this study provides the first empirical test of the prominent hypothesis
that decentralized targeting outperforms statistical targeting when targeting accuracy is evaluated
with respect to underlying program cost (Chambers, 1994b; Mayoux and Chambers, 2005; Coady
et al., 2004b; Conning and Kevane, 2002).
The second part of my dissertation (chapter 4) employs self-collected information on the local
targeting committees to test empirically for the presence of elite capture within the community-
based targeting procedure. The anxiety of elite capture occurring in decentralized targeting is
rooted in the general concern −among scholars and practitioners alike− that decentralization
enables local leaders to dominate and corrupt community-planning and governance (Dasgupta
and Beard, 2007; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). An early argument for elite capture is that
local leaders tend to dominate community decision making (Dreze and Sen, 1989), which might
be facilitated both by severe power imbalances among local participants (Platteau and Gaspart,
2003) or assortative matching of elitist households into local committees (Arcand and Fafchamps,
2012; Baird et al., 2013). While statistical targeting procedures are not immune to manipula-
−5−
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tion neither (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Niehaus and Atanassova, 2013), there seems to be
an especially widespread notion about the proneness of decentralized targeting to elite capture
(Conning and Kevane, 2002). Nevertheless, the few existing empirical studies suggest that this
perception might be unwarranted (Alatas et al., 2013a), especially within programs that encourage
local participation without relying on constituted local governments (Mansuri and Rao, 2013).6
One common manifestation of elite capture is favoritism which constitutes an in-group bias in the
political leader’s allocation decision (Bramoulle´ and Goyal, 2016).7 My main interest lies in ethnic
favoritism where coethnic households benefit from public policy decisions. At the central level,
ethnic favoritism has been identified as a major driver of public policy distortions, especially in
sub-Saharan African countries (Burgess et al., 2015; Dreher et al., 2016; De Luca et al., 2016).
The empirical analysis in chapter 4 provides the first attempt to estimate the extent to which
ethnic favoritism distorts public allocation decisions at the most decentralized level.
After having addressed two important issues that arise at the stage of poverty targeting, chapter
5 examines the effectiveness of a 50 percent price reduction in encouraging health insurance take-
up among the poor. The expansion of access to formal health insurance in low-income countries
is a high priority on the global, as well as on many national, poverty reduction agendas (see, for
instance, the third Sustainable Development Goal of the UN’s 2030 agenda). Most of the poor
in low-income countries face enormous risks in falling ill and, at the same time, can only rely on
limited informal means to deal with the corresponding income shocks (Gertler and Gruber, 2002).
In response, Social Health Insurance schemes that are adapted to the local needs of the poor have
emerged as a main cornerstone to improve universal health coverage (Bernal et al., 2016). This
trend is reflected by the surge in voluntary subnational micro-health insurance programs over
the last decade. Nevertheless, in spite of their improved accessibility, voluntary health insurance
programs in low-income countries still face exceptionally low take-up rates, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa (Carrin and James, 2005; Bocoum et al., 2017). According to the literature, several
channels contribute to the lack of insurance demand by poor households in low-income countries,
including liquidity-constraints, a lack of trust in formal institutions and financial illiteracy (see
Eling et al., 2014 for a recent literature review). In line with these considerations, health insurers
6In their extensive review of about 500 studies on participatory development and decentralization, Mansuri
and Rao (2013) distinguish between ‘community development’ and ‘government decentralization’ as the two main
modes by which to induce local participation. They observe that many community-driven development projects
explicitly incorporate collective decision making elements to circumvent existing local leaders.
7 In addition to favoritism, elite capture is commonly measured in terms of direct personal enrichment by
political leaders, reflected by the embezzlement of public resources (Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Beekman et al., 2014)
or self-selection into beneficiary lists (Besley et al., 2012; Pan and Christiaensen, 2012).
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have started to experiment with enrollment-encouraging innovations targeted towards the poor
such as premium exemptions or discounts (see, national health insurance schemes in Colombia,
Peru, China, and Georgia), information packages (see Vietnam’s Health Care Fund for the Poor),
nudging (see SMS reminders in the Philippines’ National Health Insurance), or bundling with
microcredit products (see SKS Microfinance in India). This surge in innovative program design
provides a novel opportunity for careful impact evaluations to improve our understanding of health
insurance demand in low-income countries. Chapter 5 provides novel quasi-experimental evidence
on the impact of targeted health insurance subsidies on take-up.
In this dissertation, I follow three different empirical approaches to program evaluation. All of
them represent methods that are applied in the absence of randomized field experiments. Instead,
they are based on observational data and centered around a targeted health insurance subsidy
intervention that was conducted in 2009 in Nouna, an administrative department in northwestern
Burkina Faso. The underlying health insurance program was set-up in 2004, based on a collabo-
ration between the Centre de Recherche en Sante´ de Nouna (CRSN) and the Institute of Public
Health (IPH) from Heidelberg University. This partnership was also involved in extensive data
collection activities and produced a rich amount of individual and household level information. In
addition to a favorable data situation, in the way the community-based targeting was conducted
and documented, it represents a nice social quasi-experimental design. Combining the targeting
data with three independent data sources allows me to address three separate research questions.
In what follows, for each chapter of my dissertation, I explain the methodological approach ap-
plied, briefly discuss favorable features of the corresponding empirical setting, and summarize the
main findings.
Chapter 3 investigates which method, community-based or statistical targeting, targets con-
sumption poor households more accurately. The empirical analysis combines beneficiary lists from
the community targeting exercises with household survey data that include consumption as well
as indicators commonly applied for statistical targeting. I compare community-based targeting
with four frequently used statistical procedures, where my reference is a hypothetical targeting
outcome based on survey consumption. In addition, I study how the targeting accuracy of the
two families of methods compares across alternative specifications of statistical targeting, across
rural and semi-urban sectors, and across community characteristics. Finally, I employ targeting
cost data to evaluate the existence of a trade-off between CBT’s lower program costs on the one
−7−
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
hand and the econometric PMT’s higher accuracy on the other hand.
All statistical targeting indices under consideration contain the commonality that they are
calculated as weighted averages of potentially transformed proxy-means variables, while differing
along three dimensions, the set of indicators, the way these indicators are transformed into proxy-
variables, and the weights used to aggregate the proxy-variables into a single index. Accordingly,
I distinguish between four types of statistical targeting. First, the Econometric PMT is based
on a linear regression model, which typically employs a large number of indicators available in
census data (Brown et al., 2016). The indicators are usually not transformed and the weights
are obtained from a regression of consumption on proxy-means variables (Alatas et al., 2012;
Filmer and Scott, 2012; Klasen and Lange, 2014). Second, the weights can be obtained from the
joint distribution of the indicators themselves through Principal-Components Analysis, or PCA
for short (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). Such a PCA-based index is most frequently used to proxy
a household’s socio-economic status in the absence of consumption data and in economics, as well
as demography, it is often referred to as Asset index. Third, I consider two scorecards which rely
on a limited set of transformed indicators, India’s Below the Poverty Line scorecard (Sundaram,
2003) and the Poverty Scorecard Index, a targeting tool popular among practitioners (Schreiner,
2015). Finally, I calculate a Multidimensional Poverty Index following Alkire and Santos (2010).
In this approach all indicators are first transformed into binary deprivation indicators and the in-
dex equals a weighted deprivation count. As I only observe community-based targeting outcomes,
statistical targeting is applied in a hypothetical fashion. In particular, I ask how statistical tar-
geting performed in case one would have used the available survey data to implement it. Hence,
my first evaluation approach is a comparative targeting accuracy assessment based on ex-post
simulations of five statistical targeting methods and a consumption-based benchmark.
Relative to the literature, the empirical setting provides me with two favorable features. First,
community-based targeting interventions are especially common in rural settings (Chambers,
1994a) and it has been argued that they are poorly suited for wealth assessments in more urban-
ized environments (Coady et al., 2004a). The availability of detailed community-based targeting
outcomes for both rural and semi-urban communities allows me to test this argument quantita-
tively. Second, the targeting accuracy literature that compares statistical with community-based
targeting (Alatas et al., 2012; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2015; Karlan and Thuysbaert, 2016; Stoef-
fler et al., 2016) is relatively recent and variation in study designs challenges an easy comparison
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across studies. By considering a ‘pure’ CBT that is not combined with other targeting methods,
my assessment is most closely related to the seminal work by Alatas et al. (2012).
The main findings from my comparative targeting accuracy assessment in chapter 3 are four-
fold. First, community-based targeting is substantially less accurate than the econometric proxy-
means test but more accurate than several other common statistical targeting methods. It is
approximately as accurate as the best-performing statistical methods that do not rely on con-
sumption data for the construction of weights, the asset index and the Below the Poverty Line
scorecard. Second, relative to statistical methods, CBT performs slightly better in semi-urban
than in rural areas. Third, the accuracy of community-based targeting significantly worsens with
community size, which is not the case for any of the statistical methods. On the other hand, other
community characteristics, such as economic inequality, have identical effects on the accuracy of
CBT and the statistical methods. Finally, I find statistical targeting to be more cost-effective
than community-based targeting only for very large transfer amounts, exceeding 75 US Dollars
per household (not purchasing-power-parity adjusted, reference year 2014), which equals roughly
one hundred times the daily per capita national poverty line. Hence, for the benefits usually
encountered in welfare programs in low-income countries, community-based targeting is by far the
more cost-effective method in the sub-Saharan African context studied here. Moreover I find that
the less expensive statistical methods, which do not require consumption data for calibration, have
no cost-effectiveness advantage when community-based and econometric targeting are available to
the policy maker.
In practice, the targeting exercise evaluated here was undertaken by three local representatives
who received a targeting mandate from their community. My analysis in chapter 4 investigates
whether these local targeting committees disproportionally favored households from the same eth-
nic group when making a targeting choice. Such a test for elite capture makes necessary two types
of information. First, one needs to observe the ethno-religious affiliation of the representatives to
distinguish in-group from out-group households. Second, in an ideal data scenario, one would like
to have wealth information that perfectly predicts the committee’s unbiased targeting decision to
identify the distortion due to the in-group bias. To meet the first requirement, I went to the study
area in December 2015 to compile additional information on the representatives that allowed me
to identify them in a population census dataset, which I have merged with the targeting data.
In the merged dataset I observe the following three pieces of information at the household level;
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(i) wealth ranks and beneficiary status, (ii) ethnicity and ethnic affiliation to the three local repre-
sentatives, and (iii) a vector of socio-economic characteristics. With 50 variables, the latter covers
six different wealth dimensions, which makes me confident in capturing a satisfactory amount of
the variation in observable household wealth. Taken together, my empirical specification aims to
identify distortions in the decentralized allocation decision due to ethnic favoritism, conditional
on observable wealth and on possible wealth differences across ethnic groups. In this sense, the
second evaluation is based on an OLS regression framework to identify ethnic favoritism under
fairly weak identifying assumptions.
In addition to introducing a novel elite capture dimension, namely ethnic favoritism, the present
community-based targeting design comes with four favorable features to test for this phenomenon.8
First, it directly determines the political elite in the form of three locally appointed representa-
tives per community, who were instructed to determine the set of beneficiary households. The
choice of delegating authority to a set of representatives is common in participative development
programs (Mansuri and Rao, 2013) and by observing households’ ethnic affiliations I can directly
determine the political leaders’ in-group households without relying on more noisy self-reported
network measures (Comola and Fafchamps, 2017). Second, the targeting design requires each rep-
resentative to reveal independently his targeting preferences during the first step, which allows me
to test whether my results are driven by an unintended information-based kind of favoritism. The
latter hypothetically arises when representatives have superior unobserved information on coeth-
nic rather than on non-coethnic households. This separation problem is common to most of the
study designs in the elite capture literature but, so far, has received only little attention. Third,
the program benefit of consideration is a locally targeted but centrally administered small-stake
discount voucher. These two features reduce the scope for capture at the implementation stage,
which is an important second source of elite capture that occurs after the targeting step (Alatas
et al., 2013a; Niehaus and Atanassova, 2013). If at all, I would thus expect relevant allocation
distortions to take place at the targeting stage only. Fourth, the application of population data
allows me to identify ethnic majority groups and to calculate relevant community characteristics
such as ethnic diversity.
My test finds that local targeting committees in semi-urban communities favor households of
8The literature on elite capture in decentralized welfare programs has so far considered favoritism with respect
to relatives (Alatas et al., 2012, 2013a; Panda, 2015; Basurto et al., 2016), friends or coreligionists (Schu¨ring, 2014),
or politically connected households (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Caeyers and Dercon, 2012) but not along ethnic
lines.
−10−
their own ethnicity. Evidence against a potential information story is given by the finding that
local leaders similarly favor coethnic households in comparison with non-coethnic households that
are ethnically represented in the committee. While precisely estimated, the magnitude of the
distortion due to favoritism is modest. Expressed in terms of a targeting exclusion error, it leads
to a number of wrongly excluded non-represented households that is less than ten percent of all
beneficiary households. Finally, ethnic favoritism solely comes from allocation decisions made in
semi-urban ethnically diverse communities. This latter finding confirms a well established cross-
country relationship between ethnic diversity and political economy outcomes for the local level
(Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman,
2000; Alesina et al., 2003). In the present context, no evidence for favoritism is found with respect
to religion, which is only weakly correlated with household ethnicity. Finally, my results suggest
that the number of three representatives in relatively diverse semi-urban communities is too small
to prevent ethnic minority discrimination.
My third analysis, in chapter 5, mainly relies on the merging of targeting and health insurance
data and follows a quasi-experimental approach to program evaluation. The insurer’s arbitrary
choice of a 20 percent targeting quota introduces a discontinuity in the subsidy assignment rule
and allows me to use a ‘fuzzy’ regression discontinuity design (RDD) to identify causal effects
of the subsidy on insurance demand. Specifically, in each community the subsidy assignment is
mainly based on a comparison of three wealth rankings (aggregation rule) and ‘jumps’ at the
20 percent wealth threshold. Within a sufficiently close neighborhood around the threshold I
can plausibly assume that households are as good as randomized absent the subsidy (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009). Employing the wealth ranking data, I mimic the aggregation rule, which
is a very strong −albeit not perfect− predictor for final beneficiary status. My main empirical
specification then estimates the intent-to-treat effect of being selected by the aggregation rule on
take-up, which is a lower bound of the local average treatment effect. By exploiting variation in
average community wealth, I also examine heterogeneous effects of health insurance pricing along
the household wealth distribution. The data further allow me to estimate the effect of subsidy
eligibility on both dynamic and intra-household demand of health insurance. In addition, I test
for adverse selection into the health insurance by comparing average insurance claims of insured
households just above and below the subsidy threshold. In the presence of adverse selection, one
would expect, on average, that a price increase in the premium leads to a more risky pool of insured
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households when compared to the low price scenario. Thus, significantly different magnitudes of
insurance claims across both price groups would lead me to reject the null hypothesis that there
is no selection based on risk.
The fuzzy RDD rests on the identifying assumption that my outcome variable absent the in-
tervention must be continuous in the wealth-ranking-based forcing variable (Lee and Lemieux,
2010). This is a much weaker assumption than, for instance, with propensity score matching stud-
ies, which are widespread in the health insurance evaluation literature. The quasi-experimental
setting evaluated here also compares favorably to hypothetical willingness-to-pay-studies, which
can suffer from hypothetical bias and in which results strongly depend on the experimental set-up
(Stewart et al., 2002). In terms of intervention design, the 50 percent subsidy nicely complements
existing experimental designs that consider effects of much more extreme (25 and 100 percent)
price reductions.
Overall, I find an economically large effect of pricing on health insurance take-up for households
that can be regarded as poor by national standards. Specifically, semi-urban households around
the beneficiary cutoff increase their demand by almost a factor of five, from initially 7 to 34 percent,
when being offered a 50 percent price reduction. In contrast, the subsidy is far less effective for
rural households around the eligibility threshold, which can be regarded as ultra-poor in national
terms. Extrapolation of Engel Curves shows that an upward move in wealth by one quantile is
associated with an increase in take-up by a factor of 1.4 and 0.9 for households around the 20
and 80 wealth percentile, respectively. Nevertheless, I do not find evidence that the pricing effect
on take-up changes with wealth. At the intensive margin, the subsidy offer increases coverage
of adolescents relative to adults and narrows the enrollment gap between prime aged and elderly
household members in favor of the former. Finally, I find no statistical differences in average
insurance claims between subsidized and regularly insured households, which I take as evidence
against adverse selection.
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Empirical Setting
2.1 The Local Context
Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in the Sahel region of West Africa, sharing borders with Mali
in the north, Niger in the east and Benin, Togo, Ghana and Ivory Coast in the south (see Figure
2.1). The country’s population amounts to almost 20 million people and is currently growing at
an annual rate of three percent. Half of the population is below the age of 17 years and one-third
lives in urban or semi-urban areas. Burkina Faso gained independence from France in 1960 and
experienced first multi-party elections in the nineties. Former president Blaise Compaore governed
the country for more than 25 years and resigned at the end of 2014, following an uprising against
his attempt to change the constitution for his own advantage. The subsequent government interim-
phase included a failed coup and led to rescheduled national elections in November 2015 (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2017). Administratively, the country is divided into 13 regions which are
subdivided into 45 provinces and 351 departments. A decentralization reform in 2006 introduced
nationwide local elections, which were repeated in 2012 and 2016 (Lierl, 2017).
French, the official national language, is not widespread in rural areas. Instead, the three
main local languages, Moore´, Dioula, and Fufulde facilitate communication across more than 60
different ethnic groups. With a population share of 50 percent, the Mossi people represent the clear
majority, followed by the Fulani, the Gurma, the Bobo, the Gurunsi and the Senufo who account
for 4 to 8.5 percent, each (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). Overall, ethnic groups cohabit
peacefully within the country, reflected by a reconcilable approach in renaming it from Upper
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Figure 2.1: Location of the study site
Volta into Burkina Faso in 1984. Literally, the whole phrase means ‘land of the upright people’
and comprises components from the three main local languages (De Allegri, 2006). Muslims,
catholics, animists and protestants account for about 60, 23, 7 and 7 percent, respectively.
As a low-income country, Burkina Faso has experienced a fall in its poverty rate from 46 percent
in 2010 to 40 percent in 2014 (World Bank, 2017a; based on national poverty lines) and today
ranks fifth from the bottom in the UNDP Human Development Index. The incidence of poverty
in rural and urban areas is 48 and 14 percent, respectively. Human development indicators have
improved over the last decade but infant and maternal mortality rates of 43 and 400 per 100,000 live
births, respectively, are still above the average rate for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2017a).
The country’s weak health infrastructure is seen as an important impediment to development
and is reflected by a relatively low density of primary health care centers (Centre de Sante´ et de
Promotion Sociale; CSPS), the first contact points of the health system. Further supply problems
in this regard are absenteeism and a strong urban-bias in the allocation of medical staff (Ministere
de la Sante´, 2011). In 2014, the total amount spent on health care per capita per year was $35,
almost half of $60, the minimum amount recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO)
(World Bank, 2017b). The Ministry of Health states that by 2009 there was only one doctor per
14,000 inhabitants and one nurse per 3,700 inhabitants (Ministere de la Sante´, 2011). With no
country-wide statutory health insurance in place and a negligible private health insurance market,
Burkinabe´, as the citizens of Burkina Faso are called, usually pay for health care at the point of
service. About three quarters of private health expenditures are out-of-pocket expenditures which
are mostly spent on drugs (Ministere de la Sante´, 2011). By joining the WHO’s Universal Health
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Coverage Partnership in 2015, the government of Burkina Faso has recently committed itself to
establish a social health insurance system to provide improved financial risk protection.
The study area of this dissertation is the administrative department Nouna, depicted as dark
red area on the right-hand side map in Figure 2.1. Belonging to the Kossi province in northwestern
Burkina Faso, it is located approximately 300 km from the capital, Ouagadougou, and 100 km from
the boarder with Mali. At the time of this study, the department was inhabited by a population of
about 80,000 individuals of whom two-thirds live in villages and one third in and around the town
of Nouna, the only semi-urban area. The Marka or Dafing, the Bwaba, the Samo, the Mossi and the
Peulh represent the five main ethnic groups in the area and Dioula is the local ‘lingua franca’. The
country’s main four religions −Islam, Catholicism, Animism, Protestantism− are practiced in the
study area with Islam being the dominant religion (De Allegri, 2006). The majority of inhabitants
are farmers and primary subsistence crops include millet, corn, and sorghum (Fink et al., 2013).
The Nouna department belongs to the Boucle du Mouhoun region, which is relatively poor in
national terms. With a regional poverty rate of 60 percent, it is the largest regional contributor
to national poverty incidence (INSD, 2015). Health shocks were found to be a major cause of
poverty in the region (Belem et al., 2011). While informal risk sharing networks exist, illness is
traditionally rather seen as an individual problem (Sommerfeld et al., 2002).1
The Kossi province is administratively equivalent to the Nouna Health District, which, at the
time of our study, contained 34 primary health care centers and one district hospital within Nouna
town (Fink et al., 2013).2 The average distance to the next health care center amounts to about
ten kilometers, which is above the national average of 7.2 (Robyn et al., 2012b). Since 1989,
the Nouna department has been under demographic surveillance by the Centre de Recherche en
Sante´ de Nouna (CRSN), one of the country’s few research institutions that directly report to
the Burkinabe´ Ministry of Health. Figure 2.2 shows that the area under surveillance covers a
relatively sparsely populated area including 41 rural villages and Nouna town.
In addition to supply inadequacies, people in the study area show low demand for formal
health care. A 2004 conducted household survey revealed that among those who reported a
1Informal insurance schemes have been also found to perform particularly poorly in insuring health shocks in
other contexts. In Indonesia, consumption drops by 20 percent when a household member falls severely ill (Gertler
and Gruber, 2002). In the Philippines, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) found that village-based solidarity networks
perform worst in insuring non-fatal severe diseases.
2Health districts represent the most decentralized administrative unit of the country’s health system. Each
health district belongs to one of the 11 Regional Health Directorates and usually covers one district hospital and
several health care centers. In the Nouna health district, the government is the only provider of formal health care
(De Allegri, 2006).
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recently experienced illness only 20 percent visited a health care facility center, in comparison to
50 percent who applied self-medication (Dong et al., 2008). Seasonality in both income-generating
Figure 2.2: The survey site
Notes: Pins indicate village positions in the study area. Pin size corresponds with village size (except for Nouna
town, the circled pin). Created by the author with GPS Visualizer.
activities and malaria transmission are seen as one explanation for the lack of demand. Malaria is
the most frequently reported illness in the region and endemic during rainy season, between June
and October (Fink et al., 2013). Based on administrative health care utilization data from the
study area, Figure 2.3 illustrates this pattern. Between July and November the distribution of
health care facility visits by insured individuals shows regular and slightly increasing peaks over
time. It is also during rainy season when farmers heavily invest in agricultural inputs. Hence,
this period is characterized by both high household liquidity constraints and an increased risk of
falling ill (Sauerborn et al., 1996).
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of health care facility visits over time
Source: Administrative data from the health insurer in the study area (see Section 2.3).
Notes: The graph depicts the distribution of individual health care visits over the years 2007 to 2010 for the
subpopulation of insured individuals. In addition to the histogram, a kernel density estimate (epanechnikov) is
added for smoothing. CSPS = Centre de Sante´ et de Promotion Sociale (health care facility center).
2.2 Targeted Subsidized Health Insurance in Nouna
After a decade of very limited success with ad-hoc health insurance programs in the country, in
early 2000 the Burkinabe´ Ministry of Health was interested in promoting the establishment of
a health insurance scheme at a larger scale. The idea was to first set up a pilot intervention at
the department level in order to allow for a rigorous program evaluation and with the prospect
of future expansion (De Allegri, 2006). Given its preexisting demographic surveillance system,
the Nouna department was considered a suitable environment for such an intervention. As an
additional advantage, the Centre de Recherche en Sante´ de Nouna (CRSN) had a longstanding
partnership with the Institute of Public Health (IPH), a research institution from the University of
Heidelberg, which was interested in a collaboration on the project (De Allegri, 2006). In 2004, the
partnership introduced a voluntary social health insurance scheme, the Assurance Maladie a´ Base
Communautaire (AMBC). It was randomly phased-in at the community-level over a three year
period, such that by 2006 every household in the study area was able to buy health insurance.3
3This research collaboration already has produced a large amount of studies which are mainly published in
the public health literature and deal with topics such as patterns of enrollment (Parmar et al., 2012, 2014) and
−17−
CHAPTER 2. EMPIRICAL SETTING
While the AMBC was restructured and transferred to a new implementing agency in 2012, my
dissertation considers data from the years 2007 to 2011, a time when the initial health insurance
was still in place. The ‘original’ AMBC was designed and implemented with the following features.
Enrollment was voluntary and initially supposed to take place at the household level to limit
adverse selection. Since this requirement further reduced already low insurance take-up, it was not
fully enforced in the field and households could effectively buy health insurance at the individual
level (Parmar et al., 2012; Fink et al., 2013). Enrolled households paid a one-time membership fee
of CFA 200 and an annual flat premium of 1500 and 500 West African Franc (approximately 3 and
1 US dollar in 2009, respectively, not purchasing-parity-adjusted) per adult and child under the
age of 16, respectively.4 Payment could take place in installments and health insurance coverage
started from the day of the last installment. To limit adverse selection, individuals who enrolled
for the first time were subject to a three month waiting period before receiving insurance coverage.
The benefit package included general and specialized consultation in one of the department’s 13
health care centers or the department’s hospital, covering essential and generic drugs, as well as
the most important health care facility treatments (Fink et al., 2013).5 Similar to many other
social health insurances, the program could not work self-sufficiently but was subsidized by the
Burkinabe´ Ministry of Health and international donors (Parmar et al., 2012).6
Despite of a seemingly affordable insurance premium, overall health insurance enrollment rates
had remained far below expected levels and were especially low among poor households (Souares
et al., 2010). In Figure 2.4, I have constructed household wealth percentiles by ranking all house-
holds in the study area with respect to an asset index value to illustrate its relationship with health
insurance take-up in 2006.7 The graph shows that take-up clearly increased in wealth and followed
a convex form for the upper half of the wealth distribution. Figure 2.4 further includes kernel
density estimates of the wealth variable by sector to illustrate that semi-urban households (the
red dashed line) accounted for most observations in the upper half of the wealth distribution and
utilization (Dong et al., 2009), welfare effects (Fink et al., 2013; Schoeps et al., 2011), and health insurance product
design (De Allegri et al., 2009).
4For comparison, the national poverty line is CFA 108,000 per person per year (IMF), which should roughly
equal median consumption in the Nouna department. Thus, the adult premium can be expected to equal 1.5 to 2
percent of median annual per capita consumption expenditures.
5Specifically, the benefit package included comprehensive prenatal care, laboratory tests, inpatient hospital stays,
X-rays, emergency surgery and transport by ambulance. It did not include treatment of teeth and eyes, addiction
problems and neither HIV Aids or other chronic diseases.
6In 2007, the average benefit in prescriptions per insured individual was about twice as high as the average full
premium paid (Parmar et al., 2012).
7The asset index is based on principal-components analysis (PCA) and since the asset data come from the 2009
census survey the index only provides an approximation of households’ asset wealth in 2006.
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vice versa for rural households (the blue solid line). After having observed especially low health
insurance enrollment among poor households, in 2007 the insurer decided to offer a 50 percent
premium discount to the poorest quintile of households in each community. To be precise, the
insurer’s program proposal to the ethical review committee of Burkina Faso states the intention
to ”identify the twenty percent poorest households (...) such that they could benefit from health
insurance at lower prices” (Savadogo and Souares, 2006, p.2).
Figure 2.4: Health insurance demand and wealth before the subsidy intervention
Notes: Dots indicate households’ average insurance enrollment status in 2006 by wealth percentile. Household
wealth is based on an asset index that was constructed with principal-components analysis. The asset index
employs asset data from the 2009 census survey and thus only provides an approximation of households’ asset
wealth in 2006. The solid fitted line is the predicted relationship between household wealth and insurance
enrollment for a second-order polynomial regression model. The graph further includes kernel density estimates
(epanechnikov) of household wealth for rural (blue solid line) and semi-urban (red dashed line) households.
For the targeting of households the insurer employed participatory wealth rankings, which were
carried out at the level of villages and semi-urban neighborhoods during the first quarter of 2007,
2009 and 2011.8 In each community, the procedure started with a publicly convened community
meeting where the facilitators informed about the purpose of the meeting. People who have
8For the purpose of the targeting exercise, each of the seven administrative sectors of Nouna town was divided
into up to four neighborhoods with similar numbers of households (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix for a map).
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lived in the communities for long enough to have good information on their fellow households
were especially encouraged to participate in the community meeting. On average, the community
assembly consisted of ten participants and represented different types of local non-formal political
leaders:
They could be opinion leaders like the chief of the village, religious leaders, elders, etc.
They could also be leaders of associations or groups like farming cooperative, artisan
groups and associations of women (Savadogo et al., 2015, p.3).
The facilitators then initiated focus group discussions to elicit local criteria regarding poverty
and wealth, which in turn were used to define three to four wealth categories (e.g. ‘household
has insufficient food’ was mentioned as a common criterion for the lowest category). In Section
3.1, I present and discuss a systematic review of the extant literature on participatory wealth
assessments and conclude that these three procedural steps − (i) summoning a community meeting
and (ii) conduct focus group discussions, (iii) to elicit local wealth criteria − are commonly used
in community-based targeting exercises. In contrast, I find that there is more variation across
participatory methods when it comes to agency; targeting exercises are either carried out by the
community as a whole, or by a small number of representatives (see Table 3.1 on page 34). The
targeting exercise in my study required the community assembly to elect three local representatives
by acclamation. Physically separated from the focus group and each other, each representative
then had to generate a wealth ranking of all households in the community. They did so by first
assigning each household to one of the previously defined wealth categories and, second, ordering
all households within each category.
Finally, the facilitators applied a three-step-procedure to determine the set of beneficiary house-
holds. Given an intended community targeting share of 20 percent, the absolute number of ben-
eficiary households in each community, b, was determined upfront and not disclosed. For each
representative’s wealth ranking the facilitators, in a first step, identified the corresponding target
set by drawing all households with a wealth rank lower than b + 1. In a second step, facilitators
preselected all households which appeared in at least two of the three representatives’ target sets
(i.e. they basically applied majority rule to the three wealth rankings). In communities where
the number of these ‘majority-selected’ households, m, was below (33 communities) or above (8
communities) the intended number of beneficiary households, b, the facilitators instructed the
local committee to fill-up remaining slots (if b > m) or to exclude excessive households (if b < m),
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respectively. Candidates for subsequent inclusion (exclusion) were those households which ap-
peared in exactly one (two) of the three representatives’ target sets and the choice was based on
consultation between the three representatives. Overall, 15 percent of all households qualified as
candidates for targeting by consultation, which on average determined 25 percent of all beneficiary
households. The three Venn diagrams in Figure 2.5 illustrate the exact procedure, using a stylized
example with a 20-households-strong community that targets b = 4 households. On average, the
entire targeting exercise took half a day. As only five percent of beneficiary households actually
redeemed their vouchers, the total amount of transferred benefits amounted to not more than
732 US dollar in 2009, which was covered by a German philanthropic organization. The finally
distributed transfer amount clearly represents a low-stake scenario. Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that representatives anticipated such a low take-up of the subsidy ex-ante, at the stage of target-
ing. The 50 percent subsidy offer itself represents a non-negligible transfer amount that roughly
translates into one percent of median annual per capita consumption expenditures.
(a) b = m (b) b > m (c) b < m
Figure 2.5: Three scenarios when applying majority rule among three representatives
Notes: I consider a stylized example with a community inhabiting 20 households from which b = 4 households
are to be targeted for benefits. m is the number of households targeted by majority rule. The set of circles
framed by a box denotes the preliminary target set of one representative. Filled, shaded, and hollow circles
refer to non-eligible, potentially eligible, and automatically eligible households, respectively.
Figure 2.5a presents the simplest case, where b = m, such that all beneficiary households are determined by
majority rule. Figure 2.5b depicts a scenario with b = 4 > 3 = m, where one additional household has to be
drawn from the set of shaded circles. In Figure 2.5c, where b = 4 < 5 = m, one shaded circle has to be excluded.
2.3 The Data
For the analysis, I have complemented original data from the community-based targeting exercises
with additional self-collected information and merged this augmented dataset with three separate
micro-level datasets. Figure 2.6 illustrates the merging procedure for the three final datasets. As
the main implementing institution in the field, the CRSN was in charge of both surveying the area
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and running the health insurance. It used an initial population census in 2001 as sampling frame
for subsequent data collection activities and followed the same assignment of unique identifiers
across datasets. All my datasets are centered around the year 2009, when the CRSN conducted its
second community-based targeting intervention. They differ with respect to coverage, the lowest
observational unit, and data collection method and, in the following, I shall give a brief description
of each dataset.
Figure 2.6: Merging of data sources to construct three final datasets
Notes: The flow chart illustrates the merging of six data sources into three final datasets that were used for
the three analyses in my dissertation. The six independent data sources are reflected by rectangles and their
shading roughly indicates population share covered.
My main dataset draws on two procedural outcomes of the community-based targeting (CBT)
exercises. For the ranking task, each representative was given a pile of cards where each card
included the name and survey ID of one resident household (see Figure A.2 in the Appendix). After
a representative has produced a wealth ranking of all household-cards, the facilitators manually
tagged each card with its respective wealth category and rank. From each card CRSN employees
entered both the household’s survey ID and wealth rank to construct the community-wealth
ranking dataset. By the end of the targeting exercise facilitators wrote an official list containing
the names and survey IDs of all finally eligible households in the community. CRSN employees
used these lists to add each household’s final beneficiary status to the wealth ranking data. In
addition, two field visits in June and December 2015 allowed me to considerably enhance the CBT
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dataset in three ways. First, and most importantly, I reviewed and restructured the community
wealth ranking cards from the semi-urban neighborhoods to include them for analysis. Second, I
extracted additional information from the original beneficiary lists which allowed me to identify
the survey IDs of the three targeting committee members in each community.9 Third, after
personal consultations with the CRSN staff I was provided with a cost report of the 2009 targeting
intervention. To summarize, the final CBT dataset comprises three final wealth ranks and the
final beneficiary status for each household in the survey area. In addition, it identifies the three
representatives in each community and provides information on aggregated program cost.
Since all finally merged datasets of my analyses include the community-based targeting data
(see Figure 2.6), I report summary statistics of this dataset in Table 2.1 and relegate descriptive
results of the finally merged datasets to the corresponding chapters. Overall, the CBT data cover
36 rural and 22 semi-urban communities. The average community size is about 110 households
and 20 percent of households were targeted in each community. On average, there is a sizable
positive correlation of about 0.65 between the three informants’ rankings as measured by the
Spearman rank correlation coefficient, and this applies to rural and semi-urban communities alike.
Nonetheless, if one defines an individual key informant’s target group by his m lowest-ranked
households, an unanimous agreement occurs for only 40 percent of beneficiary households. Table
2.1 also includes three measures of intra-community heterogeneity. Regarding economic inequality,
which is captured by a Gini index for a weighted average of household assets, there is remarkably
little heterogeneity across communities; the average standard deviation of four percentage points
is just one tenth of the average level of 42 percentage points. The two indices of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, for ethnicity and religion, show that there is a good deal of diversity both
within and across communities. In particular, ethnic diversity is very high in the semi-urban
neighborhoods.
My second dataset is the Nouna Household Survey, a representative dataset that contains
a wide range of socio-economic household information and covers approximately ten percent of
the survey site’s population. It involves a sampling methodology where households are randomly
drawn from clusters of similar size (De Allegri et al., 2008). Data collection took place between
September and November 2009.
My third dataset is based on the Nouna Health and Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS),
9Specifically, each representative had to write his full name on the original beneficiary list. By employing the
complete information of the population census data, the CRSN was able to match the representative names with
the corresponding household identifiers and provided me with the latter.
−23−
CHAPTER 2. EMPIRICAL SETTING
Table 2.1: Community-based targeting and community characteristics
Rural Semi-urban
Community-based targeting
Ranked households per community 114 93
(87) (39)
Targeted households per community 23 18
(18) (7)
Targeted households per community (share) 0.20 0.20
(0.01) (0.01)
Targeted by all 3 informants (share) 0.08 0.08
(0.04) (0.02)
Targeted by exactly 2 informants (share) 0.10 0.12
(0.30) (0.32)
Targeted by exactly 1 informant (share) 0.21 0.20
(0.41) (0.40)
Rank correlation between 3 informants 0.65 0.66
(0.15) (0.09)
Community characteristics
Gini (Wealth) 0.42 0.43
(0.05) (0.03)
ELF (Ethnicity) 0.33 0.67
(0.25) (0.18)
ELF (Religion) 0.39 0.32
(0.23) (0.14)
Number of communities 36 22
Number of households 3655 2053
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. All sample means are calculated at the community level. A community
is a village or urban sub-sector. ELF is the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index and measures the probability
that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different ethnic or religious groups, respectively. Gini is the
Gini index for an asset index obtained trough principal-components analysis from a total of 25 assets.
which updates vital events of all individuals living in the department on a three to four months
basis (Schoeps et al., 2011).10 For each individual ‘entering’ the survey system, it collects informa-
tion about demographics, occupational choice and ethno-linguistic affiliation. It was established
by an initial census in 1992 and complemented with a census survey component in 2009. The
latter covers economic household information including dwelling conditions, agricultural output,
and livestock as well as asset possession. For 2009 this dataset thus provides a wide range of
demographic and socio-economic information, covering the whole population of households in the
10In the literature, demographic surveillance systems are also often regarded as vital registration systems. The
main vital events covered by the HDSS in this study are events of birth, death and migration.
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study area.
My fourth dataset is based on administrative records from the health insurance provider.
It contains health insurance enrollment status, as well as information on utilization patterns of
individuals who were insured at least once between 2007 and 2010. The first source of information
is an annually updated enrollment register. Since the CRSN was in charge of both surveying
the area and running the health insurance, each client from the enrollment register can be also
identified in the surveillance system. This is reflected by the the insurance cards disbursed,
which contain personal information, the insurance ID and survey identifiers (see Figure A.3 in
the Appendix). Upon entering a health care facility, patients had to present their insurance card
to receive free of charge treatment. To claim reimbursement from the health insurer, health
care facility and hospital staff kept record of any such visit. Specifically, they wrote down the
customer’s insurance ID together with the date of sale as well as the name, amount and price of
drugs obtained (see Figure A.4 in the Appendix). Seeing a doctor was a necessary condition for
receiving drug prescriptions and consultation involved a capitation fee, which was also covered
by the health insurance. For my dissertation, I have available data on customers’ health care
utilization within one of the 13 health care facility centers but not the district hospital.
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Chapter 3
Community-based versus
Statistical Targeting∗
∗Joint work with Stefan Klonner
The first part of my dissertation investigates which method, community-based or statistical target-
ing, targets consumption-poor households more accurately. I compare community-based targeting
with five frequently used statistical procedures, where my reference is a hypothetical targeting
outcome based on survey consumption. Among other extensions, I employ targeting cost data to
compare the cost-effectiveness of each procedure. Within the vast economic literature on targeting
of welfare programs, my study contributes to the topic of targeting accuracy.1 Until recently, the
literature on this topic has followed a somewhat narrow approach, where the focus has been on
one specific targeted anti-poverty program at a time and targeting accuracy is measured by the
share of households meeting the program’s targeting criteria in all beneficiary households (Raval-
lion, 2009). These studies mainly consider statistical targeting methods and usually compare a
household’s self-reported eligibility with hypothetical eligibility calculated from socio-economic
household characteristics according to the program’s eligibility rules.2
1Other prominent themes are leakage (Alatas et al., 2013b; Niehaus and Atanassova, 2013), elite capture (Alatas
et al., 2012, 2013a; Panda, 2015), agency problems in decentralization (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Banerjee et al.,
2014), and communities’ poverty perceptions (Van Campenhout, 2007; Kebede, 2009; Alatas et al., 2012).
2Some prominent examples are Banerjee et al. (2007) for food distribution, housing and employment schemes in
India, Skoufias et al. (2001) for Progresa in Mexico, Ahmed and Bouis (2002) for food subsidies in Egypt, Handa
et al. (2012) for cash transfer programs in Malawi and Kenya, and Castan˜eda (2005) for Columbia’s SISBEN. I
describe this latter program in more detail in section 3.1. The review by Coady et al. (2004a) summarizes studies
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A more recent set of studies has taken a broader approach to the topic of targeting accuracy
by comparing alternative targeting methods in one empirical setting. This small but rapidly
growing literature employs consumption as the reference and the variation in targeting methods
comes either from alternative treatments (Alatas et al., 2012; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2015) or
hypothetical calculations with household-level survey data (Grosh and Baker, 1995; Filmer and
Scott, 2012; Klasen and Lange, 2014; Karlan and Thuysbaert, 2016; Brown et al., 2016; Stoeﬄer
et al., 2016). Within this recent comparative targeting accuracy literature one may distinguish
between a first branch that compares various alternative statistical targeting methods with each
other (Grosh and Baker, 1995; Filmer and Scott, 2012; Klasen and Lange, 2014; Brown et al.,
2016), and a second branch, whose subject is the comparative assessment of community-based
targeting. Among the latter, the seminal study is Alatas et al. (2012). These authors separately
investigate the targeting accuracy of pure community-based targeting, as in the present analysis,
and a hybrid method, where community-based targeting is combined with econometric targeting
to identify the set of beneficiaries. While Karlan and Thuysbaert (2016) and Stoeﬄer et al. (2016)
compare hybrid methods with selected statistical methods, this study is the first comparison of
statistical targeting with pure community-based targeting after Alatas et al. (2012).3
The main contribution of my analysis is to merge the two so far disconnected branches of
this recent comparative literature on targeting accuracy. I am first to compare the accuracy of
pure community-based targeting with the four most prominent approaches to statistical targeting,
including a comprehensive asset index, in one empirical setting. The second major contribution
of this study is a detailed cost-benefit analysis covering various statistical methods as well as
community-based targeting, an important topic, on which empirical evidence has been especially
thin.4 I use comprehensive targeting cost data, consider alternative cost scenarios, and also make
a methodological contribution by quantifying the trade-off between costs of targeting and its
benefits, in terms of poverty reduction. Third, by assessing the targeting accuracy in rural and
semi-urban communities separately I am first to address the issue of targeting accuracy outside a
village context. Finally, mine is the first comparative study of statistical versus pure community-
of 122 anti-poverty programs in 48 countries.
3Another related article is Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2015), who compare the targeting accuracy of pure community-
based targeting with two forms of categorical targeting, where the target groups are households with high fractions
of elderly and dependents, respectively. The empirical context is the Hunger Safety Net Programme in Kenya.
4 In their recent book Del Ninno and Mills (2015, p.12) point out that ”Trade-offs between the administrative
costs of targeting and lower program costs are not well documented; further research is needed in this area.” Karlan
and Thuysbaert (2016) compare the costs, but not the cost-effectiveness, of a hybrid targeting method to the costs
of two statistical targeting methods.
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based targeting in a sub-Saharan African context, where community-based methods have been
employed more frequently than anywhere else (Garcia et al., 2012; Handa et al., 2012).
3.1 Statistical versus Community-Based Poverty Targeting
Statistical targeting is a relatively recent but increasingly popular targeting tool in low-income
countries (Coady et al., 2004a). In Latin America, statistical targeting has been used for large-scale
cash-transfer programs in Mexico (Progresa/Oportunidades), Colombia (Familias en Accio´n), and
Chile (PASIS and SUF). National food-subsidization programs such as those in Indonesia and
Egypt use statistical targeting as well (Coady et al., 2004a; Ahmed and Bouis, 2002). Statistical
methods are also popular among small-scale poverty reduction programs, where often only a small
set of indicators is used. In practice, statistical targeting is often combined with a first-stage
geographic targeting procedure (Coady et al., 2004a).5
Statistical targeting typically relies on self-reported, and sometimes validated, information on
a household’s demographic, occupational, and asset structure to calculate for each household in
a population a wealth index, the approximate ‘means’ of a household.6 A household is targeted
if its index value falls short of a pre-specified cutoff, which may be defined in absolute terms or
as a population quantile. The wealth index is calculated as a weighted average of the potentially
transformed proxy-means variables and, in general, involves three choices; first, the set of indica-
tors: given the high cost of data collection for entire populations, often indicators available from
existing census data are used (Ravallion, 2009); second, the transformation of each indicator into
a proxy-means variable, and third the index weights. I discuss four statistical methods which I
consider along these lines and contrast them with community-based targeting.
Econometric proxy-means testing
This method typically uses a large set of proxy-means variables. The indicators are often obtained
from census data and may or may not be transformed (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Klasen and
5Two examples are the Mexican Progresa program (Skoufias et al., 2001) and the national cash transfer program
in Indonesia (Alatas et al., 2012).
6Such information is usually preferred over self-reported income or expenditures for several reasons. First,
collecting detailed income or consumption data for an entire population is very costly. Second, both measures leave
more room for strategic misreporting and can be hardly verified by the enumerator. Finally, income often suffers
from considerable short-term fluctuations (Alatas et al., 2012).
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Lange, 2014; Alatas et al., 2012). Weights are obtained from a regression of per capita consumption
on the set of proxy-means variables. More precisely, regression coefficients are used as weights
for the entire population. Hence, for a given household, its wealth index equals its predicted
value of consumption in a linear regression sense. The data used for this exercise typically comes
from a sample survey (Filmer and Scott, 2012; Klasen and Lange, 2014). This approach, hence,
requires consumption data for at least a subset of households. When a program’s purpose is
to reduce consumption poverty, this approach is easily motivated by the fact that the resulting
index is the best linear predictor of household consumption given the information available in
a population census. Most of the recent comparative targeting accuracy literature involves this
statistical targeting method, and the large-scale cash transfer programs in Mexico (Progresa) and
Indonesia (BLT) are two prominent applications.
Asset index
For the asset index weights are obtained from the joint distribution of the proxy-means variables
themselves. Specifically, principal-components analysis (PCA) is used to reduce a large set of
proxy-means indicators to a small set of orthogonal linear combinations of the variables that best
capture the variation in the original indicators. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001), the first
principal component is used as wealth index and its so-called factor loadings as weights.
The PCA-based index is most frequently used to proxy a household’s socio-economic status
in the absence of consumption data and has been particularly popular in health-related studies
that rely on data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). Within this discipline the index
is often called ‘wealth index’ (Howe et al., 2009) or ‘index of socio-economic position’ (Wagstaff
and Watanabe, 2003). No study in the recent targeting accuracy literature considers a compre-
hensive asset index.7 While in general less popular in the area of targeting, I am aware of one
prominent application, Columbia’s Sistema de Seleccio´n de Beneficiarios para Programas Sociales
(SISBEN), which has been in effect for more than twenty years. In this system, eligibility for
various social programs relies on a wealth index with 13 proxy-means variables and PCA-based
weights (Castan˜eda, 2005).
7Karlan and Thuysbaert (2016) consider a PCA-based index where five housing variables are aggregated into a
housing index.
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Scorecards
In comparison to the just discussed two statistical methods, scorecards typically rely on a smaller
set of indicators. By means of a scorecard each indicator realization is transformed into an indicator
score, which typically takes only integer values. The sum of indicator scores gives the wealth index,
here called wealth score. The mapping of indicator realizations into indicator scores simultaneously
delivers the transformation of each indicator and the weighting between indicators. A property
the scorecard approach has in common with all other statistical methods considered here is that
the final wealth index is additively separable in the individual indicators. The indicator scores are
usually obtained using either regression techniques or common sense. I include the following two
scorecard-based indices into my targeting accuracy analysis.
First, I consider the Poverty Scorecard Index (PSI). It was initially developed by a microlender
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and primarily used to measure the microfinance institution’s outreach to
the poor and the institution’s impact on customers’ welfare. It has subsequently been managed on
a global scale by Grameen Foundation and, lately, the non-governmental organization Innovations
for Poverty Action (IPA), where it is called Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI). The index has
also been used for targeting of anti-poverty interventions and is increasingly used in contexts
other than microfinance, such as health and education (Schreiner, 2015; Alkire et al., 2015).
According to IPA’s 2014 report, the PSI is being used by more than 200 organizations for anti-
poverty programs around the global South. Among them are the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC), the Grameen Bank, the Ford Foundation, and the International Finance
Corporation (Innovations for Poverty Action, 2014). Customized scorecards for 46 countries are
available as of 2016. The selection of indicators is based on ”statistics and judgment” and, similar
to the econometric PMT, indicator scores are obtained from national expenditure surveys through
regression techniques with consumption poverty as the dependent variable (Schreiner, 2015, p.556).
In my analysis, I use the 2011 version of the PPI scorecard for Burkina Faso, which I have retrieved
from IPA’s website in January 2016.
Second, I calculate an index based on the Below the Poverty Line (BPL) scorecard, which
was developed by an expert group commissioned by the Indian government in 2001 (Sundaram,
2003). The BPL criterion is used in India’s public food distribution system and for several poverty
alleviation programs administered by the Ministry of Rural Development. The indicator selection
builds on India’s 2001 census questionnaire. The scorecard includes thirteen indicators and a score
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of between zero and four is assigned to each realization. Its methodology has been vividly debated
in the policy as well as the academic community (Sundaram, 2003; Banerjee et al., 2007; Alkire
and Seth, 2013).
The Multidimensional Poverty Index
In this approach all indicators are first transformed into binary deprivation indicators and the
relevant poverty index is a weighted deprivation count. The so-called Global MPI (Alkire et al.,
2015) comprises ten indicators from three different dimensions of well-being, education, health,
and standard of living. Its weights are equal across and within the three dimensions of well-being,
such that the sum of all indicator weights within a dimension always equals one third. The MPI
and scorecards have in common that they involve normative judgments regarding the selection
and the transformation of indicators, as well as the choice of weights.
The Global MPI has been developed for the United Nations Development Programme. It is
annually reported in the Human Development Report and is calculated for more than one hundred
countries (Alkire and Santos, 2014). Its primary purpose is the measurement of multidimensional
poverty in the developing world given common data constraints. In addition, Alkire and Santos
(2010) argue that the methodology underlying the global MPI may also serve as a tool for the
targeting of anti-poverty programs (see also Alkire et al., 2015). Along these lines, four recent
studies compare targeting based on the MPI methodology with other targeting approaches, such as
the BPL scorecard (Thomas et al., 2009; Alkire and Seth, 2013; Azevedo and Robles, 2013; Robano
and Smith, 2013). I am aware that the MPI intends to capture a different, more multidimensional
concept of poverty than the consumption benchmark. Due to its popularity in policy applications
and its ambitions for targeting, I find it nonetheless of interest to include it in my comparative
analysis to see how suited (or not) it is for proxying for consumption poverty.
Community-based targeting
In community-based targeting the choice of beneficiary households is delegated to local communi-
ties (Ravallion, 1993). The approach usually includes a so-called community wealth ranking and
has earlier often been called Rapid Rural Appraisal, or RRA for short. According to Chambers
(1994a), RRAs were pioneered in the late 1970’s because of a growing discontent with statistical
poverty assessments and, in particular, their relatively high costs. Since then, community wealth
−32−
Section 3.1
rankings have not only been used for poverty assessments (see, for instance, Devereux and Sharp,
2006; McGee, 2004; Van Campenhout, 2007) but have also emerged as a targeting tool.
Recent examples include small to medium-scale asset creation programs geared at the ultra-
poor and funded by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). Karlan and Thuysbaert
(2016) analyze one such program in Honduras and Peru. Banerjee et al. (2007) investigate CBTs
within the context of a similar asset-creation program in rural India. Community-based targeting
is also sometimes used on a larger scale. In their cross-country analysis of targeted anti-poverty
interventions, Coady et al. (2004a) find that, overall, community-based targeting is similarly often
used as proxy-means testing, equally popular on all continents and especially wide-spread in very
poor countries.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no structured summary of the procedural details of
community-based targeting in the extant literature. Therefore, in Table 3.1, I review eighteen stud-
ies of CBTs, inclusive of the intervention preceding the one studied in this dissertation (Souares
et al., 2010), which are sufficiently explicit regarding procedural details. Eleven exercises have been
implemented in sub-Saharan Africa. All eighteen instances have in common that the targeting
exercise involves the entire community, at least at an initial stage. They differ along five charac-
teristics, which are set out in columns 1 to 5 of Table 3.1. First, most CBT exercises start with a
public focus group discussion to elicit communal wealth and poverty perceptions, and sometimes
also to define wealth brackets. Second, in most of the CBTs summarized in Table 1, all households
of the community are assigned to the different wealth brackets. Third, in ten of the studies, a
complete wealth ranking of households is undertaken by sorting households within each wealth
bracket subsequently. Fourth, the outcomes of the wealth ranking exercise are used for targeting
of a welfare program in two-thirds of the cases. Finally, there is variation regarding agency. In
particular, the assignment of households to wealth brackets as well as the comprehensive ranking
may be carried out either by the community as a whole or by a small number of elected local
informants.
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3.2 Empirical Approach
Sample target sets
In the main analysis I construct and compare seven different sets of target households. First, the
set of households actually targeted by the communities. I denote the corresponding set of target
households in community c in my sample by TCBTc . For my sample, the remaining six hypothetical
target groups are constructed from the household survey data as follows. Let nCBTc denote the
number of sample households targeted by the community-based method in community c. To
construct Tmc , the hypothetical target set based on statistical method m in community c, I first
sort all sample households in c by the wealth index of method m and select the nCBTc households
with the lowest index values.8 The aggregate sample target set is the union set Tm = ∪Cc=1Tmc ,
where C denotes the number of communities. Following the recent comparative targeting accuracy
literature (Alatas et al., 2012; Filmer and Scott, 2012; Karlan and Thuysbaert, 2016; Klasen and
Lange, 2014; Brown et al., 2016; Stoeﬄer et al., 2016), I take consumption as the benchmark wealth
index and denote by TCON the benchmark target set. I assess the targeting accuracy of method m
in terms of the overlap of Tm with TCON . In the following, I make precise how I calculate the five
wealth indices for statistical targeting in detail. For considerations of space, estimation outputs
and calculations are relegated to the Appendix (see Table B.1 for details). Table 3.2 provides an
overview of the statistical targeting methods regarding indicators and weights.
hjhkj
Econometric PMT
For the econometric PMT I define a dummy variable EligCONci equal to one if household i in
community c is targeted according to my benchmark. I then estimate the linear regression model
EligCONch = αc + βxch + uch,
where xch is a vector of proxy variables, β is the corresponding coefficient vector, αc are commu-
nity fixed effects, and u is a stochastic error term. I conduct this regression analysis separately for
rural and semi-urban households (see Table B.2 in the Appendix for the regression output). In a
8 To illustrate, consider a village with 100 households from which 20 have been targeted by the community-based
method. Suppose that, from this village, the household survey includes 10 households with 3 sample households
targeted and 7 not targeted. While the population targeting set contains 20 percent of all households, all seven of
my sample target sets contain precisely 3 sample households from that village.
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Table 3.2: Targeting methods
Set Description Number of Transformation Weighting of
indicators of indicators indicators
Benchmark
TCON Household head’s monthly consumption
expenditures (one month recall) 1 None n.a.
Statistical targeting
Linear regression
T ĈON Econometric proxy-means test 44 None OLS
Principal component analysis
TPCA Asset index 44 None PCA
Scorecards
TPSI Poverty scorecard index (PSI) 9 Ordered categorical hybrid
TBPL Below the poverty line (BPL) scorecard 12 Ordered categorical equal
Counting of deprivations
TMPI Multidimensional poverty index 9 Binary Global MPI
Community-based targeting
TCBT Households identified by three local informants n.a. n.a. n.a.
Notes: n.a.: not applicable; OLS: ordinary least squares regression of consumption, transformed into a dummy
variable, on the set of all indicators; PCA: principal component analysis; hybrid: implicit weights for the
different indicators as chosen by the creators of the Burkina poverty scorecard; hybrid: implicit weights for the
indicators obtained by predicting consumption from the scorecard indicators using a national household survey
(Schreiner, 2015, p.556); equal: equal weight is given to each transformed indicator; Global MPI: Weighting
scheme follows that of the global MPI.
second step, index values are calculated for each household as Êlig
CON
ch = β̂xch. Third, for each
community, households are sorted with respect to the index value and the nCBTc lowest ranked
households are assigned to T ĈONc .
Asset Index
I apply principal component analysis (PCA) to obtain weights that derive from the joint distribu-
tion of the proxy-means variables themselves. My asset index employs the same set of indicators
as the econometric PMT. To focus on within-community differences across households, I first sub-
tract community means from each indicator. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001), I take the
first principal component as wealth index and the corresponding factor loadings as weights (see
Appendix Table B.3 for details).
Poverty Scorecards
I first discuss the Poverty Scorecard Index (PSI). I use the 2011 Burkina Faso poverty scorecard
−36−
Section 3.2
from IPA’s website9 to calculate indicator scores and to construct the hypothetical target set
TPSI . Of its ten indicators I omit one which is not covered in the household survey, ‘Does the
household own a bed or mattress?’. As this indicator accounts for not more than three percent of
the full score, I am confident that this omission will not threaten its overall performance. Table
B.4 of the Appendix provides details about this scorecard.
Second, I employ the Below the Poverty Line scorecard as reproduced in Alkire and Seth (2013)
to construct the respective hypothetical target set TBPL. For reasons of data availability I have
to omit one of the thirteen original indicators, ‘food security’. This is a limitation of my study as
food security represents a potentially important and the only directly consumption-related vari-
able in the scorecard. Nevertheless, with an indicator weight of 7.5 percent I am confident that its
absence does not considerably affect the BPL’s overall targeting performance. In addition, I sub-
stitute the original indicators ‘availability of normal wear clothing’, ‘type of indebtedness’, ‘reason
for migration from household’, and ‘preference for assistance’ with ‘drinking water source’, ‘type
of risk coping’, ‘emigration incidence’, and ‘use of transfers received’, respectively (see Appendix
Table B.5 for details).
The Multidimensional Poverty Index
I build on the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) by Alkire and Santos (2010). For
reasons of data availability, I make two modifications regarding the health dimension. I omit the
nutrition indicator and substitute the child mortality indicator by the incidence of a recent severe
health shock, which is recorded in my sample survey with a recall of one month.10 I adjust the
weights for this dimension accordingly (see Appendix Table B.6 for details).
Targeting accuracy
I take the benchmark target set TCON and assess the targeting accuracy of CBT and the statistical
targeting methods in terms of the mean targeting error. The latter is defined as the proportion
of households, which are erroneously classified as either poor or non-poor (Alatas et al., 2012).11
9See http://www.progressoutofpoverty.org/country/burkina-faso.
10With an indicator weight of about 16 percent, the omission of nutrition in the MPI likely has a more severe
effect on targeting performance than it has for the BPL scorecard. I shall be cautions in interpreting the results
and comment on potential implications in subsection 3.4.
11The Targeting Differential (TD) (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) and the Coady-Grosh-Hoddinott (CGH) index
(Coady et al., 2004a) represent two additional popular targeting accuracy measures. When assuming constant
benefit amounts per household, both measures can be expressed as monotone transformations of the mean target-
ing error (MTE) because, within my framework, the share of beneficiary households equals the share of ”poor”
households. First, the Targeting Differential is the difference between the share of the poor and the non-poor
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To be precise, when there are Hc sample households in community c and n is the total number
of observations in the data set, n =
∑C
c=1Hc, the mean targeting error (MTE) for method m is
calculated as
MTEm =
1
n
C∑
c=1
Hc∑
h=1
 1{ household ch is in TCON and not in Tm}+
1{ household ch is in Tm and not in TCON }
 , (1)
m = {ĈON,PCA,PSI,BPL,MPI,CBT},
where 1{} denotes the indicator function. The mean targeting error is the sum of two types
of errors. An exclusion error (false negative) occurs when consumption-poor households are not
targeted by the targeting method under consideration. Conversely, non-poor households which are
targeted by the method under consideration contribute to an inclusion error (false positive). As
a benchmark for comparison, I also calculate the mean targeting error when households are tar-
geted at random. For the sample targeting probability of 24 percent, the probability for erroneous
targeting under random targeting is 0.76 · 0.24 + 0.24 · 0.76 = 0.37.
When I compare two alternative targeting procedures, A and B, the object of interest is the
difference in the mean targeting error. To conduct statistical inference, I estimate the regression
equation
Errchm = γ + δ · 1{m = B}+ uchm,
where Errchm is the targeting error of observation ch with procedure m, the term in brackets in
equation 1, and u is a stochastic error term. Procedure A defines the reference category and the
least squares estimate δ̂ equals the difference between the mean targeting errors of procedures B
and A. The data set for this exercise has 2n observations as every household appears twice, once
with procedure A and once with procedure B. I cluster standard errors at the household level
because only the differences ErrchB−ErrchA can safely be assumed to be statistically independent.
3.3 The Data
For the empirical analysis I match a cross-sectional household survey data set with data from the
community-based targeting exercises (see Figure 2.6 one page 22). The merged dataset contains
participating in the program, TD = 1− MTE
q
∈ [−1, 1], where q is the share of targeted households. Second, the
Coady-Grosh-Hoddinott index is the amount of resources transferred to the poor over the total amount transferred
by the program, CGH = 2q−MTE
2q2
∈ [0, 1].
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566 households, for which summary statistics are set out in Table 3.3. Households are relatively
large and literacy rates low. Agriculture is the predominant activity in villages and for half
of the semi-urban households. Livestock possession is wide-spread, especially in the rural sector.
Targeted households appear to be slightly oversampled with a targeting share of 0.24 in comparison
to 0.20 in the population (see Table 2.1 on page 24).
As reference variable for the subsequent targeting accuracy analysis, I use the value of non-
durable items purchased by the household head during the thirty days preceding the interview,
as recorded in the household sample survey. I shall point out here that my consumption variable
does not include the value of self-produced consumption items or purchases of durable (low-
frequency) consumption items. The household survey makes no attempt to record the value
of the household’s entire consumption. From my experience in the field, however, I think that
household head expenditures are a good proxy of mean per capita consumption. I also conduct
a robustness check with an alternative consumption measure exploiting the fact that the survey
includes high-frequency consumption expenditures of each adult member of a household. When
I use the sum of these expenditures and divide by the number of household members as a proxy
for per-capita consumption, all of my results remain qualitatively unchanged. Because of my
impression that household heads’ responses are more reliable, I only present the results with
household-head consumption in the main text. The respective additional results (Table B.7) as
well as an illustration that depicts the distribution of my reference variable by sector (Figure B.1)
are available in the Appendix.
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Table 3.3: Household survey summary statistics
Rural Semi-urban
Community-based targeting
Number of ranked households 15.9 12.4
(8.9) (5.5)
Number of targeted households 3.8 3.0
(2.3) (1.7)
Share of targeted households 0.24 0.24
(0.43) (0.43)
Consumption
Monthly household head expenditures (CFA) 13,709 29,667
(22,032) (43,798)
Demographics
Household size 9.38 8.75
(6.32) (5.38)
Household head literate (incidence) 0.33 0.38
(0.47) (0.49)
HH head occup. non-agric. (incidence) 0.16 0.50
(0.37) (0.50)
Asset possession (incidences)
Bullock 0.50 0.40
(0.50) (0.49)
Goat or sheep 0.84 0.60
(0.37) (0.49)
Motorbike 0.19 0.33
(0.39) (0.47)
Bicycle 0.91 0.94
(0.29) (0.24)
Number of communities 36 22
Number of households 354 212
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Monthly household head expenditures are based on a one month
recall.
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3.4 Results
Targeting accuracy
Table 3.4 reports mean targeting errors as well as exclusion and inclusion errors by sector. For
the rural sector MTEs are set out in the first column. Mean targeting errors range from 16
to 36 percentage points, which amounts to a reduction of the random MTE between 57 and
three percent. The econometric PMT has by far the lowest MTE with less than every sixth
household wrongly classified. The difference to the next-best method, the asset index, is nine
percentage points, which is statistically different from zero at the one percent significance level.
Econometric targeting reduces the MTE in a statistically significant fashion relative to any of
the other techniques (see Appendix Table B.8). On the other end, across sectors, the Poverty
Scorecard Index and the MPI deliver only marginal and statistically insignificant (at the five
percent level) improvements relative to random targeting, while the asset index performs well in
villages and semi-urban neighborhoods alike. Averaged across sectors, it is the best performing
statistical method not involving consumption data for obtaining weights, closely followed by the
BPL scorecard, whose performance is not statistically different at conventional levels. Regarding
community-based targeting, there are two salient findings emerging from Table 3.4. First, averaged
across the two sectors (that is across columns 1 and 4), CBT is about as accurate as the two best
performing statistical methods that do not require consumption data, the asset index and the BPL
scorecard. With mean targeting errors roughly twice as large as those of the econometric PMT,
the average performance of these three procedures is not statistically different from each other
at conventional levels. Second, in relation to the competing statistical targeting methods, CBT
performs somewhat better in the semi-urban neighborhoods than in the villages. In the semi-
urban areas, CBT has a slightly smaller mean targeting error than the asset index and the BPL
scorecard. The two differences fail to be significantly different from zero, however, at conventional
levels.
Table 3.4 also contains exclusion and inclusion errors, and the corresponding random targeting
errors as reference. By construction, the number of erroneously included households always equals
the number of erroneously excluded households. Accordingly, the values in columns 2 and 5 equal
the mean targeting error divided by two times the sample targeting share of 0.24. The mean
inclusion errors are a multiple of the respective exclusion errors, where the factor of proportionality
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Table 3.4: Targeting errors (in percent)
Rural Semi-urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
Targeting
Error
Mean
Exclusion
Error
Mean
Inclusion
Error
Mean
Targeting
Error
Mean
Exclusion
Error
Mean
Inclusion
Error
Econometric PMT 15.3 32.1 10.0 9.4 19.6 6.2
(1.9) (5.1) (1.8) (2.0) (5.6) (1.9)
Asset index 24.3 51.2 15.9 25.5 52.9 16.8
(2.3) (5.5) (2.2) (3.0) (7.1) (3.0)
Scorecards
Below the Poverty Line 28.2 59.5 18.5 23.6 49.0 15.5
(2.4) (5.4) (2.4) (2.9) (7.1) (2.9)
Poverty Scorecard Index 35.6 75.0 23.3 34.0 70.6 22.4
(2.5) (4.8) (2.6) (3.3) (6.4) (3.3)
Multidimensional Poverty Index 31.6 66.7 20.7 33.0 68.6 21.7
(2.5) (5.2) (2.5) (3.2) (6.6) (3.3)
Community-based targeting 27.1 57.1 17.8 22.6 47.1 14.9
(2.4) (5.4) (2.3) (2.9) (7.1) (2.8)
Random targeting error 36.4 76.0 24.0 36.4 76.0 24.0
Number of households 354 84 270 212 51 161
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
is the sample targeting share, s say, divided by one minus s. I will return to the exclusion errors
in the cost-benefit analysis.
In Table 3.5 I decompose targeting errors along the consumption distribution. In particular,
I calculate exclusion errors separately for extremely poor and moderately poor households, and
inclusion errors for households around the distribution’s median as well as for relatively aﬄuent
households. I define the expenditure classes such that the shares of extremely and moderately
poor households are roughly equal and sum up to the sample targeting shares of the community-
based targeting exercises, 24 percent (see Table 3.3). The other two expenditure brackets contain
the complementary sets of households and are defined such that they are roughly of equal size;
for example in the rural subsample the aﬄuent and around median expenditure brackets roughly
contain the first and second 38 percent wealthiest households as measured by consumption, respec-
tively. As a consequence, the mean exclusion and inclusion errors in Table 3.4 are the arithmetic
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means of the respective consumption-bracket-wise errors in Table 3.5.12 While the point esti-
mates suggest that, relative to the BPL scorecard, community-based targeting is more accurate
in identifying extremely (moderately) poor households in rural (semi-urban) areas, none of the
differences between the asset index, the BPL scorecard and the CBT are statistically significant at
conventional levels. When averaged across sectors, the four best-performing procedures all have
in common that the extremely poor are identified more accurately than the moderately poor, as
would be expected. This pattern is statistically significant for the econometric PMT, the asset
index and CBT at the five percent significance level. In this regard, community-based targeting
is no different from the three best-performing statistical procedures.
Table 3.5: Targeting errors by consumption expenditure quantiles
Rural Semi-urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Extremely
Poor
Moder.
Poor
Around
Median
Aﬄuent
Extremely
Poor
Moder.
Poor
Around
Median
Aﬄuent
Dependent variable: Exclusion Error Inclusion Error Exclusion Error Inclusion Error
Econometric PMT 9.4 46.2 12.5 7.1 9.5 26.7 5.8 6.7
(5.2) (7.0) (2.8) (2.3) (6.6) (8.2) (2.5) (2.9)
Asset index 40.6 57.7 20.8 10.3 33.3 66.7 25.6 6.7
(8.8) (6.9) (3.4) (2.7) (10.5) (8.8) (4.7) (2.9)
Scorecards
Below the Poverty Line 62.5 57.7 20.8 15.9 28.6 63.3 23.3 6.7
(8.7) (6.9) (3.4) (3.3) (10.1) (8.9) (4.6) (2.9)
Poverty Scorecard Index 87.5 67.3 24.3 22.2 71.4 70.0 30.2 13.3
(5.9) (6.6) (3.6) (3.7) (10.1) (8.5) (5.0) (4.0)
Multidimensional Poverty Index 65.6 67.3 22.9 18.3 61.9 73.3 27.9 14.7
(8.5) (6.6) (3.5) (3.5) (10.9) (8.2) (4.9) (4.1)
Community-based targeting 50.0 61.5 22.9 11.9 38.1 53.3 22.1 6.7
(9.0) (6.8) (3.5) (2.9) (10.9) (9.3) (4.5) (2.9)
Random targeting error 76.0 76.0 24.0 24.0 76.0 76.0 24.0 24.0
Number of households 32 52 144 126 21 30 86 75
Notes: All figures are in percent. Standard errors are in parentheses. The expenditure classes are defined such
that for each community the shares of ‘extremely poor’ and ‘moderately poor’ households are roughly equal
and sum up to the sample targeting share of the community-based targeting exercise. Analogously, for each
community the sample shares of ‘around median’ and ‘aﬄuent’ households sum up to one minus the community’s
sample targeting share of the CBT.
12The numbers of households in columns 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8, respectively, are not exactly
equal because of communities where the CBT sample target set or its complement contains an odd number of
households. In that case, I have chosen to allocate the median household of the consumption sample target set to
the moderately poor group and the median household of the complementary group to the around-median group.
Changing this rule does not affect the results substantively.
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Weights and indicators in statistical targeting
As mentioned earlier (see Table 3.2), statistical targeting methods vary along three dimensions, the
set of indicators, the transformation of indicators into what may be called proxy-means variables
or indicator scores, and the weighting. In section 3.4 I have found that the five different statistical
indices I consider result in very different targeting errors. In this section, I explore to what extent
these differences in targeting accuracy can be attributed to the sets of indicators on the one
hand and the weighting schemes on the other. Accordingly, Table 3.6 reports MTEs for various
hypothetical specifications of statistical indices by sector (see Appendix Tables B.8 and B.9 for
statistical differences). The shaded cells contain MTEs of the five statistical methods considered
in the previous analyses. Ten more indices are constructed by varying the five existing statistical
indices along two dimensions, the set of indicators (in columns), and the weighting method (in
rows).
Table 3.6: Mean targeting errors for alternative sets of indicators and weights
Set of proxy-means variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MPI(#9) PSI(#9) BPL(#12) All(#43)
Weights
Rural (N=354)
Original 31.6 35.6 28.2 .
PCA 37.9 24.9 27.7 24.3
Econometric
Log(expd)
OLS
27.7 22.0 24.3 18.1
Elig(expd)
OLS
26.6 21.5 24.9 15.3
Semi-urban (N=212)
Original 33.0 34.0 23.6 .
PCA 40.6 29.2 23.6 25.5
Econometric
Log(expd)
OLS
26.4 23.6 22.6 16.0
Elig(expd)
OLS
24.5 18.9 18.9 9.4
Notes: All figures are in percent. The shaded cells contain mean targeting errors for the statistical indices used
in the main analysis. Further hypothetical indices are constructed by varying the five existing statistical indices
along two dimensions, the set of indicators included (columns) and the method for obtaining the weights (rows).
‘Original Weights’ refers to the weights used in the previous main analyses.
For the role of variable selection it is interesting to compare the first three columns, where
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For the role of variable selection it is interesting to compare the first three columns, where the total
number of variables is similar. In the context evaluated here, the variables employed by the MPI
work relatively poorly for targeting consumption-poor households. Note that both the MPI and
the BPL potentially suffer from missing information on nutrition or food security, respectively.
By observing a fair indicator performance of the BPL I am nonetheless confident that missing
information does not mainly drive the poor performance of the MPI. Across sectors and weighting
methods the MPI has the highest targeting error. Turning to weights, the Poverty Scorecard Index
has the potential to outperform the MPI as well as the BPL-based scorecard when its weights
are appropriately modified. The broad picture emerging for these three approaches involving
normative choices of indicators, transformations and weights is that the PSI is strong regarding
the set of variables but poor regarding the choice of implicit weights. The MPI performs poorly
regarding both, while for the BPL scorecard both the set of indicators and the choice of weights
are fair.
Finally, for the weights of the econometric PMT, I find that the choice of the dependent variable
in the regression delivering the weights makes a non-negligible difference. When the logarithm
of consumption is used (as in Alatas et al., 2012, and others) rather than the dummy variable
‘Eligible by consumption’, the MTE increases from 9 to 16 percent (α = 0.05) for the semi-urban
sector. This suggests that there are important non-linearities in the true regression function that
are better dealt with by my dichotomous specification of the consumption variable.
Community characteristics and targeting accuracy
Drawing on population survey data (see Figure 2.6), I construct four community-level character-
istics, community size, economic inequality, and indices of ethnic and religious heterogeneity. My
measure of economic inequality is a Gini coefficient calculated for a PCA-based asset index in-
volving 25 commonly used census variables. For measures of heterogeneity, I calculate two indices
commonly known as ethno-linguistic fractionalization, which equals the probability that two ran-
domly drawn individuals from the same community belong to different ethnic or religious groups,
respectively. Table 2.1 contains summary statistics of these variables and Table 3.7 the estimation
results. Since there are only 37 and 22 observations for rural and semi-urban communities, re-
spectively, I pool the two sectors for this exercise. For ease of interpretation, all four explanatory
variables of interest have been standardized.
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Table 3.7: Mean targeting errors and community characteristics
Dependent variable: Mean targeting error (in percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Targeting method: Econo- Asset Scorecards Commun.-
metric index BPL PSI MPI based
Community Size 2.19 1.76 2.74 3.14 2.37 4.90**
(1.76) (2.05) (2.14) (3.00) (2.23) (2.07)
Gini (Wealth) 6.20** 7.62*** 6.45** 3.12 5.05* 5.68*
(2.77) (2.82) (2.83) (3.14) (3.02) (3.18)
ELF (Ethnicity) 4.21** 7.92** 2.38 9.68** 1.83 5.91
(1.94) (3.52) (2.93) (4.18) (3.20) (3.77)
ELF (Religion) -3.15 -7.17** -3.93 -1.29 -2.72 -7.97***
(1.91) (2.79) (2.39) (2.87) (2.96) (2.95)
Rural sector (dummy variable) 10.38* 8.69 6.09 14.70 0.74 6.92
(5.61) (7.49) (5.36) (9.05) (6.24) (8.24)
Constant 5.42 20.03***20.94***24.05***29.79*** 19.91***
(3.84) (4.93) (3.40) (6.03) (4.20) (4.99)
Number of communities 58 58 58 58 58 58
F-test for joint significance 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.46 0.00
R2 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.20
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each community is one
observation. The dependent variable is the sample mean targeting error in percent. All explanatory variables
are standardized. Regarding the rural sector dummy, the reference category is semi-urban community.
I find that the targeting error of community-based targeting increases significantly with com-
munity size. Increasing community size by one standard deviation, that is by 72 households or
70 percent, increases the mean targeting error by 5 percentage points (α = 0.05). The point esti-
mates for the statistical targeting methods are also positive but substantially smaller, statistically
different from neither zero nor the CBT estimate. For both statistical and participatory targeting
I find a statistically significant negative relationship between economic inequality and targeting
accuracy, and all methods respond very similarly to changes in community heterogeneity as mea-
sured by ethnic and religious fractionalization. To summarize, only community size appears to
put community-based targeting at a small disadvantage relative to statistical targeting.
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Cost-benefit analysis
Given the superior targeting accuracy of the econometric proxy-means test and partly also the
asset index over community-based targeting, I compare costs and benefits of these three methods.
Mayoux and Chambers (2005, p.283) state that ”a key advantage of participatory methods is their
cost-benefit in rapidly bringing together information and knowledge from many participants.” In
the same vein, the meta-studies of Coady et al. (2004b) and Conning and Kevane (2002) attribute
the lower administration costs of CBT to the wage differential between external enumerators and
community agents. When a welfare program’s intention is to reduce poverty and CBT is cheaper
but at the same time less accurate than statistical targeting, there is a trade-off and the relatively
inexpensive CBT will be more cost-effective than statistical targeting for programs with relatively
small transfer amounts, while the opposite holds for large transfer amounts. This is precisely what
Alatas et al. (2012) find in their Indonesian context (Table 5, columns 1 and 2, of their Online
Appendix). In the present analysis I will calculate transfer-amount thresholds for the competing
targeting methods. In this context, I make two innovations. First, on the cost side, I consider
alternative scenarios regarding the availability of data for statistical targeting. Second, on the
benefit side, I derive explicit formulae linking exclusion errors from the estimations to poverty
reduction instead of relying on numerical poverty simulations (as in Ravallion, 2009; Alatas et al.,
2012; Klasen and Lange, 2015).
I use cost information from the 2009 community-based targeting intervention and implemen-
tation costs for the statistical methods based on data collection campaigns in 2010 (Lietz et al.,
2015).13 All figures are inflated to 2014 CFA (African Financial Community) francs using the
consumer price index of Burkina Faso and converted to 2014 US dollars using the 2014 average
market exchange rate of 526 Francs per dollar. Total implementation costs for CBT amount to
$2,373. For the two statistical methods I consider three cost scenarios. First, I assume that
census and household survey information are freely available and only data processing costs of
$5,761 for the econometric PMT and $2,665 for the asset index accrue. The difference between
the two amounts reflects the extra work required to process the consumption survey data for the
econometric PMT. In addition, the second scenario takes into account the data collection costs
for the household consumption survey of $41,899, which is needed to calibrate the econometric
13I focus on direct implementation cost and do consider neither opportunity cost of the survey respondents nor
the communities’ focus group participants.
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PMT. Hence I calculate a total cost of $47,660 for the econometric PMT, while the cost of the
asset index remains unchanged. In the third scenario, for both statistical indices, I add the cost
of collecting the census data of $36,053, amounting to total costs of $83,713 and $38,718 for the
econometric and asset index, respectively. To these fixed targeting costs I will add the aggregate
benefits paid to beneficiary households as variable costs, to obtain the total cost of a targeted
welfare program.
Turning to the benefits, I will employ the so-called distributional characteristic (Coady and
Skoufias, 2004), in which the aggregate transfers received by initially consumption-poor households
are the social benefit of a targeted program. Given the purpose of the community targeting exercise
studied here, to identify the 20 percent poorest households in each community, I use this as the
definition of poverty. This approach is equivalent to considering the change in a welfare function,
where the consumption of each initially poor household enters with a weight of one and all other
households with a weight of zero. Many recent papers on targeting accuracy take the change in
poverty indices of the FGT family as the social benefit of a targeted welfare program and rely on
numerical poverty simulations to quantify a program’s effect on poverty (Ravallion, 2009; Alatas
et al., 2012; Klasen and Lange, 2015). This approach, in contrast, has the advantage that there is
a single metric linking the targeting accuracy of a specific targeting method to the social benefit
of a welfare program, namely the exclusion error. I think that this explicit relationship instead of
less transparent simulations is a substantial advantage for the understanding of the link between
targeting accuracy and poverty reduction.
To fix ideas, I denote by B the average benefit per consumption-poor household in response
to a targeted welfare program which transfers t dollars to each eligible household and relies on
a specific targeting method. Since, in my framework, the probability that a consumption-poor
household is a beneficiary equals one minus the exclusion error I have that
B = (1− E)t,
where E denotes the exclusion error of the targeting method under consideration. The cost of
such a program per eligible household will be denoted by
C = t+ TC,
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where TC denotes the fixed targeting costs per eligible household, i.e. the total targeting costs
divided by the number of beneficiary households. Consolidating the two equations, one obtains
B(C;E, TC) = (1− E)(C − TC). (3.1)
As pointed out above, this benefit is proportional to the reduction in the poverty-gap index, where
the factor of proportionality is independent of C, E and TC. Following Ravallion (2009), I am
interested in which targeting method delivers the greatest benefit given a budget for the total cost
per eligible household, C.
I now compare the benefits of transfer programs involving community-based targeting with
econometric and asset-index based proxy means tests, respectively. The econometric PMT is
always more cost-effective for programs with a large transfer benefit, and hence total costs, because,
as C tends to infinity, the limit of the benefit-to-cost ratio approaches one minus the targeting
method’s exclusion error. For low total costs, in contrast, it is solely the fixed targeting cost TC
that matters for cost-effectiveness. For all three cost scenarios regarding statistical targeting, CBT
always accrues less than half the targeting cost of the two statistical methods, implying that it is
the most cost-effective method for anti-poverty programs with small transfer amounts.
Table 3.8 contains transfer-amount thresholds for pairwise comparisons of the three targeting
methods. When only data processing costs accrue (column 1), community-based targeting is the
most cost-effective method for transfer amounts of up to 1.95 and 6.68 dollars in rural and semi-
urban communities, respectively. When all data collection costs are taken into account for the
two statistical methods, these figures increase to 99 and 133 dollars, respectively. It is also inter-
esting to compare the two statistical procedures with each other. Recall that employing principal
components does not require the use of consumption data. Accordingly, in cost scenarios 2 and
3, the econometric PMT is more cost-effective only for relatively large transfer amounts, of about
55 and 100 dollars in rural and semi-urban areas, respectively. Figure 3.1 contains plots of the
benefits as functions of total costs for the three methods for the scenario where all data collection
and processing costs are calculated for the statistical methods. Accordingly, for rural areas (upper
panel), asset-index targeting is most cost-effective for only a small intermediate cost range, around
one hundred dollars per eligible household, while CBT (econometric targeting) is the method of
choice for programs with a small (very large) budget. In the semi-urban areas (lower panel),
where CBT targets more accurately than the asset index, the picture looks qualitatively similar,
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except that the upper envelope is formed by CBT and the econometric PMT exclusively. For the
two sectors taken together I find little scope for the relatively less expensive statistical methods,
which employ no consumption data for the calibration of index weights, as the upper envelope of
the cost-benefit frontier is largely formed by community-based and econometric targeting. This
argument applies also to the BPL scorecard, which can be expected to be somewhat cheaper −but
at the same time less accurate− than the asset index.
Table 3.8: Cost-benefit analysis
Cost scenarios for statistical targeting
(1) (2) (3)
Data Data Data
Method A delivers higher benefits than method B processing processing, processing,
for program costs smaller than ... and no data consumption full data
A B collection data collection collection
Rural
CBT Econometric PMT 5.74 62.14 110.69
CBT Asset index 1.95 1.95 99.31
Asset index Econometric PMT 8.11 99.77 117.80
Semi-urban
CBT Econometric PMT 6.68 74.77 133.37
CBT Asset index always always always
Asset index Econometric PMT 5.11 56.17 74.20
Notes: All figures are in 2014 US dollars, not PPP adjusted. The maximum cost per eligible household for
which method A is more cost-effective than method B is calculated by solving the equation B(C;EA, TCA) =
B(C;EB , TCB) for C, where B is the benefit per eligible households (see equation 3.1). In column 1 we consider
only data processing costs of the census for the asset index ($1.33 per eligible household) and data processing
costs of the census and the consumption survey for the econometric PMT ($2.88 per eligible household). In
column 2 we consider data processing costs of the census for the asset index ($1.33 per eligible household),
and data processing costs of the census and the consumption survey as well as data collection costs of the
consumption survey for the econometric PMT ($23.83 per eligible household). In column 3 we consider data
collection and processing costs of the census for the asset index ($19.36 per eligible household), and data
collection and processing costs of the census and the consumption survey for the econometric PMT ($41.86 per
eligible household). For community-based targeting we consider the CBT implementation and data processing
costs of $1.19 per eligible household throughout.
To put these figures into perspective, the effective average benefit per eligible household in the
present intervention, a discount on the premium of a health-insurance police valid for 24 months,
amounts to $1.28, which implies a total cost of $3.35 per eligible household (benefit of $1.28 plus
targeting cost of $2.07). I conclude that, among the targeting procedures considered here, CBT was
indeed the most cost-effective method for targeting consumption-poor households - even though
CBT’s targeting cost of $2.07 per eligible (or consumption-poor) household amounts to more than
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three times the average transfer benefit received by a consumption-poor household ($0.64, one
minus CBT’s average exclusion error of 0.5 times $1.28). Given this seeming disproportion, would
an untargeted subsidy have been more cost-effective? As there are no targeting costs for such
a program and, by construction, twenty percent of households are poor in my application, the
benefits received by poor households equal one fifth of the total costs of the program. This implies
that a universal program is always most cost-effective for very small program budgets - because
no fixed costs accrue. For a uniform transfer, a universal program is more cost effective than CBT
up to cost thresholds of $2.18 and $1.89 in the rural and semi-urban sector, respectively. Given
the total cost per beneficiary household of $3.35, it appears that community-based targeting has
indeed been the most cost-effective method in the context considered here.
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(a) Rural
(b) Urban
Figure 3.1: Costs and benefits of statistical and community-based targeting
Notes: All figures in current local prices (in CFA) are inflated to 2014 local prices using the consumer price index
of Burkina Faso and converted to US dollars using the 2014 average exchange rate. There is no adjustment fur
purchasing power.
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3.5 Discussion
In the following I shall summarize my findings and make explicit how they contribute to the
existing literature. First, regarding the performance of various statistical targeting methods, I
confirm the common and little surprising finding that the econometric PMT is by far the most
accurate method. My findings are partially in accordance with Filmer and Scott (2012), who find
no statistical differences when comparing the asset index with other common statistical indices
that do not involve consumption data for the calibration. In this setting, the asset index performs
similarly well as the BPL scorecard, but significantly better than the poverty scorecard and the
multidimensional poverty index. Second, regarding CBT and statistical targeting methods, my
targeting accuracy results are very similar to the results obtained in a large field experiment in
Indonesia, where Alatas et al. (2012) find that the econometric PMT is about ten percentage
points more accurate than the CBT (α = 0.10).
Third, my finding of the CBT’s good performance in semi-urban neighborhoods is novel. CBT
initially emerged from so-called rapid rural appraisals and has so far predominantly been applied
in rural settings (Chambers, 1994a). Coady et al. (2004a) expect the method to perform worse in
urban sectors, where anonymity is greater and hence the information advantage of local community
members smaller. My finding suggests that communities in rural and semi-urban areas follow
different poverty concepts and that survey consumption is more correlated with the latter.
Fourth, the finding that decentralized targeting is less accurate in bigger communities is in
line with Alatas et al. (2012). Karlan and Thuysbaert (2016) find that in comparison with two
statistical procedures the CBT’s cost advantage increases with community size as it incurs high
fixed cost. Taken together, these two findings point towards a trade-off between higher targeting
errors and lower costs when implementing community-based targeting in larger communities.
Finally, findings from the cost-benefit analysis demonstrate the trade-off between CBT’s lower
program costs on the one hand and the econometric PMT’s higher accuracy on the other. Even if
there is much anecdotal evidence for CBT’s relative cost advantage over statistical targeting meth-
ods, there are very few studies including cost data (Alatas et al., 2012; Karlan and Thuysbaert,
2016). In the present context, where I consider an inexpensive decentralized expert assessment,
community-based targeting is more cost-effective than any of the statistical methods. The accu-
racy gains of the econometric PMT outweigh the CBT’s cost advantage only for very large transfer
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amounts and there is little scope for less expensive statistical methods, such as the asset index or
scorecards. For the average transfer in my application, participatory targeting is the method of
choice. But even for larger, hypothetical, transfers CBT dominates in this African context. To
illustrate, first, we consider the Indonesian unconditional cash transfer program investigated by
Alatas et al. (2012). Per individual in an eligible household, the program’s annual cash transfer
equals about 1.4 percent of Indonesia’s per capita GDP in 2008. Translated to Burkina, this figure
amounts to about $70 per household and year in 2014 US dollars. Depending on the overhead cost
available in addition to the funds earmarked for transfer benefits, a program of this size may or
may not exceed the threshold of around $125 below which community-based targeting is the most
cost-effective method. On the other hand, if benefits are granted to eligible households for more
than one year, econometric targeting will be the method of choice. A Burkinabe´ cash transfer
program geared at improving schooling and access to health care for children in poor families, the
Nahouri Cash Transfers Pilot Project, employed sophisticated econometric proxy-means testing
(Akresh et al., 2014). Implemented between 2008 and 2010, it involved transfers of about $160
per targeted household over the course of two years. Clearly, for such a program, econometric
targeting would be the method of choice in the context I have studied.
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Ethnic Favoritism in
Decentralized Targeting
In this chapter, I test for ethnic favoritism in the decentralized targeting choice of the local
committees. The merged dataset allows me to observe a household’s ethnic and religious affiliation
to each member of the targeting committee and, at the same time, to control for a wide range
of dimensions in observable wealth. My empirical specification aims to identify a bias in the
decentralized targeting decision due to ethnic favoritism, conditional on observable wealth and on
possible wealth differences across ethnic groups. With this analysis I directly contribute to three
strands of literature.
The first strand of literature studies elite capture within decentralized targeted welfare pro-
grams and can be decomposed into two sub-strands. A first branch considers participative or
community-driven allocation decisions and does not find evidence for elite capture (Dasgupta and
Beard, 2007; Alatas et al., 2012; Schu¨ring, 2014).1 A second branch looks at targeted welfare
programs at the local government level and finds mixed results. Indian village committees tend
to capture Below-the-Poverty-Line benefit entitlements for themselves and close relatives (Besley
et al., 2012; Panda, 2015), while more powerful political elites do not worsen pro-poor targeting
in West Bengal communities (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). Political leaders in sub-Saharan
1Alatas et al. (2012) randomly vary the committee composition within community-based targeting of Indonesia’s
national cash transfer program and do not find a higher targeting error for more elitist committees. Dasgupta
and Beard (2007) analyzes a community-driven poverty alleviation program and do not find that benefits were
allocated differently when elites were in charge. Schu¨ring (2014) conducts controlled lab-in-the-field experiments
in 25 Zambian villages and finds no evidence for favoritism in the benefit allocation decisions.
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Africa favor politically connected (Pan and Christiaensen, 2012, in Tanzania; Caeyers and Der-
con, 2012, in Ethiophia) and kin households (Basurto et al., 2016, in Malawi) when making an
allocation choice on private in-kind benefits. For several Indonesian welfare programs, Alatas
et al. (2013a) link both sub-strands when comparing elite capture across formal and non-formal
leaders. Overall, they find a very moderate extent of elite capture, only exercised by formal lead-
ers at the implementation but not at the targeting stage. With my study on ethnic favoritism I
introduce a novel and important elite capture dimension to this literature. The ability to empiri-
cally distinguish between intentional and information-driven favoritism provides a methodological
contribution and the analysis of a community-driven welfare program in a sub-Saharan African
country considers a novel context.
The second strand of literature investigates ethnic favoritism in distributional policies and
has exclusively considered central-level decision making, with a particular focus on sub-Saharan
African countries. Substantial favoritism −amounting to a doubling in channeled resources− is
found with respect to the president’s coethnic districts in Kenya (Burgess et al., 2015, on the
allocation of roads) and political leader’s birthplaces in 47 sub-Saharan African countries (Dreher
et al., 2016, on the allocation of Chines aid).2 In their comprehensive assessment of ethnic fa-
voritism, De Luca et al. (2016) cover 140 multi-ethnic countries and consider observations from
1992 to 2013. Among other things, they find that the current leader’s ethnic homelands enjoy up
to 10 percent more intense nighttime light and that ethnic favoritism is not only prevalent in sub-
Saharan Africa, but can be considered a global phenomenon. In contrast to Burgess et al. (2015),
they find institutional quality to only moderately reduce the extent of ethnic favoritism. I con-
tribute to this literature by shifting the empirical assessment of ethnic favoritism in distributional
policy decisions to the most decentralized level.
Third, my analysis contributes to a rapidly growing literature on the role of ethnic diversity
in explaining socio-economic outcomes. A number of empirical cross-country studies has found
that ethnic fractionalization is associated with lower growth rates (Easterly and Levine, 1997),
lower public good contributions (Alesina et al., 1999; Desmet et al., 2016), and higher corruption
(Mauro, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003). A more recent set of
studies primarily investigates public good provision outcomes and channels for the subnational
2 See also two studies that employ Demographic Health Survey data and find ethnic favoritism to correlate
with lower health and education outcomes (Kramon and Posner, 2012, in Kenya; Franck and Rainer, 2012, for 18
African countries).
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level and finds mixed evidence.3 To the best of my knowledge, Olken (2006) provides the only
subnational capture-related study and finds that ethnically diverse areas show a higher likelihood
to be missing rice within Indonesia’s public distribution system. By studying a well-documented
decentralized targeting program for the sub-Saharan African context, I complement Olken (2006)
with a more disaggregated analysis (that identifies the nature of leakage) and with evidence for a
new geographical context. In addition, the choice of my outcome variable provides novel insights
on the potential mechanisms of the ‘ethnic diversity relationship’. Ethnic favoritism can be seen
as a manifestation of discriminatory preferences, where individuals attach a higher utility to the
welfare of coethnic than to non-coethnic individuals (Becker, 1957). Such preferences can explain
lower public good contribution (Habyarimana et al., 2009) or higher corruption levels (Mauro,
1995) in ethnically diverse communities. Within a literature that is relatively ambiguous about the
channels through which ethnic diversity might worsen political economy outcomes (Habyarimana
et al., 2007) my study thus contributes with a qualitative test of the plausibility of the prominently
hypothesized ‘preferences mechanism’.
4.1 Empirical Approach
With my empirical analysis I aim to identify possible distortions in the decentralized allocation
decision, conditional on observable wealth and on wealth differences across ethnic and religious
groups. The distortion of interest arises when two equally needy households are treated differently
because of their ethnic or religious affiliations to the local representatives. I start this section by
presenting my main empirical specification and discussing identification concerns. Following this,
I set out how I test for favoritism across community fractionalization and derive a measure to
quantify the distortion in the social outcome due to favoritism.
3For the low-income context, the adverse relationship between public good provision and ethnic diversity is
confirmed for school and water provision in rural Kenya (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), for community-maintained
infrastructure projects in Northern Pakistan (Khwaja, 2009), and a cooperation game in rural Malawi (Dionne,
2015). No relationship is found for public good provision in Sierra Leone (Glennerster et al., 2013) and Tanzania
(Miguel, 2004). A positive relationship is suggested for government spending in Zambian districts (Gisselquist
et al., 2016) and a public good game in urban neighborhoods of Kampala (Schuendeln, 2013). Subnational studies
that consider high- or middle-income countries include Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Alesina et al. (2004), Glaeser
and Saks (2006), Alesina et al. (2014), Mavridis (2015), Swee (2015), Algan et al. (2016).
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Testing for favoritism
Primarily, I want to test for favoritism in the committee’s final allocation choice. The latter
occurs when households which are ethnically affiliated to at least one committee member are
favored over non-represented households. While this definition does not fully match the more
narrow notion of ethnic favoritism, where political leaders favor coethnic households exclusively
(Burgess et al., 2015; Bramoulle´ and Goyal, 2016), it considers an outcome that likely reflects
the preference for ethnic favoritism. Given that committee members share an interest in favoring
coethnic households, the choice to favor all ethnically represented households provides a plausible
strategy. Specifically, favoritism of ethnically represented households can be understood as the
representative’s best response, leading to an equilibrium allocation that contains sufficiently many
coethnic households from each representative. Similarly, elected representatives belong to the
community’s elite (see section 2.2) and as such they likely share a common identity (Platteau,
2004). Ethnic favoritism with respect to committee-affiliation then would reflect a natural way to
act in the common interest of the elite.
In the data I observe one final allocation decision per household and consider the following
regression equation:
1{Targeted}cher =αe + µr + φc + X’γ + β1 · 1{Ethnicity represented}cher
+ β2 · 1{Religion represented}cher + ucher,
(4.1)
where 1{Targeted}cher equals one if household h in community c with ethnicity e, and religion
r is entitled to the benefit.4 A household h with at least one ethnically or religiously affiliated
committee member is indicated by {Ethnicity represented}cher and {Religion represented}cher,
respectively. αe, µr, φc are ethnicity, religion, and community fixed effects, respectively, and X’
is a vector of 50 socio-economic control variables. Given the empirical specification, my iden-
tifying assumption may be stated as follows: A household’s ‘unobservable’ wealth must not be
systematically different when living in a community where it is affiliated to the local committee,
in comparison to a community where it shows no such affiliation. For simplicity, I estimate a
linear probability model and relegate alternative regression specifications to my robustness checks
4In addition to ethnicity, it is of interest to also consider favoritism along religious lines. It primarily depends
on the local context and, thus, is an empirical question whether favoritism takes place through the one or the other
channel. In the local context considered here, ethnic and religious affiliation are not strongly correlated and I show
in section 4.4 that the exclusion of one of the two dimensions does not qualitatively change the main results. For
ethnically and religiously mixed households I assign the household head’s affiliation.
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in Section 4.4. Economically, equation 4.1 is of main interest as it refers to the final allocation
decision. Econometrically, however, this empirical specification is prone to three potential threats
from selection on unobservables (the following considerations mainly refer to the ethnic dimension,
but they equally apply for religion).
First, I cannot rule out that the targeting committee processed wealth information that is
unobservable in the data. When unobservable household characteristics correlate with ethnic
affiliation, such a scenario can bias my ethnic favoritism coefficient. This is likely to occur when
committee members have superior unobserved information on coethnic households. Let us assume
that, for instance, ethnic affiliation allows to better observe a household’s poverty dimension
which is not observable to the researcher. In such a scenario, a positive βˆ1 might include both an
intended preferential treatment of coethnic households but also an unintended information-driven
kind of favoritism. The direction of the latter is not clear; a more precise wealth assessment of
coethnic in comparison to non-coethnic households could lead a representative to either overvalue
or undervalue the wealth of non-coethnic households. Nevertheless, the resulting outcome would
reflect a deviation from a hypothetical allocation that is based on my set of observable wealth
variables. To address this separation problem between an ‘intended’ and an ‘information-based’
type of favoritism, I exploit the fact that the targeting design in the context of my study is
based on the aggregation of three individual, independently determined beneficiary lists. All
households were ranked by three representatives. Thus, I observe three (preliminary) allocation
decisions per household, such that the number of observations equals three times the number of
sample households. At the same time, the affiliation status for a given household might vary.
Household h is either (i) affiliated to representative i, (ii) not affiliated to representative i but
affiliated to at least one other committee member, or (iii) without any affiliation to the committee.
Consequently, I can test whether representatives only favor coethnic households −probably due
to better information− or whether they also favor non-coethnic represented households. While
evidence for the latter does not rule out the occurrence of ‘information-based’ favoritism overall,
it can be taken as evidence for the existence of an ‘intentional’ favoritism.5 The corresponding
5In the local elite capture literature, surprisingly few studies address information-based identification concerns.
For the set of studies that tests for capture and redirection of benefits towards relatives (Alatas et al., 2012, 2013a;
Panda, 2015; Basurto et al., 2016), friends (Schu¨ring, 2014), or politically connected households (Dasgupta and
Beard, 2007; Caeyers and Dercon, 2012) I have come across two. First, Caeyers and Dercon (2012) state that
an in-group information advantage should disproportionally pay-off in larger communities. They do not find a
significant interaction effect with community size and take this as evidence in favor of the ‘intended’ favoritism
channel. Second, for the local allocation of agricultural input and food subsidies, Basurto et al. (2016) test whether
chiefs’ allocation choice incorporates additional local information on household’s returns to subsidies.
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regression equation is
1{Targeted}cheri = αe + µr + φc + X’γ
+ β1 · 1{Same ethnicity}cheri + η1 · 1{Different ethnicity, represented}cheri
+ β2 · 1{Same religion}cheri + η2 · 1{Different religion, represented}cheri + ucheri,
(4.2)
where 1{Targeted}cheri indicates whether household h in community c with ethnicity e, and
religion r is targeted by representative i, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. {Same ethnicity}cheri in equa-
tion 4.2 equals one if household h has the same ethnic affiliation as representative i, while
{Different ethnicity, represented}cheri indicates a household h which ethnicity is represented by
the committee, but not by representative i. The baseline group is a household not being ethnically
represented in the committee and the same applies for religion. A statistically significant effect
for both η1 and η2 should reduce concerns about an information story, especially, when I cannot
reject H0 : βj = ηj , j ∈ {1, 2}. I cluster standard errors at the household-level.
Second, there remains a risk that my estimates are driven by the one-fourth of decisions which
were not based on the aggregation of the three independently created household wealth rankings,
namely the majority rule. These allocation decisions on how to fill-up remaining or exclude excess
households were based on consultations within the committee (see Section 2.2). At this stage,
a distinction between local-information-processing and discriminatory preferences is not possible
either. Additionally, and in contrast to the majority rule, within-committee consultation allowed
the representatives to share their information. The existence of information aggregation could
lead to an even improved assessment of represented households’ wealth and has the potential
to bias my estimates further. One natural way to test whether consultation-based allocation
decisions drive the effects is to estimate equation 4.1 with the subsample of households considered
for committee consultation. In all communities where the share of majority-selected households
was below (above) the intended targeting share, all those households which have been targeted by
exactly one (two) representative(s) were considered for consultation.
Finally, it is worth noting that the community-based targeting design is based on the endoge-
nous formation of local committees. Such an empirical setting is common to most of the local elite
capture studies that consider participative targeting exercises and distributional decisions within
constituted local governments. To my knowledge, only Alatas et al. (2012) and Alatas et al.
(2013a) provide two novel exceptions for the Indonesian context by introducing random variation
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in targeting committee composition.6 Hence, even if considering a common decentralized tar-
geting setting, endogenous committee formation can complicate the interpretation of my results.
Specifically, a coefficient estimate that indicates the presence of ethnic favoritism could be induced
by the committee election procedure. One evident case is reciprocity; a community assembly that
assigns the targeting mandate favorably to ethnically connected representatives (that is ethnic
majority representatives) could increase the likelihood that representatives in turn ‘respond’ with
a similarly biased targeting choice. In this case it is difficult to distinguish an ‘intended’ from a
‘reciprocal’ type of favoritism. Nevertheless, in comparison with targeting choices made by formal
elites (such as in Bardhan and Mookerjee, 2006; Besley et al., 2012; Caeyers and Dercon, 2012;
Pan and Christiaensen, 2012; Alatas et al., 2013a; Basurto et al., 2016), two features of the present
targeting design clearly hamper the room for favoritism based on reciprocal relationships. First,
public election of representatives likely reduced the incentive to suggest clearly self-serving can-
didates. Second, representatives were given a one-shot targeting mandate that neither involved
private benefits nor farther reaching political powers. Thus, apart from reputation, the benefits
from accomplishing the mandate are small and so are the reasons to act reciprocally. Neverthe-
less, it is still possible that elected representatives also held other political offices and used this
one-shot intervention as a mean to maintain their network of reciprocal relations. That I am not
able to observe such kind of committee information is a limitation of this study. It is neverthe-
less reasonable to consider my results as an upper bound of ethnic favoritism in comparison to a
hypothetical allocation that takes place under a randomly selected local committee.
Favoritism and community characteristics
I am further interested in heterogeneous effects of ethnic and religious favoritism. In particular,
I test whether political leaders capture and redirect relatively more benefits in communities that
are more diverse. To measure ethnic and religious diversity, I apply the widely-used index of
ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF), which is a decreasing transformation of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman concentration index (Hirschman, 1964). Due to a limited total number of communities
I construct a fractionalization indicator variable, which is one for the fifty percent least fraction-
alized communities and zero otherwise.7 For both ethnicity and religion I add the corresponding
6For a collective community exercise, Alatas et al. (2012) produce differently composed groups by randomly
varying the venue or time of the exercise, while Alatas et al. (2013a) randomly delegate targeting authority either
to a group of formal or informal political local leaders.
7In Section 4.4 I show that results are not driven by community outliers which are located close to the median-
based cutoff and that the results remain qualitatively unchanged when interacting the two indicator variables with
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community fractionalization indicators and interact them with the favoritism variables. When
augmenting equations 4.1 and 4.2 in this way, I obtain the following two regression equations:
1{Targeted}cher = αe + µc + φc + X’γ
+ δ1 · 1{Ethnicity represented}cher + δ2 · 1{Religion represented}cher
+ λ1 · {Ethnicity represented∗ Ethn. homogenous community}cher
+ λ2 · {Religion represented ∗ Rel. homogenous community}cher + ucher.
(4.3)
1{Targeted}cheri = αe + µc + φc + X’γ
+ δ1 · 1{Ethnicity represented}cher + δ2 · 1{Religion represented}cher
+ λ1 · {Ethnicity represented∗ Ethn. homogenous community}cher
+ λ2 · {Religion represented∗ Rel. homogenous community}cher + ucheri.
(4.4)
Note that the application of community fixed effects eliminates the community fractionalization
indicators and that my identifying assumption is further relaxed by the introduction of the in-
teraction terms. The empirical specifications in equations 4.3 and 4.4 allow me to test whether
ethnic or religious favoritism statistically differ across high- and low-fractionalized communities.
For instance, for the effect of being ethnically represented on the probability of being targeted in
equation 4.3, I consider two coefficients of interest. First, δ1 is the effect of being an ethnically
represented household who lives in an ethnically high-fractionalized community. Second, δ1 + λ1
gives the same effect for households living in ethnically low-fractionalized communities. For re-
ligion, the two corresponding coefficients of interest in equation 4.3 are δ2 and δ2 + λ2, and the
same logic applies for equation 4.4. In line with existing studies from the elite capture literature,
I shall also examine favoritism across a community’s degree of economic inequality.
Measuring the distortion to the social outcome due to favoritism
I finally examine how the favoritism-based allocation bias deteriorates the overall targeting accu-
racy. The latter is commonly assessed in terms of the mean targeting error, which is the proportion
of households which are erroneously excluded from or included in the beneficiary list (section 3.2
on page 37). I shall focus on the exclusion error, which occurs when a household whose ethnicity
is not represented in the committee fails to receive benefit entitlements because of favoritism.
the rank in ethnic or religious fractionalization.
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Specifically, my objective is to calculate the proportion of not ethnically represented households
which are excluded from the beneficiary set due to favoritism (reflected by β1 > 0 in equation
4.1). When I express this figure as a fraction of the total number of beneficiary households, I have
1− p
q
(
Pr(Targeted = 1|R = 0, β = 0)− Pr(Targeted = 1|R = 0, β > 0)
)
,
which I call the ‘distortion to the set of beneficiary households’ or ‘exclusion error’. It can either be
defined with respect to ethnic or religious favoritism. In the above expression, Targeted indicates
whether a household is eligible to receiving benefits, R is an indicator for being represented in the
committee, p is the corresponding fraction of represented households in my application, and q is
the share of beneficiary households, or the targeting quota. Notice that (1 − p) · Pr(Targeted =
1|R = 0, β = 0) is the fraction of not represented households in the population when there is no
favoritism. Hence, (1 − p) times the difference in parentheses is the fraction of not represented
households in the population excluded from the eligibility set due to favoritism. Divided by q, I
have the population counterpart of the number of excluded households which are not represented,
divided by the number of households in the beneficiary set.8 Furthermore,
Pr(Targeted = 1|R = 0, β = 0) = EX|R=0[γX]
Pr(Targeted = 1|R = 0, β > 0) = EX|R=0[γX]− pβ.
Hence, the distortion equals
(1− p)p
q
· β, (4.5)
where p and q can be obtained from the data’s sample means, and β from the LPM estimation. In
my data the fraction in the latter expression is bounded by 1.33, as the maximum of the numerator
is 0.25 (for p = 0.5) and the targeting share is 0.188. For both ethnicity and religion, Table C.2
in the Appendix provides the respective values for the fraction in equation 4.5 when considering
all, high-fractionalized, and low-fractionalized communities.
8In equation 4.1, I assume a data generating process where a household being targeted (Targeted = 1) is
a Bernoulli trial with the probability depending on observables, including representation status (R). I consider a
population model, Pr(Targeted = 1|X,R) = γX+β(R−p) = γX+βR˜, where X is a vector of wealth characteristics
observed by the researcher, including village dummies and ethnicity fixed effects, drawn from some multivariate
distribution. R˜ is the representation status normalized by subtracting its population mean. The normalization
won’t affect any of the parameters of interest that are estimated, in particular β, when X includes a constant term.
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4.2 The Data
For empirical analysis, I combine the community-based targeting dataset with the population
survey data and the health insurance register (see Figure 2.6 on page 22). For the year 2009 the
merged dataset allows me to observe a household’s ethnic or religious affiliation, whether and how
it was targeted for private benefits as well as its ethnic or religious affiliation to the targeting
committee. In addition, I observe a wide range of socio-economic household characteristics that
are likely to explain a fair amount of the committee’s ‘unbiased’ allocation decision. Given its
universal coverage, I augment the dataset with information on how ethnic and religious groups
are distributed within communities. From the initial set of 36 rural villages and 22 semi-urban
neighborhoods I had to drop eight villages where I could not successfully identify all three repre-
sentatives.
Figure 4.1 presents average community population shares for six ethnic and five religious groups
that are present in the study area. Religion, in the lower panel, is very similarly distributed across
rural and semi-urban communities. On average, Muslims and Catholics account for more than
80 and 96 percent of the rural and semi-urban community populations, respectively. In contrast,
rural-urban differences exist for ethnicity, with ethnic groups being more uniformly distributed in
semi-urban than in rural communities. On average, the Dafin and the Bwaba account for more
than 75 percent of the rural but for less than 50 percent of the semi-urban community population.
The Samo are very widespread in Nouna town but almost not existent in villages. See Table C.1
in the Appendix for more detailed descriptive information on the distribution of groups.
The upper panel in Table 4.1 presents alternative measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization
at the community-level. According to all measures, and in line with the pie charts in Figure 4.1,
fractionalization is relatively low except for ethnic groups in semi-urban communities. According
to the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF), the average probability of randomly drawing
two ethnically different households is twice as high in semi-urban than in rural communities,
while no such pattern is observed with respect to religion. The two bottom panels in Table
4.1 report the composition of the local targeting committees which, overall, may be regarded as
fairly representative of the community population. Higher ethnic fractionalization in semi-urban
communities is reflected by more heterogeneous committees. About two-thirds of rural and one-
third of semi-urban committees are occupied by three representative from the same ethnic group,
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Figure 4.1: Average community population shares by sector
Notes: Pie charts depict average community population shares of six ethnic and four religious groups in the study
area by sector.
respectively. The slightly higher religious fractionalization of rural communities is associated
with a higher likelihood to observe a non-homogeneous committee, when compared to semi-urban
communities. Lower fractionalization is associated with a higher average number of representatives
belonging to the majority ethnic or religious group. The opposite holds for representatives from
minority groups and representatives from ethnically or religiously mixed households.
Overall, I use a set of 49 socio-economic indicators covering demographics (7), occupational choice
(11), dwelling conditions (7), livestock (8), non-productive assets (13), and health insurance pref-
erences (3). In addition, I construct a variable that represents a household’s position in the overall
distribution of households’ approximated landholdings.9 Table 4.2 separately presents summary
statistics for all, representative, and beneficiary households by sector. Overall, rural (column 2)
and semi-urban (column 5) households are similar with respect to demographic characteristics
and show only slight differences in education and migration patterns.10 On average, semi-urban
9In particular, from the population census, I first took the households’ statements on their agricultural output
during last harvest, measured in kilogram. For each product the FAO gives the approximate cropland required
per kilogram. By multiplying the latter with the output amount I calculated the approximate plot size used by
each household. Based on this measure, I grouped households into deciles, for rural and semi-urban subsamples,
separately.
10Merging the CBT data with the population survey data led to a loss of 735 rural and 400 semi-urban house-
holds. Most rural households are lost due to the exclusion of eight rural villages, where no information on the
representatives could be obtained. Lost households in Nouna town are distributed evenly across neighborhoods.
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Table 4.1: Community and committee characteristics: ethnicity and religion
Ethnicity Religion
Rural Semi-urban Rural Semi-urban
A. Fractionalization at the community-level
Number of groups per community 3.79 5.41 3.18 3.00
Average share of majority group 0.78 0.43 0.74 0.79
Average share of minority group 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.04
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF) 0.32 0.67 0.36 0.32
B. Fractionalization at the committee-level
Homogeneous committees 0.64 0.27 0.46 0.77
Majority committees 0.29 0.55 0.46 0.23
Heterogeneous committees 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.00
C. Average number of representatives
... from majority group 2.43 0.82 2.07 2.41
... from minority group 0.04 0.36 0.43 0.05
... with mixed households 0.14 1.41 0.57 0.45
Notes: Panel A reports mean values calculated at the community level. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization
index (ELF) measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different ethnic or religious
groups, respectively. In each community a local targeting committee with three representatives was formed.
Panel B and C report mean values at the committee level.
households are less often occupied in the agricultural sector, show more sophisticated dwelling
characteristics, higher possession incidences for assets, and higher health insurance utilization
than rural households, while the opposite is true for livestock possession. When comparing the
unrestricted sample with the subsample of political leaders, for the latter one observes higher mean
values for a wide range of wealth-indicating variables (columns 1 and 4). Beneficiary households
(columns 3 and 6), on average, show higher degrees of deprivation in all three wealth dimensions
than the population sample. In rural villages, for instance, beneficiary households show possession
incidences less than half of those of the population sample for one-sixth of dwelling characteristics
and roughly one-third of livestock and asset indicators.
The community-based targeting design of consideration deliberately involves the participation
of community members with political influence (Savadogo et al., 2015). Participants of the publicly
summoned community meetings were instructed to propose three representative who, in turn,
made a choice on the set of beneficiary households. Hence, within each community there is
endogenous committee formation. While missing information on political power relations of these
Since the timing of CBT data collection does not perfectly overlap with the population survey period, matching
of households performed worse in Nouna town, which has a much higher degree of in- and out-migration than the
average rural village.
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representatives, with the following two equations I set out to analyze their ethno-linguistic and
socio-economic characteristics:
1{Representative}her = αe + µr + φc + uher, (4.6)
1{Representative}her = φc + γ1 ·Demographicsher + γ2 ·Occupationher
+ γ3 ·Housingher + γ3 · Livestockher + γ3 ·Assetsher + uher.
(4.7)
The unit of observation is a household h, the left-hand side dependent variable is one for represen-
tative households and standardized by community size. First, in equation 4.6, I analyze whether
representatives are more likely to come from certain ethnic groups by regressing the dependent
variable on a set of ethnicity (αe), religion (µr) and community (φc) fixed effects. I am mainly
interested in the single intercepts of α̂e, the ethnicity fixed effects, which also capture across-group
variation in all other socio-economic characteristics (the base ethnic group is ‘other’). Second, in
equation 4.7, I check whether the mandated political leaders are representative in terms of socio-
economic characteristics or whether they are, for instance, outstandingly wealthy. To this end, I
have applied principal-components analysis to construct socio-economic aggregates from my five
sets of census variables in Table 4.2, and take a household’s standardized rank in the correspond-
ing PCA-based index as explanatory variable. I present regression results of equation 4.6 and
4.7 in panel A and B of Table 4.3, respectively. The 134 representatives identified in the dataset
account for about 3 percent of all sample households. Overall, I find evidence that all semi-urban
households not coming from the ethnic group ‘other’ have a 3 to 10 percentage points higher like-
lihood of being an elected representative. Overall, Peulh households show the highest coefficient
for semi-urban communities. The second panel shows that semi-urban representative households
are relatively well-equipped with livestock when compared to the average normal household.
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Table 4.2: Census survey summary statistics by sector and sample specification
Rural Semi-urban
Sample specification:
Represen-
tatives
All
HHs
Benefi-
ciary HHs
Represen-
tatives
All
HHs
Benefi-
ciary HHs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Demographics
Household size 8.70 8.24 5.76 9.60 7.85 5.87
Age of household head 47.47 50.56 53.29 52.40 52.90 56.91
Household had is prime age 0.70 0.63 0.52 0.58 0.57 0.42
Share of children below age of 16 0.41 0.39 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.29
Share of prime age household members 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.43
Share of elderly household members 0.08 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.14 0.23
Any death of prime age member (2007-09) 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Occupational choice
HH head’s graduation 73.12 78.63 85.66 48.40 57.56 73.03
HH head is literate 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.53 0.35 0.16
HH head is no employed in agric. 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.36 0.54 0.56
HH head never emigrated 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.03
HH head never imigrated 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.09 0.10
HH head migrated into study area 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.13 0.21 0.21
Highest graduation within HH 93.31 94.95 94.56 86.65 86.58 90.13
Number of literate HH members 7.05 6.45 4.49 12.55 9.42 6.33
Number of non-agric. employed HH members 6.28 5.61 3.73 8.35 6.39 4.49
Number of emigrated HH members 0.53 0.56 0.54 0.78 0.47 0.40
Number of imigrated HH members 1.59 1.65 1.28 2.16 1.62 1.28
Dwelling characteristics
Good roof (better than tile) 0.27 0.23 0.09 0.53 0.52 0.29
Good wall (more than straw) 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.18 0.07
Good toiled toilet (not open field) 0.28 0.24 0.16 0.93 0.88 0.86
Number of living rooms 4.08 3.81 2.84 4.76 4.54 3.61
Light with electricity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.39 0.15
Not cooking with wood 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02
Good water connection 0.41 0.34 0.35 0.62 0.56 0.50
Livestock possession (incidences)
Bullock 0.61 0.56 0.24 0.56 0.36 0.21
Sheep 0.42 0.40 0.21 0.55 0.39 0.25
Goat 0.62 0.63 0.45 0.27 0.21 0.14
Donkey 0.59 0.53 0.26 0.64 0.46 0.33
Horse 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Pig 0.22 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.13
Chicken 0.94 0.83 0.68 0.67 0.61 0.48
Rabbit 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Assets possession (incidences)
Bike 0.99 0.90 0.77 0.89 0.92 0.84
Motorbike 0.41 0.28 0.07 0.38 0.38 0.11
Car 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Wagon 0.52 0.49 0.19 0.60 0.48 0.33
Radio 0.82 0.75 0.56 0.91 0.83 0.62
TV 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.29 0.33 0.10
Mobile phone 0.41 0.26 0.10 0.64 0.64 0.40
Refrigerator 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.01
Sewing machine 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.05
Mill 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Gun 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.00
Modern kitchen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.01
DVD player 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.16 0.03
Health insurance
Any HH members enr once betw 2007-09 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.15
Any HH members enr > once betw 2007-09 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.08
Number of communities 28 28 28 22 22 22
Number of households 79 2920 549 55 1653 305
Share of all households 0.03 1.00 0.19 0.03 1.00 0.18
Notes: The table reports mean values from the merged dataset across three subpopulations and by sector.
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Table 4.3: Representatives’ characteristics
Being elected representative∗100 / Community size
Panel A: Ethnic differences Panel B: Socio-economic Differences
Pooled Rural Semi-urban Pooled Rural Semi-urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ethnic group
Dafin 0.05*** 0.08* 0.03**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Bwaba 0.04** 0.05 0.04**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Mossi 0.05*** 0.05 0.06**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Peulh 0.04* 0.01 0.10***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Samo 0.07*** 0.11 0.06***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02)
Indices of socio-economic position (PCA)
Demographics 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Occupation 0.00 -0.04 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Housing 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Livestock 0.01 -0.02 0.05**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Assets -0.01 0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Landholding decile 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Controls (50) NO NO NO NO NO NO
Community FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ethnicity FEs YES YES YES NO NO NO
Religion FEs YES YES YES NO NO NO
Number of households 4573 2920 1653 4573 2915 1635
Number of representatives 134 79 55 134 79 55
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Indices for demographics,
occupation, housing, livestock, and assets are obtained through principal-components analysis from a set of
7, 11, 7, 8, and 13 variables, respectively (see Table 4.2). Landholding decile: a household’s position in the
overall distribution of households’ approximated landholdings, based on households’ self-reported statements
on agricultural output in the last season.
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4.3 Results
Ethnic and religious favoritism
Estimation results for my main favoritism specifications from section 4.1 are presented in Table
4.4 on page 73. For the ease of interpretation, I have multiplied the dependent variable by
100, if not stated otherwise and report pooled as well as sector-wise results. Columns 1−6 and
7−12 depict individual and committee allocation decisions, respectively. According to Panel A,
representatives similarly favor coethnic households in comparison to ethnically represented non-
coethnic households. Even though the effect for the latter is about two percentage points greater
than for the former, I cannot reject the hypothesis that both coefficients are equal at conventional
levels. I thus interpret them as being similarly large and take it as evidence against the argument
that my estimates are primarily driven by an unintended information-based favoritism. Overall,
these effects are clearly driven by and precisely estimated for semi-urban communities, while
no effects are found for religious affiliation. In addition, the results from Panel A suggest that
representatives in semi-urban communities carefully take into account the targeting preferences of
the joint committee.
Given the majority-based aggregation rule such collusive or strategic behavior likely reinforces
the extent of ethnic favoritism at the committee level, for which Panel C sets out corresponding
estimation results. The weakly significant effect of ethnic favoritism by rural representatives
is not transmitted to the final allocation decision but instead vanishes. On the other hand,
strong ethnic favoritism in individual choices made by semi-urban representatives is reinforced at
the committee-level, where being an ethnically represented household increases the likelihood for
receiving benefits by 6.40 percentage points, statistically significant at the one percent level. This
gives a distortion measure of 0.083, indicating that more than eight percent of the total number
of beneficiary households have been erroneously excluded due to favoritism.
Panels B and D in Table 4.4 present heterogeneous effects with respect to community fraction-
alization for the individual and committee allocation choice, respectively. Overall, I do not find
any evidence for religious favoritism after controlling for the degree of religious diversity. Further,
it is evident that the main action of ethnic favoritism comes from ethnically high-fractionalized
semi-urban communities. That is reflected by large and highly significant coefficient estimates in
the first row of column 6 and 12 (which is δˆ1 from equation 4.3 and 4.4). For both individual and
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committee decisions, the estimated effect roughly doubles when I only consider high fractionalized
semi-urban communities. Being ethnically represented in a high fractionalized semi-urban com-
munity increases the likelihood for receiving benefits by more than 11 percentage points, which
translates into a relative number of erroneously excluded households of almost 15 percent (see
Table C.2 in the Appendix for values applied for the exclusion error calculation).
Given that semi-urban communities, on average, are more ethnically diverse than rural commu-
nities, these findings put into question whether the difference in rural and semi-urban environments
matters at all for identifying ethnic favoritism, or whether ethnic diversity is the eminent factor.
My illustration in Figure 4.2, where I have ranked all communities (rural and semi-urban alike) by
their ELF index value suggests the latter. It shows that 20 out of the 25 most diverse communities
are semi-urban and that only one semi-urban community has a below-the-median ELF rank.
Figure 4.2: Rural and semi-urban communities, ordered by ethnic fractionalization
Notes: The graph ranks all communities (rural villages and semi-urban neighborhoods alike) according to their
value of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF). The community with the lowest ELF index is ranked first.
Grew circles indicate a community’s relative population size. Urban refers to the subsample of households from
semi-urban communities.
Regression results from Table 4.4 make me confident that I do not confuse the intention to
favor ethnically represented households in the final allocation decision with some unintentional
information-driven favoritism. Additionally, I want to test whether my estimates are driven by
consultation-based decisions to subsequently include additional or exclude excessive households,
which took place at the committee level for one-fourth of beneficiary households. Even if mainly
motivated by identification concerns, this exercise adds additional general insights by exploring
whether and how an elite-capture outcome changes with the degree of discretion that is granted to
the targeting committee. To this end, I estimate equation 4.1 only with households that qualified
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as candidates for committee consultation and present results in Panel A of Table 4.5 on page 76.
My reduced sample covers 38 communities, indicating that in seven rural and five semi-urban
communities all beneficiary household were selected by majority rule. I do not find evidence that
ethnic favoritism in semi-urban communities is primarily driven by decisions where representatives
were given some room for discretion. Given a relatively high targeting share of about 0.27 in this
subsample, coefficient estimates are similarly large when compared to the unrestricted specification
in Panel C of Table 4.4.
In addition to ethno-linguistic fractionalization, it is reasonable to assume that benefit cap-
ture is associated with a community’s degree of economic inequality. This notion is based on the
argument that higher economic inequality reflects a power advantage for local elites over non-
elites and that the elites’ ability to capture resources is increasing in the latter (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2006). Thus, in what follows I estimate whether ethnic favoritism systematically
differs with a community’s observed inequality in wealth. My measure of economic inequality
is the Gini coefficient calculated for an aggregated asset index based on principal-components
analysis involving 28 census variables on dwelling characteristics, livestock and asset possession
(see Table 4.2). My inequality variable, again, is based on a sample split at the Gini coefficient
median value, and equals one for values above the median. The resulting regression equation is
equal to equation 4.3, after substituting the two indicators {Ethnic homogenous Community} and
{Religious homogenous Community} with the indicator {Non-egalitarian Community}. Estima-
tion results in Panel B of Table 4.5 demonstrate that ethnic favoritism is strongest in the 50 percent
most egalitarian semi-urban communities, suggesting a negative relationship between ethnic diver-
sity and economic inequality. This is confirmed by Figure C.1 in the Appendix, which depicts the
relationship between economic inequality and fractionalization for semi-urban communities. Co-
efficient estimates for religious favoritism provide suggestive evidence that religiously represented
households are discriminated in semi-urban communities with high economic inequality levels;
being religiously represented by the committee decreases the chances for benefit entitlements by
6.19 percentage points.
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Table 4.4: Test for ethnic and religious favoritism
Being targeted poor by representative∗100 Being finally targeted poor∗100
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9 ) (10) (11) (12)
Ethnicity
HH ethnicity is reprsn. (in fract. commun.) 4.93*** 3.06 8.85*** 4.46*** 1.38 6.40*** 5.95*** 1.71 11.49***
(1.42) (1.95) (2.32) (1.57) (2.49) (2.20) (1.86) (2.69) (2.94)
Represented and coethnic 3.32*** 3.19* 3.67**
(1.26) (1.92) (1.80)
Represented but not coethnic 3.61*** 1.94 5.73***
(1.39) (2.10) (1.94)
H0: Ethn. coefficients are equal (p-value) 0.78 0.39 0.17
Ethnicity represented * Low fractionalization -4.65** -1.66 -9.41*** -4.92* -2.85 -10.98***
(2.28) (3.67) (3.20) (2.91) (4.67) (4.06)
HH ethnicity is reprsn. in homog. commun. 0.28 1.40 -0.56 1.03 -1.13 0.51
p-value 0.88 0.70 0.81 0.68 0.80 0.87
Religion
HH religion is reprsn. (in fract. commun.) -1.03 -0.67 -1.10 -0.65 0.47 -1.87 -1.09 0.13 -2.03
(1.24) (1.54) (2.33) (1.58) (2.04) (2.81) (1.67) (2.16) (3.01)
Represented and coreligious -0.37 0.16 -1.21
(1.20) (1.51) (2.17)
Represented but not coreligious -2.17 -1.71 -1.88
(1.38) (1.62) (2.88)
H0: Rel. coefficients are equal (p-value) 0.05 0.07 0.74
Religion represented * Low fractionalization 3.29 7.15 -0.34 5.17 10.18 1.02
(3.01) (5.02) (3.93) (4.07) (7.35) (5.07)
HH religion is reprsn. in homog. commun. 2.26 6.49 -1.44 4.07 10.31 -1.01
p-value 0.44 0.19 0.70 0.30 0.15 0.84
Controls (50) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ethnicity Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Religion Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 13650 8745 4905 13650 8745 4905 4550 2915 1635 4550 2915 1635
Number of households 4550 2915 1635 4550 2915 1635 4550 2915 1635 4550 2915 1635
Number of communities 50 28 22 50 28 22 50 28 22 50 28 22
Number of key informants 150 84 66 150 84 66 150 84 66 150 84 66
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in
parentheses. For ethnicity and religion, H0 tests whether βˆ1 = ηˆ1, and βˆ2 = ηˆ2, respectively (see equation 4.2).
Urban refers to the subsample of households from semi-urban communities. Low fractionalization: equals one
for the fifty percent least fractionalized communities (’homog. commun.’ in the table above) and zero otherwise
(’fract. commun.’ in the table above). The fractionalization measure is the ethno-linguistic fractionalization
Index (ELF).
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Capture of program benefits
As an extension to the main favoritism analysis, I want to test for two more dimensions of benefit
capture. First, and similar to existing elite capture studies (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006;
Besley et al., 2012; Pan and Christiaensen, 2012; Beekman et al., 2014; Schu¨ring, 2014), I test
whether political decision makers reallocate a disproportionally large share of program benefits to
themselves. Such behavior would be reflected by self-selection into the beneficiary lists, conditional
on observable wealth. Note that the targeting design of consideration naturally limits the extent of
capture to the extensive margin, as each household could only redeem one voucher. Nevertheless,
representatives were allowed to preselect their own households for benefits and that is what about
17 percent of them did. The ratio is considerably higher in rural communities and, overall, 13
percent of representatives belong to the set of beneficiary households. In the same spirit as
equation 4.1, I estimate the following regression equation
1{Targeted}cher = αe + µr + φc + X’γ + β1 · 1{Representative}cher + ucher,
where the dependent variable is the committee’s final targeting decision and {Representative}cher
indicates whether household h provides a member from the local targeting committee. I include
the common set of fixed effects and control variables. As Panel C in Table 4.5 sets out, I do not
find evidence for benefit capture by representatives.
Second, I am interested to which extent favoritism of ethnically represented households al-
lows for benefit capture by the communities’ ethnic majority groups. As shown in section 3.1,
community-driven programs differ in terms of agency. In two-thirds of the studies that are suf-
ficiently explicit about their underlying community-based targeting procedure, villagers appoint
representatives to determine the final targeting set, while the remaining schemes involve the com-
munity as a whole (see Table 3.1 on page 34). One major public choice argument in favor of
maximizing the set of representatives is minority protection (Tullock, 1959), which often comes
at higher institutional cost (Auriol and Gary-Bobo, 2012). I test for benefit capture by ethnic
majority groups within a program that uses a relatively small number of representatives. By do-
ing so, I provide descriptive insights on the optimal number of representatives in targeted welfare
schemes. As Table 4.1 on page 65 shows, the small number of representatives makes ethnic or
religious minority representation very unlikely. The opposite is true for majority groups and it is
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likely that ethnic favoritism corresponds with a situation of benefit capture by the ethnic majority
group. To test for such a phenomenon I estimate
1{Targeted}cher =αe + µr + φc + X’γ + β1 · 1{Ethnic majority}cher
+ β2 · 1{Religious majority}cher + ucher,
(4.8)
and
1{Targeted}cher = αe + µc + φc + X’γ
+ δ1 · 1{Ethnic majority}cher + δ2 · 1{Religious majority}cher
+ λ1 · {Ethnic majority∗ Ethn. homogenous community}cher
+ λ2 · {Religious majority ∗ Rel. homogenous community}cher + ucher,
(4.9)
where the dependent variable reflects the committee’s final allocation choice, while {Ethnic majority}cher
and {Religious majoritycher} equal one for a household h belonging to the community’s ethnic or
religious majority group, respectively. Remaining regression components are equal to my former
specifications.
Regression results for equation 4.8 and 4.9 are set out in the first and second block of Panel
D, respectively. They indicate that favoritism of ethnically represented households coincides with
a situation in which ethnic majorities capture disproportionally more private benefits than non-
majority households. On average, and conditional on observable wealth, they are five percentage
points more likely to receive program benefits, which gives an exclusion error of more than six
percent. In line with my favoritism results, benefit capture by ethnic majority groups is about
75 percent higher when one only considers highly fractionalized semi-urban communities, which
amounts to an exclusion error of about 11 percent.
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Table 4.5: Additional specifications for ethnic and religious favoritism
Being finally targeted poor∗100
Panel A:
Favoritism with
room for discretion
Panel B:
Favoritism and
econ. inequality
Panel C:
Benefit capture by
representatives
Panel D:
Benefit capture by ethnic
and religious majority groups
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9 ) (10)
Representative’s household -6.62 -1.46
(5.02) (7.85)
Ethnicity
HH ethnicity is reprsn. (in fract./egalit. commun.) 16.00* 11.11 3.96 9.61***
(9.14) (8.67) (4.49) (3.04)
Ethn. majority (in fractionalized commun.) -1.03 5.02** -0.60 8.71***
(2.50) (2.06) (2.66) (3.00)
Ethn. treatment * Low fractionalization 0.23 -7.98*
(4.42) (4.32)
Ethn. treatment * High inequality -3.46 -7.14*
(4.76) (4.32)
Ethn. treatment in homog./non-eglat. commun. 0.50 2.47 -0.38 0.73
p-value 0.85 0.43 . 0.93 0.80
Religion
HH religion is reprsn. (in fract./egalit. commun.) 6.44 16.57 2.13 5.66
(6.25) (11.82) (3.47) (3.94)
Relig. majority (in fractionalized commun.) -0.97 -1.65 -0.57 -1.20
(1.97) (2.45) (2.06) (2.62)
Rel. treatment * Low fractionalization -5.00 -0.88
(5.89) (4.98)
Rel. treatment * High inequality -2.44 -11.86***
(4.14) (4.44)
Relig. treatment in homog./non-eglat. commun. -0.31 -6.19* -5.57 -2.08
p-value 0.90 0.06 0.33 0.66
Controls (50) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ethnicity Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Religion Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 526 188 2915 1635 2893 1021 2915 1635 2915 1635
Number of households 526 188 2915 1635 2915 1635 2915 1635 2915 1635
Number of communities 21 17 28 22 28 22 28 22 28 22
Number of key informants 18 3 84 66 84 66 84 66 84 66
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimations in Panel A use
the subsample of households that qualified for subsequent inclusion into or exclusion from the beneficiary list.
Urban refers to the subsample of households from semi-urban communities. The fractionalization measure is the
ethno-linguistic fractionalization Index (ELF). The inequality measure applied in Panel B is the Gini index for
an asset index obtained through principal-components analysis from a total of 28 assets. Low fractionalization:
equals one for the fifty percent least fractionalized communities (’homog. commun.’ in the table above) and
zero otherwise (’fract. commun.’ in the table above); Ethnic and religious majority; equals one for households
that belong to the biggest ethnic or religious group of their community; High inequality: equals one for the
fifty percent most unequal communities (’non-eglat. commun.’ in the table above) and zero otherwise (’egalit.
commun.’ in the table above).
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4.4 Robustness Checks
If ethnic and religious affiliation are highly correlated it is problematic to interpret my effect as
working only through the channel of the former. In such a case, separate estimation of ethnic and
religious favoritism likely captures a similar degree of the allocation bias due to favoritism. To
check for multicollinearity, I separately test for ethnic and religious favoritism in the committee
decision and present results in Panel B of Table C.3 in the Appendix. I find that testing for
ethnic or religious favoritism alone does not change the results. As a second robustness check, I
consider an alternative model specification. As Panel C shows, the pattern of my results remain
qualitatively equal when estimating a Probit instead of a Linear Probability model.
In what follows, I check robustness of the heterogeneous effects with respect to ethnic fraction-
alization. For the set of 22 semi-urban communities, Figure C.2 depicts community-wise coefficient
estimates of ethnic favoritism (particularly, βˆ1 in equation 4.1) ordered by their rank in ethnic
fractionalization. My fractionalization indicator, {Ethn. homogenous Community}, is one for
communities below the median rank, represented by the vertical dashed line in Figure C.2. Even
though community-wise coefficients are not precisely estimated, this figure provides two insights.
First, it is reassuring to not observe any bunching of outlier coefficients close to the threshold.
Hence, the heterogeneous results are unlikely driven by the choice of applying a median-based sam-
ple split. Second, the community which is ranked third qualifies for an outlier. When excluding
this community and rerunning the main estimations I do not find significant changes in the results.
A second robustness check involves the estimation of equation 4.3 with an alternative measure of
fractionalization, the share of a community’s ethnic or religious majority group. As I expect a
strong negative correlation between ELF values and the share size of a community’s majority (see
Table 4.1), I adjust my fractionalization indicator {Ethn. homogenous Community} such that it
equals one if community c has an above-the-median majority share. Panel D in Table C.3 shows
that the community classification based on this alternative measure gives very similar estimation
results when compared to the ELF classification in Panel D of Table 4.4. Finally, Table C.4 sets
out results from an estimation of equation 4.3, where I have substituted the community-specific
diversity identifier {Ethn. homogeneous communityc} with the actual rank in fractionalization
{Ethn. fractionalization rankc}. As expected, one only observes a precisely estimated interaction
effect for ethnicity in semi-urban communities.
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4.5 Discussion
I shall close this chapter by summarizing and discussing my two main results. First, I find evidence
for ethnic favoritism by semi-urban elites, leading to an exclusion error of about 8 percent wrongly
excluded households, as a share of all beneficiary households. My effects appear modest when
compared to the distortions caused by ethnic favoritism at the central level, where Burgess et al.
(2015) find a twofold increase in road investments for coethnic districts. When compared to
other elite capture dimensions, my results are mainly in line with the existing literature. Alatas
et al. (2012) consider a low-stake cash-transfer program in Indonesia and find no evidence for
elite capture. For the same context, the authors also analyze a high-stake scenario (Alatas et al.,
2013a) for which they can distinguish between two types of political leaders as well as between
the targeting and distribution step. They find modest elite capture by formal elites at the stage
of benefit distribution. With an exclusion error of 4 percent wrongly excluded households their
effect is half as strong as ours. In addition, my results correspond with the extent of elite capture
found for two programs in sub-Saharan Africa, where local governments make an allocation choice
on private in-kind benefits. Favoritism of politically connected households in Ethiopia (Basurto
et al., 2016) and kin households in Malawi (Caeyers and Dercon, 2012) lead to exclusion errors
of 5 and 15 percent, respectively. Finally, and in line with my results, Schu¨ring (2014) finds no
evidence for religious favoritism in Zambia.
Second, my results indicate that community characteristics matter. I find that ethnic favoritism
is increasing in communities’ ethnic fractionalization, thereby confirming a large body of cross-
country studies on the adverse relationship between ethnic fractionalization and political economy
outcomes. While this empirical finding is powerful and robust across many studies −especially
for public good outcomes at the country level− less is known about the underlying channels. One
prominent hypothesis in this regard states that people would contribute relatively less to a welfare-
enhancing public good in an ethnically diverse community, assuming they give higher weights to
the utility of coethnic community-members (Habyarimana et al., 2009). Similarly, for corrup-
tion, Mauro (1995) expects bureaucrats to be relatively more willing to demand (higher) bribes
from non-coethnics such that bribe demand should be higher in ethnically diverse environments.
Based on the idea that ethnic favoritism reflects the existence of discriminatory preferences, my
results support the plausibility of the prominently hypothesized ‘preference mechanism’. Follow-
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ing Mauro (1995)’s argument, I would also expect ethnic favoritism −as one manifestation of elite
capture− to increase with ethnic fractionalization. This is different to two recent studies, which
have found that lower public good contributions in urban Ugandan neighborhoods (Habyarimana
et al., 2007) and rural Tanzanian villages (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005) is mainly driven by the
inability to enforce social sanctions within more diverse environments. As far as capture by po-
litical leaders is considered, three studies find that there is higher perceived corruption in more
ethnically fractionalized countries (Mauro, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000). At the
subnational level, my results confirm Olken (2006), who finds significantly higher leakage in pub-
licly distributed rice for ethnically diverse areas in Indonesia. Interestingly, he finds no such effect
for religious fractionalization, neither. Overall, with my study I confirm that ”one of the most
powerful hypotheses in political economy” (Banerjee et al., 2005, p.639) persists when looking at
one important manifestation of elite capture at the most decentralized level.
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Chapter 5
Subsidized Health Insurance for
the Poor: Effects on Health
Insurance Demand
After I have analyzed two important aspects of poverty targeting in chapter 3 and 4, I now turn
to the impact evaluation of the actual targeted intervention; the allocation of a premium subsidy
to encourage health insurance enrollment among poor households. My empirical strategy exploits
a discontinuity in the underlying community-based targeting procedure to identify causal effects
of the subsidy offer on health insurance demand. This analysis directly contributes to two strands
of literature.
First, I contribute to the literature on health insurance demand. To the best of my knowl-
edge, only five studies rigorously evaluate price interventions aimed at expanding health insurance
uptake in low-income countries.1 Recently, Capuno et al. (2016) and Wagstaff et al. (2016) have
evaluated social health insurance interventions that randomly varied the price of and informa-
tion on the insurance product in the Philippines and Vietnam, respectively, and find significant
enrollment effects. Thornton et al. (2010) find that Nicaraguan workers are more likely to buy
1 The majority of studies on the relationship between price and insurance take-up relies on hypothetical will-
ingness to pay studies which are presented elsewhere. These can suffer from hypothetical bias and results strongly
depend on the experimental set-up (Stewart et al., 2002). Several authors have studied the price elasticity of de-
mand for health insurance in the U.S. and mainly find fairly price-inelastic demand for health insurance (Chernew
et al., 1997; Blumberg et al., 2001; Gruber and Washington, 2005; Royalty and Hagens, 2005; Finkelstein et al.,
2012).
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health insurance when being initially offered six months of free coverage and King et al. (2009)
find considerable take-up effects for an intervention that offers improved health care supply at
lower prices in Mexico. For a social health insurance in Cambodia, Levine et al. (2016) play
a lottery with community-members who participated in an information campaign to offer them
health insurance at two different prices. Their subsidized package offered participants five months
of free health insurance and six months of health insurance at a 50 percent discount (leading to an
effective premium discount of 80 percent) and increases enrollment from about 7 to 50 percent.2
My study design comes with two favorable features when compared to the existent literature.
First, it establishes exogenous variation in health insurance pricing only and does not combine the
latter with an additional treatment, such as information (Thornton et al., 2010; Capuno et al.,
2016) or supply side incentives (King et al., 2009). Second, the 50 percent subsidy from the con-
text of my study nicely complements the two remaining study designs from the South-East Asian
context, that consider the effect of a much smaller (25 percent subsidy in Wagstaff et al., 2016)
and a much bigger (six months at price zero in Levine et al., 2016) ‘pure’ price reduction.3 My
main methodological contribution to this literature is the analysis of a pricing effect on health
insurance take-up along the household wealth distribution. In my view, investigating this rela-
tionship within the same empirical setting is crucial because the inability to afford an insurance
premium has been identified as a main obstacle to insurance take-up by poor households (Jakab
and Krishnan, 2004; Gine´ et al., 2008). Furthermore, I am first in evaluating the effect of pric-
ing on households’ health insurance demand at the intensive margin, which contributes to the
sub-literature on intra-household allocation of health inputs. Finally, this study provides novel
evidence on the price elasticity of health insurance demand for the sub-Saharan African context,
where average health indicators perform especially poorly and health insurance outreach faces
enormous challenges (World Bank, 2014).
Regarding the second directly related literature, my study provides a rigorous test for adverse
selection into health insurance in a low-income context. Social health insurance often uses the
insurance’s pooling mechanism as a market-based mean to achieve and maximize financial health
protection for the poor (Yao et al., 2015). In this sense, evaluating the extent of adverse selection
2Another related study in this regard is Fischer et al. (2016), who randomly offer six different health insurance
contracts to households in Pakistan in order to evaluate patterns of adverse selection.
3All three study designs suffer from minor limitations in generalizability in different ways. Wagstaff et al. (2016)
look at a sampled sub-population of non-poor households which are self-employed or without a long-term contract,
while Levine et al. (2016) randomize prices only among those households who attend the insurer’s information
campaign meeting. While my sampling frame considers the whole universe of households living in the study area,
the RDD approach only allows me to identify causal effects for households that are close to the beneficiary cutoff.
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is regarded important from both an efficiency and equity perspective; it informs not only on a
scheme’s financial self-sufficiency but also on its potential to cover the neediest and thus most risky
individuals in the population. The literature on adverse selection in health insurance markets of
high-income countries finds mixed results (Cohen and Siegelmann, 2010). Even though one also
expects Ackerlof’s (1970) main theoretical assumptions about the mechanisms of adverse selection
to hold in a low-income setting, such environments still could produce different results. First, there
is less capacity for ex-ante risk screening of clients as social health insurance often offers only one
very simple product (Brau et al., 2011). Second, studies in high-income countries usually focus on
switching behavior of clients between different insurance plans, while health insurance markets in
the global South commonly offer only a choice between buying and not buying health insurance
(Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). Third, risk-seeking individuals might be relatively more likely to
buy health insurance in low- than in high-income settings as it constitutes a new and largely
unknown product in the former (Polimeni and Levine, 2011).
The literature mainly considers two empirical approaches to test for adverse selection in health
insurance markets (see Yao et al., 2015 for a recent review). The first approach examines the cor-
relation between individuals’ decision to buy health insurance and health care utilization. Since
the choice on the latter might be affected by insurance status, such an approach cannot disen-
tangle adverse selection from moral hazard (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000). Alternatively, one
can address this separation problem by estimating the relationship between ex-ante health status
and health insurance take-up. Studies that apply this second empirical approach for low-income
countries, however, usually do not observe ex-post health care utilization and thus fail to quantify
the financial consequences of adverse selection (Fischer et al., 2016).4 Following a more recent
alternative approach, I exploit exogenous health insurance price variation and employ health care
utilization data among insured individuals to analyze whether the pool of insurees that bought
health insurance at a higher price, on average, shows higher utilization levels. While this approach
takes care of moral hazard and obtains a cost-relevant measure of adverse selection, exogenous
price variation also allows for differences in unobservables. For the low-income context, Polimeni
and Levine (2011) and Fischer et al. (2016) are the only studies which apply such a ‘price test’
to study adverse selection into a newly established insurance in Cambodia and Pakistan, respec-
tively. I contribute to this literature by considering a setting where price variation takes place
4To my knowledge, Banerjee et al. (2014) provide the only exception in this regard. The empirical context is a
newly introduced bundled health insurance by SKS Microfinance in Karnataka, India.
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for a health insurance product that has been in place for three years already and by adding novel
evidence for the sub-Saharan African context.
5.1 Empirical Approach
My identification strategy exploits a discontinuity in the premium subsidy allocation rule which is
based on community wealth rankings. I explain in the following how I set up my fuzzy regression
discontinuity design and discuss necessary identifying assumptions, before I introduce my empirical
specification and outcome variables.
A fuzzy regression discontinuity design
In the local context of my study, community-based targeting of subsidy-eligible households mainly
relies on an observable aggregation rule that is subject to the three representatives’ wealth rank-
ings. As I have set out in Section 2.2, three quarters of beneficiary households are selected by
applying ‘majority rule’ to the three representatives’ wealth rankings. By calculating a house-
hold’s median wealth rank and using the community-specific beneficiary cutoff rank, I can mimic
the majority rule as follows: A household is eligible by majority rule when its median wealth rank
is below the beneficiary cutoff.5
Thus, with a household’s median wealth rank as forcing variable, the majority rule gives a
discontinuity in eligibility assignment at the community cutoff rank. Since not all finally eligible
households are determined via majority rule, ‘being eligible by majority rule’ is a strong but not
a perfect predictor for subsidy eligibility. In particular, I observe a fair fraction of ‘non-complier’
households which is subsidy-eligible but only mentioned by one representative. In some rare cases,
where a small number of majority-eligible households had to be excluded, I also observe some ‘non-
compliers’ which are not on the beneficiary list even though eligible by majority rule. Hence, my
‘fuzzy’ regression discontinuity design (RDD) uses the discontinuity in the majority rule as an
instrument to predict subsidy-eligibility in a first-stage.6 For households with a median wealth
rank sufficiently close to the community’s beneficiary cutoff, my identification strategy then allows
5To see this, consider community c with 50 households, a beneficiary share of 20 percent and a corresponding
cutoff rank of 10. Assume further, that representatives {A,B,C} assign wealth ranks {4, 9, 13} and {6, 11, 12} to
household h and j, respectively. Then, household h is eligible by majority rule since its median wealth rank of 9 is
below the beneficiary cutoff of 10, while household j is not.
6In Section 5.3 I run such a first-stage regression to demonstrate the relevance of my instrument. As the allocation
of subsidy entitlements was the sole purpose of the community-based exercise, I do not expect the majority rule to
work through a different channel than the subsidy entitlements itself (exclusion restriction).
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me to estimate the effect of being offered a 50 percent premium discount on insurance take-up
and other outcomes. My main identifying assumption is that the outcome variable absent the
intervention must be continuous in the household median wealth rank.7 For continuity to hold,
individuals must not be able to manipulate the forcing variable, nor to precisely sort around the
discontinuity threshold (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In Section 5.4, I shall
discuss the validity of my identifying assumption and present corresponding robustness tests.
Empirical specification
In order to obtain a lower bound of the average treatment effect (around the cutoff), I estimate the
intent-to-treat effect (ITT) of being subsidy-eligible by majority rule on health insurance take-up,
and utilization. As suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010), I estimate a local linear regression
model with rectangular kernels
ych =αc + β · 1{EligByMajority}ch + γ ·MedianRankch
+ δ · 1{EligByMajority}ch ∗MedianRankch + uch,
(5.1)
where 1{EligByMajority}ch is my instrumental variable, indicating whether household h from
community c has been preselected for the subsidy entitlement by majority rule or not. As discussed
in the former subsection, this treatment variable equals one for households with a median wealth
rank below the beneficiary cutoff. If not stated otherwise, I include community fixed effects
(αc) to improve the precision of the estimation. My forcing variable is a household’s median
wealth rank (MedianRankch) which is centered at the cutoff, CDF-transformed and thus bounded
between −0.2 and 0.8. I include the forcing variable as well as the interaction effect between the
instrumental and forcing variable to allow for different slopes at both sides of the beneficiary
cutoff. Since both the application of majority rule and the determination of final beneficiary
status are community specific, I do not expect any benefit from including community fixed effects
in the first-stage regression and thus leave them out. The dependent variable ych in my first-stage
regression is an indicator for final eligibility status. Then, for households in a sufficiently small
interval around the beneficiary cutoff, the ordinary-least square coefficient estimate βˆelig gives the
effect of being eligible by majority rule on final eligibility status. When ych is one of my outcome
variables, βˆoutc gives the intent-to-treat effect of being majority-eligible for the subsidy on the
7To be precise, due to the aggregation rule it is even sufficient if the outcome variable is continuous in one of
the three household wealth ranks.
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outcome of interest. In addition, the Wald estimator, βˆ
outc
βˆelig
, gives the local average treatment
effect (LATE) of being eligible on taking up the insurance (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Note that,
economically, the LATE provides a more meaningful interpretation than the ITT. Nevertheless,
I will show that the ITT is a very strong instrument for eligibility, which can be considered as a
reasonable lower bound of the LATE.
Table 5.1 lists the outcome variables of my analysis. When the outcome variable is health
insurance take-up, I consider the following three specifications. First, I estimate the ITT and
LATE on household take-up at the extensive margin, with an outcome variable that indicates
whether any member in household h has bought health insurance in the year 2009 or 2010. As
an extension, I also estimate the ITT effects on take-up incidence across both years (that is: Has
any household member bought health insurance at least once between 2009 and 2010?) and test
whether subsidy-eligibility in 2009 affects the choice to renew health insurance into the year 2010.
Second, to estimate the ITT effect at the intensive margin, I separately estimate equation 5.1
with corresponding subsets of household members (for instance, for male and female household
members) and test for statistically significant differences across subgroup ITT estimates.
Third, I exploit wealth differences across semi-urban communities to estimate heterogeneous
effects of the subsidy offer. I construct the community wealth variable in three steps. In a first
step, I build a principal-components asset index that is based on household dwelling characteristics
and asset possession indicators. I then sort all semi-urban households in the study area by the
asset index to obtain household wealth percentiles. In a third step, I take out the average wealth
percentile for the two households located around each community’s beneficiary cutoff, wc. Thus,
wc provides a measure for community wealth evaluated at the beneficiary cutoff and expressed
in wealth percentiles of the semi-urban area’s household wealth distribution.8 The corresponding
regression equation to estimate heterogeneous ITT effects is
ych =α+ β · 1{EligByMajority}ch + γ ·MedianRankch
+ δ · 1{EligByMajority}ch ∗MedianRankch
+ pi · 1{EligByMajority}ch ∗ w˜c + λ · w˜c + uch,
(5.2)
where w˜c is the community wealth percentile centered at the median of wc. For the ease of
interpretation, I do not include community-fixed effects (inclusion does not change the results).
8As I estimate local causal effects, I define wc this way and do not take a more general measure for community
wealth such as the mean asset index value.
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Then, βˆ is the ITT effect of subsidy-eligibility for a median-wealthy household and pˆi gives the
additional change in the ITT effect for moving up the wealth distribution by one percentile. Hence,
equation 5.2 allows for the estimation of price elasticities of insurance demand across wealth. In
addition, λˆ gives the relationship between wealth and health insurance demand such that equation
5.2 allows me to extrapolate Engel Curves at two different prices. The latter should be only drawn
and interpreted for the range of wealth percentiles one observes in wc.
Table 5.1: Set of outcome variables
Outcome variable Cross-section Round
Enrollment: Extensive margin
Any HH member bought health insurance in the year 2009 or 2010 universe 2009/10
Any HH member bought health insurance at least once betw. 2009 and 2010 universe 2009
Any HH member bought health insurance in the year 2010 HHs insured in 2009 2010
Enrollment: Intensive margin
Individual bought health insurance in the year 2009 or 2010 female vs. male 2009/10
Individual bought health insurance in the year 2009 or 2010 adolescents vs. adults 2009/10
Individual bought health insurance in the year 2009 or 2010 prime aged vs. elderly 2009/10
Individual bought health insurance in the year 2009 or 2010 core vs. extd. family 2009/10
Health care utilization
Total household per capita number of annual health care facility visits insured HHs 2009/10
Total household per capita amount of annual health insurance payouts insured HHs 2009/10
Notes: Cross-section: indicates whether the whole population (universe) or a distinct subpopulation of households
is covered; Round: indicates which survey round was used for the estimation.
From a health insurance perspective, risky individuals are more likely to fall ill or less likely
to recover quickly and, thus, should show higher health care utilization rates. When the insurer is
not able to screen for different risk types or has only one single health insurance product at offer,
selection of risky types into the health insurance (adverse selection) drives up the insurer’s cost
in the long-term. As a consequence, the insurer has to lift up the premium, which crowds out less
risky individuals with a lower willingness to pay and leads to market failure (Akerlof, 1970). In
contrast to this efficiency-based perspective, adverse selection into health insurance can also be
understood as a favorable feature to achieve universal health coverage, a concept that is advocated
by the World Bank and aims towards a reality where every needy individual might receive health
services without financial hardship (Wagstaff et al., 2016). I test for adverse selection into health
insurance by analyzing whether the pool of insurees that bought health insurance at the normal
price, on average, comprises higher health risk than the group that bought health insurance at
the subsidized price. My outcome variable reflects health care utilization, a cost-relevant measure
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for the insurer’s self-sufficiency that is driven by a household’s risk to fall or stay ill. Specifically,
I estimate equation 5.1 for the subsample of households which has been partially or fully insured
at least once between 2009 and 2011. The two outcome variables, ych, are the total household
per capita number of ambulance visits and the total household per capita value of annual health
insurance payouts. The latter provides a lower-bound cost measure as it contains consultation
capitation fees and prescribed drugs but excludes costs for treatments that were provided in the
department hospital.
5.2 The Data
The empirical analysis in this chapter combines the community-based targeting data with popu-
lation survey data and administrative data from the health insurance records (see Table 2.6 on
page 22). Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for some key variable of the combined dataset
by sector. I use the wealth ranking data to construct the forcing variable which is household h’s
median wealth rank. Descriptive statistics of this dataset are set out in Table 2.1 on page 24.
I construct the main outcome variables of interest from the administrative insurance data that
is depicted in Panel A of Table 5.2. I consider insurance enrollment between 2009 and 2010 at the
extensive (household level) and intensive (individual level) margin. While semi-urban communities
show an average individual enrollment rate that is twice as high as in rural communities, the latter
shows a higher percentage increase over years. By 2010, about one-sixth and one-fourth of all
households had at least one member insured in rural and semi-urban communities, respectively.
In line with the enrollment patterns, utilization rates increased from 2009 to 2010 and insurance
payouts are on average 55 percent higher in semi-urban than in rural communities.
As Panel B illustrates, the average household consists of about 12 members, of which about six
members are aged below 16 years, 5 are prime aged and 1 is above the age of 55 years. The average
annual household mortality incidence is 0.2 and the average number of within-household deaths
between 2009 and 2012 is 6.20 and 3.85 in rural and semi-urban communities, respectively. Finally,
census survey data in Panel C of Table 5.2 illustrates that livestock possession is widespread in
the study area and even more pronounced in rural communities.
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics
Rural Semi-urban
2009 2010 2009 2010
A. Insurance enrollment (Admn. insurance data)
Individual enrollment incidence 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.13
Households with at least one enrolled member 0.10 0.14 0.23 0.26
Individuals’ number of ambulance visits 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.28
Households’ number of ambulance visits 3.06 4.84 4.60 6.42
Amount of households’ ambulance payouts 2,952.5 5,190.0 5,013.7 7,627.1
B. Demographics (Vital registration system)
Household size 11.56 11.57 11.69 12.02
Household-share of 0-16 year-olds 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.46
Household-share of 16-55 year-olds 0.38 0.38 0.43 0.44
Household-share of >55 year-olds 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11
Incidence of any within-household death 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.20
Number of within-household deaths over 2009/12 6.20 6.20 3.85 3.85
C. Livestock (Population census survey)
Household owns any big livestock 0.74 0.65
Household owns any small livestock 0.97 0.91
Number of big livestocked household owns 5.30 3.11
Number of small livestocked household owns 23.47 12.26
Number of individuals 28,569 28,446 17,496 17,580
Number of households 2,791 3,128 1,506 1,884
Number of communities 28 28 22 22
Notes: The table presents mean values from the merged dataset for three different categories. Mean values in
Panel A and B are calculated at the individual or household level. Asset information in Panel C is recorded at
the household level.
5.3 Results
In addition to result tables, I illustrate the main local linear regression results with scatter plots,
depicting the relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable. As suggested by Lee and
Lemieux (2010), for all the RDD scatter plots, I calculate average outcome values by household
median wealth percentile. The relative number of observations per percentile is expressed by
bubble size. The plots also indicate the beneficiary cutoff value at zero and depict the fitted
local linear regression line with a 95 percent confidence interval. This graphical presentation
allows for immediate statistical inference. The coefficient estimate βˆ reflects the distance between
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both fitted lines at the cutoff and is precisely estimated at conventional levels as long as the
confidence intervals on both sides of the cutoff do not overlap.9 As my identifying assumption
only holds for a sufficiently small neighborhood around the beneficiary cutoff, I separately estimate
equation 5.1 and 5.2 with household samples I have trimmed towards 20, 15, and 10 median-wealth-
rank percentiles around the cutoff. Given an underlying non-linear functional form, the bias in
my local linear approximation of the ‘true’ local effect increases in window size. As estimation
accuracy also increases in window size, the optimal choice of window size is subject to a trade-
off between a smaller bias at the expense of a loss in accuracy (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The
comparison of ITT estimates across window sizes provides a common check for the robustness of
my results. Large variation in the estimates’ magnitude across windows can be either driven by
power issues or by a relatively bad fit of my local approximation for large windows. In either case
I should be cautious when interpreting corresponding results. While my regression tables include
different window specifications, I display my RDD scatter plots for only one selected window
size. Summary statistics and estimation results from the study area thus far suggest that rural
and semi-urban communities provide very different living environments, for instance, reflected by
significant differences in asset wealth (see Figure 2.4). Hence, I am interested how health insurance
pricing affects outcomes in both rural and semi-urban sectors, separately, and shall present my
results in this fashion.
First-stage regression
For both rural and semi-urban communities, Figure 5.1 illustrates that the wealth-ranking-based
majority rule is a strong predictor for finally receiving the subsidy entitlement. The scatter
plots confirm that almost all majority-eligible households finally received the subsidy offer. In
contrast, those households at the right-hand side of the cutoff, which are not majority-eligible but
were nevertheless subsequently drawn into the beneficiary list after consultation, introduce some
‘fuzziness’ in the subsidy assignment and motivate the use of majority rule as an instrument. As a
relevant instrument, being eligible by majority-rule increases the chances for subsidy-eligibility by
about 85 percentage points in rural and semi-urban communities alike. In Figure 5.1 I depict this
effect for a one-decile-window around the cutoff, while local linear regression estimates in Table
9There can be slight deviations between statistical inference from the graphical presentation in comparison to
the output tables that come due to the fact that the confidence interval option in Stata does not allow for robust
standard errors.
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D.1 in the Appendix confirm the robustness across different window sizes.
Pricing and health insurance demand
Figure 5.2 and Table 5.3 set out the ITT effect of being subsidy-eligible by majority rule on
households’ health insurance take-up at the extensive margin. If not stated otherwise, my result
interpretations in this subsection refer to a 15 median-wealth-rank percentile window around
the cutoff (h=0.15). I find an economically large effect for semi-urban communities which is
statistically significant at the one percent level. Being offered health insurance at a 50 percent
discount increases average health insurance demand by a factor of almost 5, from initial 7 percent
to almost 34 percent (column 5). According to the left-hand side graph in Figure 5.2, there is
no such effect for rural communities. When taking the exact coefficient estimates from Table 5.3,
for a 15 and 10 percentile window I find a price elasticity of health insurance demand of −1.3
and −1.5, respectively.10 Table 5.4 sets out three additional specifications for the semi-urban
(a) Rural (b) Urban
Figure 5.1: First-stage regression
Notes: Dots represent average outcome values by household median wealth percentile. Dot size indicates the
relative number of observations per percentile. The forcing variable on the horizontal axis is based on three
community wealth rankings, centered at the beneficiary cutoff, CDF-transformed and bounded between −0.2
and 0.8.
subsample. The Wald estimator in the first panel gives the local average treatment effect for
eligible households on the probability to take up health insurance. The LATE (Table 5.4, column
2) is about five percentage points higher than the ITT (Table 5.3, column 5), which reflects a
moderate increase of roughly 15 percent. Hence, the ITT provides a reasonable lower bound
10I compute the price elasticity as the jump in demand relative to average insurance demand at the cutoff. For
a 15 percentile window this gives 0.268
0.5·((0.268+0.07)+0.07) = 1.31.
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(a) Rural (b) Urban
Figure 5.2: Intent-to-treat effect of majority-eligibility on health insurance enrollment
Notes: Dots represent average outcome values by household median wealth percentile. Dot size indicates the
relative number of observations per percentile. The forcing variable on the horizontal axis is based on three
community wealth rankings, centered at the beneficiary cutoff, CDF-transformed and bounded between −0.2
and 0.8.
approximation of the economic effect I am finally interested in. Second, I check whether being
offered a 50 percent discount affects the household’s choice to insure at least one member over a
two-years period. Relative to the pooled local linear regression from Table 5.3, I find a slightly
smaller increase in take-up of a factor of 3.9 (column 5) reflecting a price elasticity of −1.2. For
households that have bought health insurance in 2009, I finally estimate the ITT of the subsidy
offer on the decision to extend health insurance coverage into the next year. Not surprisingly,
this subsample shows a relatively high average 2010 enrollment rate of about 70 percent in a 20
percentile window around the cutoff. When keeping only households that were already insured in
2009, the sample size decreases considerably and challenges robust identification of the ITT effect.
Even for a 20 percentile window around the beneficiary cutoff one observes only 31 households
to the cutoff’s right, that is an average 1.4 households per community. Given these concerns, I
take the ITT estimate of 0.36 in column 7 of Table 5.3 rather as suggestive evidence for a positive
effect of subsidy eligibility on the likelihood of extending health insurance into the next year.
So far, I have focused on enrollment effects at the extensive margin, where I considered a
household’s decision to insure at least one of its members. In addition, Table 5.5 sets out results
for enrollment effects at the intensive margin. To test whether the price discount leads to selection
into health insurance by certain household member groups, I separately estimate the ITT effect
on enrollment for different pairs of complement household subsets and check for significantly
different ITT coefficient estimates across both equations. For statistical inference, I consider the
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Table 5.3: Intent-to-treat effect of majority-eligibility on enrollment
Insured in 2009 or 2010
Rural (N=5692) Semi-urban (N=2690)
h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1 h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Majority-eligible in 2009 0.008 0.007 0.018 0.238*** 0.268*** 0.324***
(0.027) (0.032) (0.040) (0.064) (0.074) (0.094)
Median wealth rank -0.288* -0.351 -0.337 0.441 1.043** 1.668*
(0.156) (0.248) (0.485) (0.280) (0.489) (0.854)
Majority-eligible * Median wealth rank 0.320 0.397 0.666 0.842 0.362 0.818
(0.257) (0.371) (0.632) (0.620) (0.920) (1.666)
Constant w./o comm FEs 0.053 0.056 0.059 0.090 0.070 0.053
Mean of insured 0.041 0.041 0.046 0.157 0.168 0.181
Community FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations (number of households) 2088 1675 1143 1038 809 548
Observations left of cutoff 987 862 603 507 420 292
Observations right of cutoff 1159 871 598 570 428 295
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. h is the window bandwidth
around the beneficiary cutoff: for instance, h = 0.2 indicates that the regression only includes households
that are located 20 wealth percentiles above or below the beneficiary cutoff. The corresponding number of
observations is given in the bottom panel, while the header contains the overall number of observations.
corresponding test statistics in conjunction with the subgroups’ baseline insurance rates.11 When,
for instance, subgroup A shows both a significantly higher ITT effect and an initially lower or
equal insurance rate as subgroup B, I take this as evidence for selection into health insurance
by households members of subgroup A. I find evidence for selection by household age groups
(columns 7 to 14). Overall, the subsidy offer encourages households to enroll younger household
members who are aged below 16 (column 8 vs. 10). Within the group of adults, elderly household
members, on average, show twice as high initial enrollment rates as prime aged individuals but
significantly lower enrollment effects of the subsidy (column 12 vs 14). Thus, the discounted price
offer enhances convergence in health insurance enrollment among these two adult groups and, on
average, puts adolescents at an advantage over adults. I do not find evidence for selection within
sex (columns 4 to 6) and only suggestive evidence for selection by extended households members
(columns 15 to 18).
11Otherwise it is hard to tell whether a larger coefficient actually provides evidence for a statistically significantly
larger relative effect on take-up.
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Table 5.4: Different enrollment specifications for semi-urban communities
Insured in 2009 or 2010 Insured in 2009 and/or 2010 Renewed ins. in 2010
h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1 h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1 h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Majority-eligible in 2009 0.263*** 0.285*** 0.333*** 0.364* 0.487** 0.737***
(0.073) (0.085) (0.108) (0.217) (0.220) (0.236)
Finally eligible (instrumented) 0.279*** 0.317*** 0.383***
(0.075) (0.087) (0.111)
Median wealth rank 0.645** 1.327** 2.085** 0.384 0.885 1.339 2.358 4.438** 7.449***
(0.316) (0.535) (0.932) (0.371) (0.611) (1.111) (2.056) (2.151) (2.218)
Eligibility * Wealth rank 0.621 0.047 0.348 1.009 0.535 1.094 -1.020 -3.037 -4.179
(0.586) (0.868) (1.570) (0.714) (1.065) (1.908) (2.433) (2.507) (2.844)
Constant w./o comm FEs 0.054 0.028 0.002 0.118 0.102 0.089 0.727 0.649 0.549
Mean of insured 0.157 0.168 0.181 0.190 0.202 0.216 0.808 0.828 0.867
Community FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations (number of households) 1038 809 548 526 411 278 78 64 45
Observations left of cutoff 507 420 292 259 215 149 49 42 30
Observations right of cutoff 570 428 295 287 216 149 31 24 17
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimations refer to the
subsample of semi-urban households. h is the window bandwidth around the beneficiary cutoff: for instance,
h = 0.2 indicates that the regression only includes households that are located 20 wealth percentiles above or
below the beneficiary cutoff.
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Drawing Engel Curves: Health insurance demand and wealth
In line with existing studies on the determinants of health insurance demand, my descriptive
results indicate a strong positive association between household wealth and insurance take-up (see
Figure 2.4). In addition, Figure 5.3 shows that the subsidy effect puts the demand of semi-urban
poor households on par with the wealthiest households in the study area. To test for heterogeneous
effects of health insurance pricing along household wealth, I exploit wealth differences across the
22 semi-urban communities. Since the participative wealth rankings cannot be compared across
communities, I use census survey information on households’ dwelling characteristics and asset
possessions to identify a household’s position in the area’s asset wealth distribution. Specifically,
my community wealth variable wc gives the wealth percentile of the ‘cutoff household’ living in
community c. Given across-community variation in average wealth, I expect ‘cutoff households’
to show different wealth percentiles across communities.
Figure 5.3: Take-up effect along the whole distribution of semi-urban households
Notes: Dots represent average outcome values by household median wealth percentile. Dot size indicates the
relative number of observations per percentile. The forcing variable on the horizontal axis is centered at the
beneficiary cutoff, CDF-transformed and thus bounded between −0.2 and 0.8.
The two bottom rows in Table D.2 in the Appendix indicate that most of semi-urban ‘cutoff
households’ are positioned within the range of the 20 and 35 percentile of the semi-urban area’s
household wealth distribution. For this wealth spectrum the results suggest a substantial wealth
effect on health insurance demand. Moving up one decile in the household wealth distribution is
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associated with an increase in demand by 4.15 percentage points (coefficient λˆ in equation 5.2).
On the other hand, I cannot reject the hypothesis that differently wealthy households respond
differently to health insurance pricing (coefficient pˆi in equation 5.2). The relatively large increase
in the standard errors of my estimated interaction effect (when compared to the linear effect),
however, suggests a power problem (due to only limited variation of my wealth variable at the
community level) to be a likely reason for this non-result.12
The results in Table D.2 motivate an Engel Curve illustration. Figure 5.4 depicts the relation-
ship between health insurance demand and asset wealth for the semi-urban subpopulation. The
gray dashed line shows the estimated (and smoothed) density in household eligibility status by
wealth percentile. It indicates that only a tiny fraction of the wealthiest 40 percent households
has received the subsidy entitlement. I regard this fraction as sufficiently low to interpret the
corresponding fitted quadratic regression line as a reasonable Engel Curve approximation at high
prices. For the poorest sixty percent, on the contrary, I observe health insurance demand for
both subsidy-eligible and non-eligible households. For the subset of households residing within
the range of percentile 20 to 35, I can exploit across-community variation in wealth (green hollow
dots) to disentangle the choices made under both price scenarios.13 Consequently, the blue line
in the lower part reflects the strong wealth correlation of 0.415 absent the subsidy. Extrapola-
tion indicates that households at the 20 percentile increase their demand by a factor of 1.4 when
moving up to the 40 wealth percentile. For households around the 60 and 80 wealth percentile,
a one-quantile upward jump in wealth is associated with a smaller increase in take-up of 67 and
90 percent, respectively. The linear pricing effect in Table D.2 (coefficient βˆ in equation 5.2) is
reflected by the overall upward shift of the red line. The slope of this upper line is not estimated
precisely, which I take as evidence for similar levels of price elasticity along the wealth distribution.
Adverse selection
Table 5.6 sets out results from the adverse selection test. For this I have estimated local linear
regression equation 5.1 with the subsample of ever-insured households between 2009 and 2010.
This restriction trims the sample down to about 400 and 450 households in rural and semi-urban
12To illustrate the interpretation of my coefficients in equation 5.2, let us assume a statistically significant
interaction effect. For a 15 percentile window, the latter then would roughly indicate a 50 percent decrease in the
price elasticity of health insurance demand for moving up one wealth percentile.
13The extrapolation of both curves in this range of the distribution is based on the point I observe for the median
community and the corresponding slopes that are provided by the coefficients estimates in Table D.2.
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Figure 5.4: Extrapolation of Engel Curves for semi-urban households
Notes: The horizontal axis depicts household wealth percentiles based on an asset index. Hollow dots indicate
average enrollment rates by community asset-wealth percentile at cutoff. Filled dots indicate average enrollment
rates by asset-wealth percentile. The grey dashed line is the density of average percentile-wise subsidy eligibility,
obtained with kernel density estimation that applies a bandwidth of 0.2 (see right-hand side vertical axis). The
extrapolation of Engel Curves is based on a second-order polynomial fit for the relationship between asset-based
household wealth and insurance status (right-hand side curve: D(wealth|high price)) and on regression results
in Table D.2 (left-hand side curves).
communities, respectively, from which about one-fourth are located within the 20 percentile win-
dow around the cutoff. The first two panels reflect the extensive margin of adverse selection by
considering the total household per capita number of health care facility visits as an outcome
variable. For both rural and semi-urban communities my ITT estimate is not statistically signif-
icant at conventional levels for any window size such that my test cannot reject the hypothesis
that there is no self-selection based on risk. For rural communities I observe negative coefficients
which vary considerably with window size. In contrast, semi-urban communities show positive
coefficients which are more precisely estimated and less sensitive to window choice. Nevertheless,
my empirical design suffers from a power problem as it would require true ITTs of size one to
obtain precisely estimated coefficients. The latter would reflect an unrealistically large effect,
namely a threefold increase in average health care visits due to being offered a 50 percent price
discount. Hence, coefficient estimates for the 20 and 15 percentile window only provide suggestive
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evidence that a lower price draws in higher risk in semi-urban communities.14 Being offered health
insurance at a discounted price more than doubles the average number of per capita health care
visits from 0.53 to 1.32, for a 20 percentile window. The third panel in Table 5.6 considers ITT
effects at the intensive margin of health care utilization in semi-urban communities. The corre-
sponding outcome variable is the average annual per capita amount in payouts received by an
insured household through drug prescriptions. With a threefold increase in payouts the coefficient
estimates suggest an even stronger extent of selection at the intensive margin, even though not
statistically significant at conventional levels (see also Figure D.1 in the Appendix).
Table 5.6: ’Price test’ for adverse selection into health insurance
Number of avg. annual per capita visits Avg. annual p.c. payout amount
Rural (N=404) Semi-urban (N=447) Semi-urban (N=447)
h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1 h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1 h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1
( 1) ( 2) ( 3) ( 4) ( 5) ( 6) ( 7) ( 8) ( 9)
Majority-eligible in 2009 -0.123 -0.464 -0.177 0.789 0.765 1.152 843.741 900.153 1454.769*
(0.727) (0.848) (1.036) (0.493) (0.601) (0.758) (563.674) (683.161) (824.022)
Median wealth rank -8.886 -12.695 -11.856 2.692 3.452 5.484 2091.727 3250.665 4214.724
(6.187) (9.731) (15.158) (2.725) (4.277) (6.608) (2460.224) (3394.086) (3896.860)
Majority-eligible * Median wealth rank 9.480 12.663 25.851** -7.490 -9.026 -1.720 -4584.964 -5326.087 9567.475
(6.643) (8.929) (12.064) (7.402) (9.146) (9.743) (6979.630) (9552.132) (13957.447)
Constant w./o community FEs 1.326 1.382 1.337 0.531 0.460 0.305 459.454 407.948 311.821
Mean of outcome variable 1.138 1.094 0.998 1.089 1.083 0.900 1006.163 1021.420 881.529
Community FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations (number of households) 88 71 55 142 112 79 174 136 92
Observations left of cutoff 51 43 32 87 71 51 104 85 59
Observations right of cutoff 40 31 26 60 46 33 78 59 41
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. h is the window bandwidth
around the beneficiary cutoff: for instance, h = 0.2 indicates that the regression only includes households that
are located 20 wealth percentiles above or below the beneficiary cutoff. The outcome is health care facility
utilization from insured households at the extensive (number of average annual per capita visits) and intensive
(Average annual per capita health insurance payouts in terms of prescribed medicine) margin.
5.4 Robustness Checks
Internal validity
My main identifying assumption is that the outcome variable absent the intervention must be
continuous in the household median wealth rank. Then the variation in the treatment in a neigh-
borhood of the threshold is ‘as good as randomized’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). For continuity
to hold, individuals must neither be able to manipulate the forcing variable, nor to precisely sort
14Given the small number of observations, I am even less confident about the results for the very small window.
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around the discontinuity threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
The following three features make sorting very unlikely. First, the final targeting choice is
based on community-specific multidimensional targeting criteria and an aggregation rule that
relies on three individual wealth assessments. For a household, the nature and timing (targeting
criteria were revealed just before the wealth rankings took place) of this stepwise procedure make
it extremely difficult to correctly understand and anticipate the community’s welfare function.
Second, wealth assessments rely on local knowledge and not on one-shot survey questions. The
former is likely to cover a longer period and should be less prone to short-term strategic signaling by
households. Third, the targeting decision followed a relative concept of poverty and facilitators did
not disclose the beneficiary cutoff ranks beforehand. For successful sorting households thus would
have to master three challenges at once: (i) directly anticipating the community’s welfare function,
(ii) correctly assessing their own relative position within the household wealth distribution, and
(iii) shifting their position below an undisclosed beneficiary cutoff through successful strategic
signaling of deprivation. This makes it very unlikely that households were able to precisely sort
around the cutoff.
A more credible thread to the RDD’s validity might arise with elite capture when representa-
tives manipulate the targeting procedure to favor themselves or crony households. As discussed in
section 4.1, such a behavior could be both intrinsically (representatives dislike for non-cronies) or
extrinsically (reciprocal relationships with cronies) motivated and it could apply for different types
of cronies such as friends, family members or households from the same ethnic group. I argue that
extrinsically motivated elite capture is unlikely to occur at all. To demand preferential treatment,
cronies have to convince at least two representatives at the same time. In addition, cronies have to
act very foresighted as physical isolation of the representatives during the ranking process prevents
direct collusion. Even if a household colluded successfully, the representatives’ ability to produce
a preferential ranking would be hampered by the fact that they did neither know the cutoff rank
nor the wealth rankings from the two other representatives. The last argument equally applies
to a scenario where representatives have an intrinsic interest in favoring crony households. While
my analysis in chapter 4 provides evidence for the existence of a moderate allocation bias due
to ethnic favoritism, the features of the underlying targeting design make such a bias unlikely to
disproportionally occur in the cutoff’s neighborhood.
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Placebo and balancing tests
First, I run a placebo test by estimating my main local linear regression equation with enrollment
prior the subsidy intervention as a dependent variable. Specifically, I estimate the ITT of being
majority-eligible for the subsidy in 2009 on a household’s insurance status in 2007 and 2008.
Based on the first targeting round in 2007, households in these two years already got assigned a
‘baseline’ eligibility status. Even though the 2009 targeting update followed the same design, I
expect substantially different community wealth rankings due to differently composed targeting
committees and changes in household wealth over time. If household characteristics were truly
continuous in the household median wealth rank, subsidy eligibility must not affect the decision
to buy health insurance prior to 2009. That is exactly what I observe in Figure 5.5. In contrast
to my main result in Figure 5.2 on page 92, the placebo test reveals very imprecisely estimated
negative coefficient estimates with a magnitude of about 3 percentage points for rural and semi-
urban communities alike (see also Table D.3 in the Appendix). As a second robustness check,
(a) Rural (b) Urban
Figure 5.5: Subsidy-eligibility in 2009 and baseline enrollment in 2007 to 2008
Notes: Dots represent average outcome values by household median wealth percentile. Dot size indicates the
relative number of observations per percentile. The forcing variable on the horizontal axis is based on three
community wealth rankings, centered at the beneficiary cutoff, CDF-transformed and bounded between −0.2
and 0.8.
I test whether subsidy-eligibility in 2009 has an effect on household outcomes from the same
year which should not be affected (McCrary, 2008). This is similar to a test whether households
are balanced across treatment and control groups within an experimental setting. My outcome
variables come from the vital registration survey data and comprise two variables on each of the
following dimensions; demographics, ethno-linguistic information and occupational choice. Figure
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5.6 shows the corresponding local linear regression results for the six different outcomes. It is
reassuring and confirmed by regression results in Table D.4 in the Appendix that no outcome
variable shows a statistically significant jump at the beneficiary cutoff.15 Taken together, results
from my two tests in combination with the conceptual consideration from the former subsection
make me very confident that my discontinuity design is sufficiently valid to estimate the causal
effect of subsidy-eligibility on the outcomes of interest.
Figure 5.6: Balancing tests for six variables in semi-urban communities in 2009
Notes: Dots represent average outcome values by household median wealth percentile. Dot size indicates the
relative number of observations per percentile. The forcing variable on the horizontal axis is based on three
community wealth rankings, centered at the beneficiary cutoff, CDF-transformed and bounded between −0.2
and 0.8.
15As a robustness check for individual manipulation Lee and Lemieux (2010) further propose to examine the
density of the forcing variable in order to check for a suspicious high density on the eligibility-side of the cutoff.
Yet, the targeting design always selects a predetermined set of beneficiary households, namely the poorest quintile
in each community, such that the design does not allow for such a robustness check.
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Local polynomial regression
As a final robustness test, I check how sensitive my results respond to a change in the underlying
functional form. Specifically, I estimate the following local polynomial regression model with
distinct second-order polynomials to the left and the right of the cutoff
ych =αk + β · 1{EligByMajority}ch
+ γ ·MedianRankch + δ · 1{EligByMajority}ch ∗MedianRankch
+ φ ·MedianRank2ch + λ · 1{EligByMajority}ch ∗MedianRank2ch + uch,
(5.3)
where ych equals one if any member of household h living in community c has bought health
insurance in the current year and where the quadratic term allows for a non-linear relationship
between health insurance take-up and the household median wealth rank. The local polynomial
regressions in Figure D.2 in the Appendix provide very similar results than the linear specification.
While there is still no detectable jump at the rural beneficiary cutoff, I observe a ITT effect in semi-
urban communities which is statistically significant and of similar size than in Figure 5.2. Table
D.5 in the Appendix reveals that ITT estimates from both my linear and quadratic specification
converge to a very similar value when trimming down the window size. Given that the non-linear
model provides a relatively good fit of the underlying data generating process, this is what one
expects.
5.5 Discussion
I will discuss my four main findings in the following. First, for a relatively poor sub-Saharan
African country my main finding is that health insurance pricing matters and can have substantial
effects on take-up. Specifically, for semi-urban households that are placed around the 20 percentile
wealth threshold the 50 percent subsidy offer, on average, increases take-up by a factor of five.
While providing novel evidence for the sub-Saharan African context my results nicely complement
the existing literature on health insurance demand and pricing from Asian and Latin-American
countries. To my knowledge, there are only three very recent studies that evaluate health insurance
demand under an exogenously introduced new price that is not zero. For two rural districts in
Vietnam, Wagstaff et al. (2016) evaluate an intervention that aims to encourage enrollment with a
25 percent premium subsidy and, overall, find no evidence for measurable take-up effects. Capuno
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et al. (2016) evaluate enrollment effects for a health insurance intervention in Vietnam where
a premium subsidy is combined with an extra information leaflet. Very similar to the setting
considered here, their subsidy amounts to a 50 percent reduction and initial average take-up
is below ten percent. Nevertheless, their effect on take-up is modest when compared to ours,
amounting to a 37 percent increase from 8.4 to 11.4 percent. Fischer et al. (2016) offer social
health insurance in Pakistan at four randomized prices and find price elasticities in the range
of −0.6 and −1.6. Finally, two studies consider a six-months offer of a fully subsidized health
insurance in Cambodia (Levine et al., 2016) and Nicaragua (Thornton et al., 2010) and observe
very different responses in uptake.16
A second important set of findings addresses the heterogeneity in enrollment effects. Results
substantially differ between semi-urban and rural households around the beneficiary cutoff which
can be regarded as poor and ultra-poor by national standards, respectively. While the former show
a very price elastic health insurance demand, the subsidy is little effective for rural households.
This is in line with the study by Capuno et al. (2016) which finds larger enrollment effects in urban
relative to rural areas in the Philippines. Motivated by the question whether rather remoteness or
poverty explains the lack in demand by rural households, I took a closer look at the relationship
between insurance take-up and household wealth. When extrapolating Engel Curves for health
insurance demand among semi-urban households I find a very strong relationship between enroll-
ment and wealth. In addition, the 50 percent discount puts poor households in my study area on
pair with the wealthiest households, while price elasticity does not seem to differ across household
wealth groups. To the best of my knowledge, only Thornton et al. (2010) rigorously evaluate
heterogeneous enrollment effects with respect to wealth and do not find significantly different pat-
terns. With respect to other outcomes, wealthy households have been found to show a relatively
strong increase in health care utilization (Wagstaff et al., 2009 in China; Kuuire et al., 2016 in
Ghana) and more pronounced reductions in health care expenditures (Bernal et al., 2016 in Peru;
Woldemichael et al., 2016 in Rwanda) when being offered social health insurance. In addition,
household wealth has been also found an important predictor for rainfall insurance demand in
rural India (Gine´ et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2013)
16For Cambodia, Levine et al. (2016) find a sixfold increase in demand from seven to about 50 percent, leading to
a price elasticity that is very close to the one I have found in my study. As control households were simultaneously
offered one month of fully subsidized health insurance, their effective six-months subsidy amounts to a 80 percent
increase in the number of fully subsidized months. Thornton et al. (2010) consider the subpopulation of Nicaraguan
informal workers who started at a fairly high initial enrollment rate of twenty percent and increase take-up only
modestly, by a factor of 1.65.
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Third, by exploiting the fact that health insurance purchase effectively took place at the
individual level, I can evaluate the intent-to-treat effect of pricing on the intra-household allocation
of health insurance coverage. Adolescents show similar insurance coverage than adults at pre-
intervention levels and I find that the subsidy offer puts them at an advantage. Within the group of
adults, a lower premium leads to favoritism of prime aged over elderly household members. These
findings complement the small and recent literature that analyses the intra-household allocation of
health insurance in low-income countries. The main finding from this literature is that household
heads show a preference for insuring themselves and their spouses in comparison to other household
members (Govender et al., 2014 in South Africa; Panda et al., 2014 in India). In addition, such a
disaggregated analysis helps to better understand and reduce circumstances leading to unequally
distributed health inputs within households. Prominent studies in this area deal with unequal
nutritional intake (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982; Pitt et al., 1990) and the effect of negative
income shocks on within-household mortality rates (Rose, 1999).
Fourth, my test for adverse selection rejects the hypothesis that a higher price draws in higher
risk but, if anything, suggests the opposite. This finding confirms two former analyses from the
present study area (De Allegri et al., 2006; Parmar et al., 2012) and differs in comparison to the two
existing studies that run an adverse selection ‘price test’ in a low-income setting.17 The first study
by Fischer et al. (2016) on social health insurance in Pakistan finds evidence for substantial adverse
selection, which increases in the premium amount but can be abated by bundling enrollment at
the household level. Their latter finding might offer a partial explanation for the different result
I observe in my study, where the insurer clearly encouraged enrollment by households and not
individuals (Fink et al., 2013). Within a health insurance that makes enrollment at the household
level mandatory, Polimeni and Levine (2011) find evidence for substantial adverse selection. The
five-months-offer of free health insurance might led to considerable selection of low-risk households
when compared to the 50 percent subsidy from my study. While context-specific differences will
always complicate comparisons across studies, I conclude that more research of this type is needed
to better link the occurrence of adverse selection with the underlying health insurance design.18
17De Allegri et al. (2006) and Parmar et al. (2012) employ household sample survey rounds between 2004 and
2007 to estimate the relationship between a household’s current enrollment and health status and find weak or no
statistically significant estimates, respectively.
18 Clearly, evidence from ‘ex-ante correlation’ studies should be carefully included into the picture. Polimeni
and Levine (2011), show that their ‘ex-ante correlation’ test for adverse selection gives a much lower bound for its
existence than the ‘price test’. Overall, this branch of studies provides evidence against (Dror et al., 2005; Nguyen
and Knowles, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2014; Capuno et al., 2016) and in favor (Wagstaff et al., 2009; Wang et al.,
2009; Wagstaff et al., 2016) of adverse selection into social health insurance.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Social protection programs are becoming increasingly popular around the globe and most gov-
ernments in low-income countries regard them as a crucial tool to achieve sustainable poverty
reduction (Coady et al., 2004a; World Bank, 2014). In practice, however, many programs still fail
to cover large parts of their poor populations, which can be attributed to both supply and demand
side obstacles. Due to inaccurate targeting, on the supply side, governments often miss large parts
of the intended target group when offering program benefits. Even if targeting is successful, on
the demand side, entitled households are often reluctant to enroll into social protection programs.
This state of development is especially applicable to the context of sub-Saharan Africa. In interna-
tional terms, the region has experienced the most rapid expansion of anti-poverty programs over
the last five years, but also performs worse in covering poor households (Honorati et al., 2015).
Programs are often implemented in an ad-hoc fashion (Monchuk, 2013) and limited government
capacity severely undermines effective targeting (Del Ninno and Mills, 2015). Furthermore, it has
proven especially challenging to encourage enrollment among the large parts of rural and remotely
located people in this region (World Bank, 2014).
My dissertation has evaluated a social protection scheme that was implemented in Burkina
Faso, one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Within this context, I have analyzed an
intervention that targeted poor households by offering them health insurance access at a reduced
price. Detailed information on the underlying targeting procedure, which I merged with several
micro-level datasets, allowed me to analyze both the intervention’s effectiveness in encouraging
enrollment and the performance of the underlying targeting method. The program evaluated here
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applied community-based targeting, a commonly employed approach that delegates authority of
the targeting choice to the community (Alatas et al., 2012). Within my dissertation I have ad-
dressed three different research questions in the realm of social policy implementation. First, I
have asked whether community-based or statistical targeting is more accurate in targeting con-
sumption poor households and whether the picture changes in consideration of the programs’
targeting costs. Since there exists a well-established concern about the threat of elite capture
in decentralized programs, in the second part of my dissertation I have addressed the question
whether the local targeting committees in the present context have favored ethnically connected
households. The last part concerns program uptake by poor households and asks whether pricing
is an effective instrument to encourage households’ demand of voluntary micro-health insurance.
While I have summarized and discussed the results in the respective chapters, I shall close this
work with some farther reaching concluding remarks.
In line with existing studies, my comparative targeting accuracy analysis finds that program
coverage might vary significantly with the underlying targeting method. Ceteris paribus, a higher
targeting accuracy implies less benefits ‘leaking’ to non-poor households and more benefits that are
available for the poor (Coady et al., 2004a). Nevertheless, my data confirm the general perception
that targeting program costs also vary substantially across methods. ”Targeting is ultimately
meant to be a cost-control exercise” (Del Ninno and Mills, 2015, p.12) and a comprehensive
cost-benefit comparison requires targeting program costs. This study provides the first such
assessment and confirms common practice from the field; programs that have limited capacity
or distribute small benefits find it far more cost-effective to employ community-based targeting
exercises. The finding that econometric targeting is excessively expensive when census data are not
readily available further motivates the design of hybrid targeting approaches.1 Given that a general
census is typically carried out no more often than every ten years, targeting based on census data
will become less accurate the more outdated the underlying data. Community-targeting exercises,
on the other hand, may be repeated on a revolving basis at a moderate cost and, in this way, keep
track of poverty transitions of households over time. This argument further suggests that revolving
community-based targeting might be particularly suited for quickly-evolving environments. In the
present study area, for example, the community-based targeting exercise has been carried out
1Hybrid targeting approaches that combine community-based and statistical targeting exercises are already
common practice (Coady et al., 2004a). Alatas et al. (2012), Karlan and Thuysbaert (2016), and Stoeﬄer et al.
(2016) analyze a hybrid CBT where communities predetermine a household target set that is subsequently verified
and refined through the application of survey-based information. Nevertheless, these hybrid methods are relatively
expensive (Alatas et al., 2012) and so far have been not motivated on cost-benefit grounds.
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three times between 2007 and 2011.
In addition, it has been argued that program cost might increase considerably when ”local
elites dominate and corrupt community-level planning and governance” (Dasgupta and Beard,
2007, p.230). Local elites might directly embezzle program benefits at the implementation stage
(Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Beekman et al., 2014) or, instead, manipulate and bias the allocation
choice at the targeting stage (Alatas et al., 2012). For the local context of my study, I have
found evidence for the latter, reflected by local targeting committees which favor households
from their ethnic group. The effects reported here are in line with recent studies on alternative
elite capture outcomes and, economically, they appear modest in comparison to results from the
targeting accuracy literature. Specifically, my exclusion error due to ethnic favoritism of not more
than ten percent compares favorably to the potential increases in exclusion errors induced by
a ‘wrong’ targeting method choice. This is reflected by the exclusion error range of 25 to 60
and 20 to 75 percent found within the comparative targeting accuracy literature (Alatas et al.,
2012; Stoeﬄer et al., 2016) and this study, respectively. It suggests that policymakers should be
less concerned about elite capture when making a choice between decentralized and statistical
targeting to maximize program coverage.
Furthermore, my test for ethnic favoritism provides a motivation for future research on the
role of institutions. Burgess et al. (2015) analyze distributional policies at the central level and
show that the existence of democratic institutions can remarkably reduce the extent of ethnic
favoritism. At the local level, my review of the existing literature cautiously suggests that elite
capture rather takes place within constituted local governments when compared to participatory
programs. According to Mansuri and Rao (2013), the latter often explicitly incorporate checks
and balances that limit the potential for capture by political leaders. The targeting design I have
considered, for instance, involves three such features. First, publicly determined wealth criteria
and a clearly communicated mandate for targeting likely reduced the representatives’ incentive
for selfish decision making. Second, the application of a straight-forward rule to aggregate three
independent wealth rankings and the public disclosure of beneficiary lists at the end of each exercise
improved the procedure’s transparency. Finally, the targeting design restricted the room for
within-committee collusion by enforcing the independent creation and aggregation of three wealth
rankings. However, in order to subsequently include or dismiss households, the committee was
given some room for collusion to decide on a minor set of beneficiaries. A comparison of estimates
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under both targeting regimes suggests differences in the targeting outcomes and motivates further
research on the effects of institutional change on elite capture at the local level.2
This study also provides two insights that highlight the important role of institutional design
within ethno-linguistically diverse environments. First, for a program that delegates the targeting
choice to a small set of representatives, I find that ethnic favoritism can lead to a situation of
‘ethnic minority discrimination’. In practice, community-driven welfare programs differ in their
agency structure (see Table 3.1), suggesting the existence of a well-known public choice trade-
off between the number of representatives and institutional cost (Auriol and Gary-Bobo, 2012).
More representatives assure minority protection, but can also complicate decision making. These
institutional costs were also considered in the design of the present targeting intervention, as the
following quotation shows:
(A) larger group could be difficult to control with a high risk for participants
to become shy, leading to the creation of subgroups and to the deterioration of the
conversation (Savadogo et al., 2015, p.3).
Comparing my results with Alatas et al. (2012) suggests the existence of such a trade-off for
decentralized welfare programs. Their community-based targeting intervention is based on collec-
tive choice within the community and thereby ensures a maximum degree of representation. As
a result, and in contrast to my finding, communities produce an allocation that actually favors
ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, on the cost side they find that community-members become tired
and significantly less accurate in their wealth assessments the longer the targeting exercise pro-
ceeds. Second, the finding that ethnic favoritism comes from ethnic diverse communities adds to a
broader debate, reflected by two popular arguments from the sociology literature. Allport’s (1954)
contact hypothesis states that more diverse communities can achieve a permanent reduction of
prejudice and conflict between different groups. In contrast, Blumer’s (1958) conflict theory takes
the view that more interaction with individuals of other groups is costly and generates greater
antagonism. I take my results as suggestive evidence in favor of conflict theory even though I
can only conjecture about the underlying channels. Further analysis could investigate the role of
competition, for instance, by testing whether ethnic favoritism rather takes place in environments
2While, so far, the (local) elite capture literature does not provide a rigorous distinction of elite capture across
institutional settings, two studies examined the role of the decision maker type. For a collective choice design
among villagers, Alatas et al. (2012) find no significant differences in targeting outcomes across different randomly
induced group compositions in Indonesia. For the same context, Alatas et al. (2013a) rigorously distinguish between
targeting by informal and formal leaders and find only negligible differences.
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where people follow competitive (e.g. service sector) instead of complementary (e.g. farming)
working relationships.
In addition to cost-benefit concerns, the choice of a targeting approach likely affects successful
program implementation in two more indirect ways. First, it may be called into question whether
consumption should be the sole targeting objective. Alternatively, there might be considerable
value added to the targeting process when communities’ concepts of poverty are taken into account.
Recent empirical evidence on communities’ poverty perceptions shows that communities consider
more dimensions than only consumption (Van Campenhout, 2007; Alatas et al., 2012). Kebede
(2009) shows that poverty perceptions reflect local circumstances and Alderman (2002) finds that
community assessments put more weight on chronic poverty. For the context considered in this
study, an ongoing project shows that the community’s poverty concept is multidimensional and
puts relatively much weight on asset wealth and demographics when compared to mortality and
education.3 In addition, when considering the wealth criteria defined by the communities in the
present targeting exercise, it is striking that communities define most of the criteria in terms
of capabilities such as ‘has insufficient food’, ‘has nothing’ or ‘is not able to solve problems by
himself’ (Savadogo et al., 2015). This fits well into Amartya Sen’s capability approach (Sen, 1988)
and supports the view that communities consider consumption rather as a means to an end. In
this perspective, community-based targeting appears to be well-suited for translating deprivations
in the space of capabilities into targeting outcomes.
Second, satisfaction with an implemented targeting method likely affects public acceptance of
the underlying program and, thus, its overall success. In this regard, the participative procedure
of community-based targeting has the potential to produce some benefits of itself. Since the
inception of participatory appraisals, local control over the targeting process has been viewed as
a desirable attribute of CBT, powerful enough to increase ownership and awareness, and foster
institutional change (Chambers, 1994b). This view is supported by empirical evidence, which
shows remarkably high approval rates by communities for decentralized targeting methods (Alatas
et al., 2012; Robertson et al., 2014; Schu¨ring, 2014). Savadogo (2017) confirms this picture for the
community-based targeting intervention I consider in my dissertation. In a representative sample
of 115 households, he finds that more than 85 percent approve of the targeting method.
Hence, it is possible that the relatively large enrollment effect I have found in my price inter-
vention is also partly driven by the participative nature of the underlying targeting design. While
3Results can be made available on request.
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my study design does not allow for an assessment of the latter relationship, it provides the novel
finding that health insurance pricing matters and substantially influences take-up in sub-Saharan
African countries. I also find suggestive evidence that the subsidy successfully encourages poor
households to extend their membership into the next year. This is in line with insights from a
2006 household survey in our study area, where affordability was the most-stated reason for ter-
minating the health insurance contract (Dong et al., 2009). While short-term encouragement is
successful for at least some parts of the population, my study cannot address the common concern
that subsidies may undermine individuals’ willingness to pay an actuarially fair premium in the
long-term. As another limitation, my results primarily speak to the subpopulation of households
around the beneficiary cutoff and not to the whole population. Nevertheless, by exploiting hetero-
geneity in community wealth, I am able to provide some additional policy lessons. In the present
context, progressive subsidy schedules are necessary to facilitate access to health care through
pay-for insurance schemes. For ultra-poor households, only free health insurance seems to be a
viable option. This latter finding confirms a recent trend in targeting poor households for fully
subsidized social health insurance in sub-Saharan Africa (Mensah et al., 2010), Latin America
(Sosa-Rubi et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2013; Bernal et al., 2016) and East Asia (Bauhoff et al.,
2011).
My pricing analysis deliberately considers the role of liquidity constraints in explaining low
enrollment into social protection schemes. Nevertheless, additional non-income factors contribute
to low insurance demand in low-income countries, including a lack of trust in formal institutions
and financial illiteracy (Eling et al., 2014). The availability of administrative health insurance
records over the years 2007 to 2011 and a Geographic Information System at the household-level
allows for the analysis of the two latter factors in the context considered here. Specifically, it is the
subject of an ongoing project to test whether a household’s current purchasing decision is affected
by health insurance experience in its neighborhood. Following Karlan et al. (2014), who analyze
an indexed rainfall insurance in Ghana, experience is proxied with the average annual payouts a
household received from the health insurance in the former year.
Finally, an individual’s decision to purchase health insurance depends not least on the perceived
quality of services one finds in the respective health care facilities. Poor health care provision con-
siderably reduces the value of and, thus, the willingness to pay for any health insurance scheme,
even if optimally designed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that poor health service quality might be
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a considerable explanation for low health insurance demand in the present study area. According
to Dong’s (2009) survey appraisal, the second and third most often cited reason for not extending
health insurance into the next year are dissatisfaction with the staff behavior and the services
received in health care facilities, respectively. In line with this perception, the most recent large-
scale health intervention in Burkina Faso aims towards the improvement of health care provision
through a financial incentive scheme, commonly known as performance-based financing (PBF).4
With financial and technical assistance from the World Bank, in 2014, the Burkinabe´ Ministry
of Health rolled-out a pilot PBF that covers over one-third of the country’s districts, including
the study area of this dissertation. Performance indicators focus on maternal and child health
treatments while a quasi-experimental intervention design allows for a comprehensive impact eval-
uation. Clearly, the PBF’s effects on health care provision outcomes are of primary interest to
the initiators. Nevertheless, a side-analysis should investigate the potential of such supply-side
incentives for the expansion of health insurance coverage in the department of Nouna.
4In recent years, performance-based financing (PBF) has become a popular measure to improve health care
provision by conditioning the amount of funding for a health care provider on performance. The latter is usually
defined in outputs (also known as results-based financing) and often prioritizes maternal and newborn health. The
World Bank is its biggest advocate and partly responsible for the rise in PBF-implementing countries from 3 in
2006 to 32 in 2013 (Eijkenaar et al., 2013).
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Figure A.2: Community-wealth ranking cards
Notes: Each staple of cards was designated for one out of three community representatives and comes with a
different color. Each card contains the printed name of the household head and the household ID. After the
wealth ranking exercise, facilitators manually tagged each card with its respective community rank and wealth
category.
Figure A.3: Health insurance identification card
Notes: The front part on the left-hand side indicates the current insurance status and the insurance ID. The back
contains personal information, namely village of residency, household ID, name of household head and insured
individual, individual ID, birth date and sex. Confidential information was blackened.
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A. Targeting Accuracy Analysis
Figure B.1: Histogram and kernel densities of the consumption reference variable
Notes: Urban refers to the subsample of semi-urban households.
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Table B.1: Five statistical targeting indices and their specifications
Indicators
Number of
categories used
Multidim.
Poverty
Poverty
Scorecard
Below the
pov.line
Asset
Index
Econometric
PMT
Total number of variables used 9 9 12 44 44
Demographic characteristics
At least one male HH-Member at age 15 2 x x
At least one female HH-Member at age 15 2 x x
At least one male HH-Member at age 16 to 60 2 x x
At least one female HH-Member at age16 to 60 2 x x
At least one male HH-Member at age 60 2 x x
At least one female HH-Member at age 60 2 x x
How many household members are 15-years-old or younger? 7 x
HHHead is married 2 x x
HHHead is polyg married 2 x x
HHHead is not widowed 2 x x
HHHead is male 2 x x
Occupational choice
HHH can read or write 2 x x x
HHH response for literate 2 x x x
No one in the HH is literate 2 x
Any HH member completed primary 2 x x x
No HH member has completed five years of schooling 2 x
Any HH member completed secondary 2 x x
HHH completed secondary 2 x x
Any HH member completed tertiary 2 x x
HHH is not employed in agriculture 2 x x
Any HH member is not employed in agriculture 2 x x x
Share of employable household members 5 x
Type of occupation (nothing, agric., non-agric.) 3 x
Status of children (5-14 years) 3 x
HH head is disabled 2 x x
Dwelling characteristics
HH uses running-water or good wells, any period 2 x x x
Drinking Water is changed at least every 2nd day 2 x x
Wastewater by cesspool, gutters or septic tank 2 x x
Water is not piped outside 2 x
Source of drinking water 4 x
Drinking Water arrangement 4 x
Sanitation not at the open field 2 x x
Toilet arrangement 3 x
number of rooms n.A. x x
Type of house 5 x
Roof is made of concrete, metal sheets, or tile 2 x x
Wall is not made of ordinary mud or straw 2 x x
Floor is made of cement 2 x x x
Garbage evacuation through dustbin 2 x x
No electricity or solar panel 2 x
Main energy source of lighting 4 x
Cooking fuel is wood 2 x
Asset possession at household level
At least one cart 2 x x
At least one plow 2 x x
At least one bike 2 x x
At least one mbike 2 x x x
At least one car 2 x x
At least one radio 2 x x
At least one tv 2 x x x
At least one tel 2 x x
At least one fridge 2 x x
At least one kitchen 2 x x
Ownership of 3 assets 4 x
HH owns no assets at all 2 x
Livestock possession at household level
At least one horse donkey 2 x x
At least one goat sheep 2 x x
At least one chicken 2 x x
At least one bullock 2 x x
At least one pig 2 x x
Number of bulocks owned by HH head 4 x x
Other
HH experienced at least one severe illnes last month 2 x
Type of risk coping 3 x
At least one HH member emigrated last year 2 x
Usage of transfers received 4 x
HHs belongs to ethnic minority group 2 x x
Relative size of primary agricultural output 5 x
Notes: The second column Categories specifies the number of categories of the variable. The majority of variables
consists of indicator variables which only take on two values.
Table B.2: Indicators and weights of the econometric PMT index
Dependent variable: Eligible by consumption
Rural Semi-urban
Any HH-member with primary education -0.111 -0.155
Any HH-member with secondary education -0.101 0.040
Any HH-member with tertiary education 0.000 0.023
Household head literate (incidence) -0.222 -0.030
HHH response for level2 0.003 -0.086
HHH can read or write 0.147 -0.055
HH head occup. non-agric. (incidence) 0.061 0.035
Incidence of no primagr at HH-level -0.084 0.376
HHs belongs to ethnic minority group 0.196 -0.050
HHHead is disabled 0.033 0.134***
HH uses running-water or good wells, any period 0.015 0.078
Drinking Water is changed at least every 2nd day -0.055 -0.053
Wastewater by cesspool, gutters or septic tank 0.021 -0.252
Garbage evacuation through dustbin -0.064 0.171
Concrete, metal sheets, or tile 0.073 0.090
No ordinary mud or straw -0.129 -0.143
Floor is made of cement 0.000 -0.089
Not at the open field 0.010 -0.011
Number of rooms 0.017 0.007
At least one Cart -0.038 0.128
At least one Plow 0.017 -0.073
Bicycle 0.134 -0.107
Motorbike 0.031 -0.014
At least one Car 0.093 -0.295
At least one Radio -0.111* -0.080
At least one TV -0.066 -0.194**
At least one Telephone -0.064 0.069
At least one Fridge -0.039 0.110
At least one Kitchen 0.000 -0.162
At least one Horse or donkey 0.067 -0.083
Goat or sheep 0.040 -0.073
At least one Chicken -0.019 0.097
Bullock -0.097 0.077
At least one Pig 0.061 -0.043
There is a male HH-Member at age15 -0.028 -0.102
There is a female HH-Member at age15 -0.099 0.061
There is a male HH-Member at age1660 -0.065 0.043
There is a female HH-Member at age1660 -0.104 -0.164
There is a male HH-Member at age60 0.157* 0.095
There is a female HH-Member at age60 0.118 0.018
HH head is married 0.175 -0.180
HH head is polyg married -0.200 0.178
HH head is not widowed -0.076 -0.288*
HH head is male 0.141 0.024
Observations 349 211
R2 0.39 0.50
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the household level. Regressions
include community fixed effects.
Table B.3: Indicators and weights of the asset index
1st principal component factor loadings
Rural Semi-urban
Any HH-member with primary education 0.181 0.267
Any HH-member with secondary education 0.107 0.182
Any HH-member with tertiary education omitted 0.030
Household head is literate 0.155 0.134
HHH response for level2 0.108 0.091
HHH can read or write 0.154 0.125
HH head employed non-agriculturally -0.102 -0.050
No HH member applied in agriculture 0.165 0.122
HHs belongs to ethnic minority group -0.029 -0.033
HHHead is disabled 0.002 -0.049
HH uses running-water or good wells, any period -0.042 0.074
Drinking Water is changed at least every 2nd day 0.002 0.111
Wastewater by cesspool, gutters or septic tank -0.015 -0.031
Garbage evacuation through dustbin 0.011 0.045
Concrete, metal sheets, or tile 0.137 0.142
No ordinary mud or straw 0.041 0.102
Floor is made of cement omitted 0.012
Not at the open field 0.101 0.191
Number of rooms 0.228 0.231
At least one Cart 0.258 0.199
At least one Plow 0.271 0.166
At least one Bicycle 0.170 0.215
At least one Motorbike 0.217 0.208
At least one Car 0.014 0.053
At least one Radio 0.171 0.180
At least one TV 0.164 0.219
At least one Telephone 0.168 0.260
At least one Fridge 0.053 0.047
At least one Kitchen omitted 0.067
At least one Horse or donkey 0.257 0.206
At least one Goat or sheep 0.239 0.183
At least one Chicken 0.169 0.150
At least one Bullock 0.227 0.145
At least one Pig 0.080 0.041
There is a male HH-Member at age15 0.200 0.173
There is a female HH-Member at age15 0.215 0.185
There is a male HH-Member at age1660 0.216 0.240
There is a female HH-Member at age1660 0.204 0.255
There is a male HH-Member at age60 -0.033 -0.017
There is a female HH-Member at age60 0.035 -0.032
HH head is married 0.164 0.128
HH head is polyg married 0.168 0.130
HH head is not widowed 0.141 0.150
HH head is male -0.094 -0.114
Observations 349 211
Number of principal components 41 44
Notes: Weights are derived from a principal component analysis where all variables are first demeaned at the
community level.
Table B.4: The Poverty Scorecard Index
Original scorecard for Burkina Faso Scorecard adjusted for our study
Indicator Score Indicator Score
1. How many household members are 14-years-old or younger? 1. How many household members are 15-years-old or younger?
A. Six or more 0 A. Six or more 0
B. Five 5 B. Five 5
C. Four 6 C. Four 6
D. Three 10 D. Three 10
E. Two 13 E. Two 13
F. One 19 F. One 19
G. None 29 G. None 29
2. In what languages can the male head/spouse read and write? 2. HH head can read and/or write
A. None, or no male head/spous 0 A. No 0
B. French only 4 B. Yes 4
C. A non-French language (regardless of French literacy) 5
3. Has the female head/spouse completed first grade? 3. First grade completed by HH head
A. No 0 A. No 0
B. No female head/spouse 0
C. Yes 9 B. Yes 9
4. What is the main source of energy for lighting? 4. What is the main source of energy for lighting?
A. Firewood, or other 0 A. Firewood, or other 0
B. Candles, kerosene, or LPG 4 B. Candles or oil lamp 4
C. Flashlight, or batteries 5 C. Flashlight 5
D. Electricity, or solar energy 8 D. Electricity, solar panel or battery 8
5. What toilet arrangement does the household have? 5. What toilet arrangement does the household have?
A. No toilet arrangement, or other 0 A. Open field 0
B. Non-ventilated pit latrine 4 B. Latrine 4
C. Ventilated pit latrine, or flush to a septic tank 15 C. Ventilated latrine and flush toilet 15
6. Does the household own a television? 6. Does the household own a television?
A. No 0 A. No 0
B. Yes 10 B. Yes 10
7. Does the household own a bed or a mattress? 7. Omitted
A. No 0
B. Yes 3
8. Does the household own a scooter or a motorcycle? 8. Does the household own a scooter or a motorcycle?
A. No 0 A. No 0
B. Yes 6 B. Yes 6
9. Have any household members, in their main 9. Is the primary occupation of the HH head
occupation in the last seven days, worked in in agriculture?
agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing, or forestry?
A. Yes 0 A. Yes 0
B. No 8 B. No 8
10. How many head of cattle or other large 10. How many head of bullocks does the
animals does the household now own? household head now own?
A. None, or one 0 A. None, or one 0
B. Two 2 B. Two 2
C. Three to five 3 C. Three to five 3
D. Six or more 7 D. Six or more 7
Notes: This was retrieved from the following link on September 10, 2016: http://www.progressoutofpoverty.
org/country/burkina-faso
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Table B.7: Mean targeting error rates, alternative consumption definition
Rural Semi-urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
Targeting
Error
Mean
Exclusion
Error
Mean
Inclusion
Error
Mean
Targeting
Error
Mean
Exclusion
Error
Mean
Inclusion
Error
Econometric PMT 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.07
Asset index 0.25 0.48 0.17 0.25 0.54 0.17
Scorecards
Below the poverty line 0.28 0.54 0.18 0.22 0.46 0.14
Poverty Scorecard Index 0.32 0.62 0.21 0.33 0.70 0.22
Multidimensional Poverty Index 0.33 0.65 0.22 0.30 0.64 0.20
Community-based targeting 0.28 0.55 0.19 0.25 0.52 0.16
Random targeting error 0.38 0.74 0.26 0.36 0.76 0.24
Number of households 349 89 260 212 50 162
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B. Ethnic Favoritism Analysis
Figure C.1: Fractionalization and economic inequality for semi-urban communities
Notes: Grew circles indicate an community’s relative population size. Values for ethnic diversity and economic
inequality are the community ELF and Gini ranks, respectively. The Gini index is based on a PCA-based asset
index comprising 28 variables.
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Figure C.2: Ethnic favoritism in the semi-urban committee decision by community
Notes: The graph depicts community-wise coefficient estimates of ethnic favoritism (particularly, βˆ1 in equation
4.1) ordered by their rank in ethnic fractionalization. Fractionalization is based on the ethno-linguistic index of
fractionalization (ELF). Grew circles around the dots indicate relative community size. For these community-
wise coefficients I cannot reject the hypothesis of having zero value coefficients at conventional significance
levels.
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Table C.1: Distribution of six ethnic and four religious groups at the community-level
Rural Semi-urban
Average
population
share per
community
Relative
frequency
of being
majority
Relative
frequency
of being
minority
Rel. frequency
of belonging
to village
leader group
Average
population
share per
community
Relative
frequency
of being
majority
Relative
frequency
of being
minority
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ethnicity
Dafin/Marka 0.48 0.54 0.11 0.54 0.33 0.27 0.00
Bwaba 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.12 0.14 0.27
Mossi 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.14 0.05
Peulh 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.27
Samo 0.04 0.04 0.25 0.04 0.25 0.32 0.00
Other 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.41
Religion
Muslim 0.65 0.75 0.18 0.11 0.71 0.82 0.00
Catholic 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.61 0.25 0.18 0.18
Protestant 0.04 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.59
Animist 0.08 0.04 0.21 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.23
Other 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of communities 28 28 28 28 22 22 22
Notes: The table depicts mean values that are calculated at the community level. Column 4 is based on additional
information on the ethnic and religious affiliation of each community’s traditional leader. There are no appointed
traditional leaders for semi-urban neighborhoods. Majority and minority groups are defined as the group with
the biggest and smallest population share, respectively.
Table C.2: Numeric values to calculate the distortion due to favoritism
Rural communities Semi-urban communities
All High-fract. Low-fract. All High-fract. Low-fract.
Ethnicity 0.638 0.862 0.287 1.289 1.254 1.197
Religion 0.873 0.871 0.866 0.791 0.763 0.784
Notes: Each cell reflects the calculated value of the fraction
(1−p)p
q
in equation 4.5. I obtain 12 different values
by differentiating between ethnically and religiously represented sample households, as well as across all, high-
fractionalized, and low-fractionalized communities.
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Table C.4: Alternative specification for ethnic and religious favoritism across frac-
tionalization
Bein finally targeted poor∗100
Pooled Rural Semi-urban
Ethnicity
HH ethnicity is represented 3.14 -4.18 -1.87
(3.18) (6.90) (4.52)
Ethnicity represented * ELF (ethnicity) 0.08 0.26 0.69**
(0.17) (0.30) (0.34)
Religion
HH religion is represented 0.61 2.24 -0.81
(4.24) (7.73) (6.11)
Religion represented * ELF (religion) -0.06 -0.07 -0.08
(0.20) (0.32) (0.38)
Controls (50) YES YES YES
Community Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Ethnicity Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Religion Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Number of observations 4550 2915 1635
Number of households 4550 2915 1635
Number of communities 50 28 22
Number of key informants 150 84 66
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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C. Subsidy Evaluation
(a) Rural (b) Urban
Figure D.1: Adverse Selection: Health care utilization among insured households
Notes: Dots represent average outcome values by household median wealth percentile. Dot size indicates the
relative number of observations per percentile. The forcing variable on the horizontal axis is based on three
community wealth rankings, centered at the beneficiary cutoff, CDF-transformed and bounded between −0.2
and 0.8.
(a) Rural (b) Urban
Figure D.2: Local polynomial regression for health insurance enrollment
Notes: Dots represent average outcome values by household median wealth percentile. Dot size indicates the
relative number of observations per percentile. The forcing variable on the horizontal axis is based on three
community wealth rankings, centered at the beneficiary cutoff, CDF-transformed and bounded between −0.2
and 0.8. Fitted regression lines are based on the second-order polynomial regression equation 5.3.
160
Table D.1: First-stage regression results
Eligible for subsidy in 2009
Rural (N=5692) Semi-urban (N=2690)
h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1 h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Majority-eligible in 2009 0.839*** 0.859*** 0.885*** 0.861*** 0.856*** 0.857***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.044) (0.042) (0.049) (0.059)
Median wealth rank -0.264 0.192 1.070 -0.584 -0.675 -0.776
(0.252) (0.388) (0.701) (0.360) (0.544) (0.956)
Majority-eligible * Median wealth rank 0.181 -0.197 -0.990 0.601* 0.673 0.871
(0.241) (0.355) (0.642) (0.328) (0.476) (0.800)
Constant 0.146*** 0.129*** 0.106*** 0.136*** 0.140*** 0.143***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.034) (0.039) (0.044) (0.052)
Mean of eligible 0.502 0.543 0.551 0.495 0.520 0.516
Community FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations (number of observations) 2088 1675 1143 1038 809 548
Observations left of cutoff 987 862 603 507 420 292
Observations right of cutoff 1159 871 598 570 428 295
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. h is the window bandwidth around
the beneficiary cutoff: for instance, h = 0.2 indicates that the regression only includes households that are
located 20 wealth percentiles above or below the beneficiary cutoff. The corresponding number of observations
is given in the bottom panel, while the header contains the overall number of observations. Median wealth rank
of household h is the median value of three community-based wealth ranks. A household is majority-eligible
when its median wealth ranks is below the community-specific beneficiary cutoff.
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Table D.2: Heterogeneous effects of the subsidy offer with respect to household wealth
Insured in 2009 or 2010
Rural (N=5692) Semi-urban (N=2690)
h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1 h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Majority-eligible in 2009 (at w˜) 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.230*** 0.259*** 0.318***
(0.029) (0.034) (0.044) (0.066) (0.078) (0.100)
Majority-eligible in 2009 * w˜ -0.203 -0.283 -0.362 0.092 0.220 0.573
(0.166) (0.197) (0.247) (0.342) (0.385) (0.453)
Median of community wealth at cutoff (w˜) -0.013 0.024 0.089 0.449** 0.415** 0.286*
(0.121) (0.153) (0.211) (0.183) (0.183) (0.156)
Median wealth rank -0.316* -0.390 -0.499 0.312 0.827 1.270
(0.174) (0.276) (0.541) (0.312) (0.525) (0.928)
Majority-eligible * Median wealth rank 0.317 0.389 0.664 0.992 0.647 1.514
(0.266) (0.380) (0.651) (0.644) (0.957) (1.755)
Constant 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.063** 0.092*** 0.072** 0.053
(0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.038)
Community Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations (number of households) 2088 1675 1143 1038 809 548
Observations left of cutoff 987 862 603 507 420 292
Observations right of cutoff 1159 871 598 570 428 295
Mean of ’being insured’ 0.041 0.041 0.046 0.157 0.168 0.181
25th percentile of commun. wealth at cutoff (w) 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.216 0.216 0.216
75th percentile of commun. wealth at cutoff (w) 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.361 0.361 0.361
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. wc is the wealth percentile of a
community c’s ’cutoff household’ and w˜c = wc−median(wc). h is the window bandwidth around the beneficiary
cutoff: for instance, h = 0.2 indicates that the regression only includes households that are located 20 wealth
percentiles above or below the beneficiary cutoff. The corresponding number of observations is given in the
bottom panel, while the header contains the overall number of observations. Median wealth rank of household
h is the median value of three community-based wealth ranks. A household is majority-eligible when its median
wealth ranks is below the community-specific beneficiary cutoff.
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Table D.3: Placebo Test: 2009 eligibility and enrollment in 2007/2008
Insured in 2007 or 2008
Rural (N=5978) Semi-urban (N=2620)
h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1 h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Majority-eligible in 09 -0.036 -0.032 -0.034 -0.035 -0.031 -0.025
(0.023) (0.028) (0.035) (0.049) (0.056) (0.068)
Median wealth rank -0.227 -0.230 -0.532 0.070 0.141 0.108
(0.166) (0.277) (0.504) (0.359) (0.576) (1.060)
Majority-eligibility * Median wealth rank 0.046 0.134 0.637 -0.510 -0.552 -0.364
(0.249) (0.385) (0.668) (0.531) (0.803) (1.439)
Constant 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.076*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.106**
(0.016) (0.019) (0.025) (0.033) (0.038) (0.047)
Mean insurance status 0.046 0.049 0.052 0.112 0.106 0.109
Community FEs NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations (number of observations) 2280 1772 1224 1036 810 578
Observations left of cutoff 1008 818 586 516 426 312
Observations right of cutoff 1324 1006 690 558 422 304
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. h is the window bandwidth around
the beneficiary cutoff: for instance, h = 0.2 indicates that the regression only includes households that are
located 20 wealth percentiles above or below the beneficiary cutoff. The corresponding number of observations
is given in the bottom panel, while the header contains the overall number of observations. Median wealth rank
of household h is the median value of three community-based wealth ranks. A household is majority-eligible
when its median wealth ranks is below the community-specific beneficiary cutoff.
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Table D.5: Intent-to-treat effect on enrollment with local polynomial regression
Insured in 2009 or 2010
Rural (N=5692) Semi-urban (N=2690)
h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1 h=0.2 h=0.15 h=0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Majority-eligible in 2009 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.322*** 0.346*** 0.302**
(0.043) (0.050) (0.059) (0.091) (0.104) (0.129)
Median wealth rank -0.498 -0.352 -0.688 2.302** 2.445 -0.106
(0.570) (0.849) (1.339) (1.152) (1.622) (2.674)
Median wealth rank2 1.442 0.072 5.060 -12.320* -11.385 27.239
(3.003) (5.819) (13.137) (6.622) (12.401) (32.101)
Majority-eligible * Median wealth rank 0.509 0.464 0.882 0.522 1.555 2.510
(0.630) (0.796) (1.114) (1.363) (1.835) (3.170)
Majority-eligible * Median wealth rank2 -1.391 0.549 -5.980 21.643* 32.850 -24.365
(6.186) (11.280) (27.025) (12.252) (23.186) (60.563)
Constant w./o comm FEs 0.058 0.057 0.066 0.056 0.047 0.068
Mean of insured 0.041 0.041 0.046 0.157 0.168 0.181
Community FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations (number of households) 2088 1675 1143 1038 809 548
Observations left of cutoff 987 862 603 507 420 292
Observations right of cutoff 1159 871 598 570 428 295
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. h is the window bandwidth around
the beneficiary cutoff: for instance, h = 0.2 indicates that the regression only includes households that are
located 20 wealth percentiles above or below the beneficiary cutoff. The corresponding number of observations
is given in the bottom panel, while the header contains the overall number of observations. Median wealth rank
of household h is the median value of three community-based wealth ranks. A household is majority-eligible
when its median wealth ranks is below the community-specific beneficiary cutoff.
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